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BRINGING CULTURAL PRACTICE INTO LAW:
RITUAL AND SOCIAL NORMS JURISPRUDENCE
Andrew J. Cappel*
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed an explosive growth in legal
scholarship dealing with the problem of informal social norms
and their relationship to formal law.1 This article highlights a sa-
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University Law School. J.D., Yale
Law School; M.Phil., Yale University; B.A., Yale College. I would like to thank
Bruce Ackerman and Stanley Fish, both of whom read prior versions of this paper,
for their help and advice. I also wish to thank Robert Ellickson for his encourage-
ment in this project. In addition, valuable suggestions were made by participants
when a version of this paper was presented at the 2000 Law and Society conference
in Miami. Among the many of my present and former colleagues at St. Thomas
who have provided helpful critiques, I particularly wish to thank Jean Thomas,
Beverly Horsburgh, Fred Light, Siegfried Wiessner, and Peter Margulies, with spe-
cial thanks to former Dean Dan Morrissey for initially encouraging me to study the
role of ritual in legal and informal legal practice.
1. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 537, 542-43 (1998) (noting four separate symposia on norms since 1990).
For examples of this literature, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:
How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, ORDER]; ERIC A.
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000) [hereinafter POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS];
Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) [hereinafter
Cooter, Decentralized Law]; Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585 (1998) [hereinafter Cooter, Expressive Law]; Robert Cooter, Normative
Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997) [hereinafter Cooter, Normative
Failure]; Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for
Norms, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 625; Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The
Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003
(1995) [hereinafter McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict]; Richard H. McAdams, Group
Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1996); Richard McAdams, The
Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) [hereinafter
McAdams, Origin]; Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1697 (1996) [hereinafter Posner, Inefficient Norms]; Eric A. Posner, The Legal
Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 LEGAL THEORY 33 (1996) [hereinafter Posner, Reli-
gious Groups]; Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: the Influence of Legal and
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lient feature of our common social practice integral to the gen-
eration, maintenance, and transformation of social norms (as
well as to many formal legal practices), the significance of which
has been largely unappreciated in the mass of literature: the fact
that many norms and political/legal practices are produced by
and grounded in ritualized activity.2 In a society that is highly
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996); Eric A. Posner,
Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (1997); Eric A.
Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
765 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Symbols]; Richard Posner, Social Norms and the Law:
An Economic Approach, 87(2) AM. ECON. REV. 365 (1997). All of this literature is ori-
ented towards the currently dominant paradigm of studying informal social norms
in terms of game theoretic, rational actor models. For recent examples of a more
"cultural" approach to social norms, see DENNIS CHONG, RATIONAL LIVES: NORMS
AND VALUES IN POLITICS AND SOCIETY (2000) [hereinafter CHONG, RATIONAL LIVES];
Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2079 (1996) [hereinafter Chong, Values]; Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Inter-
nalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & Soc'Y. REV. 157 (2000).
2. There is a brief discussion of the role of ritual in creating trust in informal
social norms in Allan Gibbard, Norms, Discussion, and Ritual: Evolutionary Puzzles,
100 ETHICS 787, 798-99 (1990). Additionally the role of "ritual" (more broadly de-
fined for purposes of this article) in changing social meanings is briefly outlined in
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 978-80,
1008-14 (1995), and in promoting group solidarity in ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note
1, at 233-36. See also POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 1, at 54; Etzioni, supra note
1, at 174. None of these, however, fully explore the connection between ritual and
informal norms, particularly their ability to create a source of sacred authority op-
posed to that of the state. Recently, economist Michael Chwe has analyzed the role
of ritual in the context of the rational actor model of social coordination. See gener-
ally MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, RATIONAL RITUAL: CULTURE, COORDINATION, AND
COMMON KNOWLEDGE 3-8 (2001). According to Chwe, ritual practices help solve
coordination problems that can arise when members of a group who wish to adopt
a certain course of action are inhibited from doing so because they do not know
whether they will be joined by others. See id. Ritual provides group members with
the common knowledge that others are also like-minded, by providing the oppor-
tunity for participants to make public representations of their preferences for a
given course of action. This is an important insight, but it only addresses a single
aspect of the ritual phenomenon. Chwe does not take into account the way that rit-
ual directly affects the preferences of individual actors for a certain course of action
(or set of norms). Moreover, Chwe's conception of common knowledge, which fo-
cuses only on what individuals know about the intentions of others, ignores the
critical way that ritual (1) establishes the conceptual framework of obligation within
which individual actors make decisions, and (2) helps stabilize the intersubjectively
shared linguistic and cultural meanings that make communication possible at all.
In particular, Chwe's approach largely ignores problems of social trust and the way
that ritual creates "hypertrust" among the participants in a ritual community.
While some aspects of social norms can be understood in terms of coordination
problems among like-minded individuals, many others need to be conceptualized
as collective action problems, modeled in terms of noncooperative games such as
Prisoner's Dilemma, that raise serious issues concerning the problems of defection
and free-riding. In these cases, a substantial premium is placed upon one player's
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secularized, relative to other eras and cultures, it is difficult to
see the impact of ritualized activity on our norms and beliefs,
and easy to dismiss ritual as a vestigial remnant of an earlier era,
surviving (perhaps barely) in isolated practices cabined off un-
der the general rubric of "religion." This dismissal, however, is
misleading on two counts. Limiting our conception of ritual to
formal religious practices ignores the pervasiveness of ritualized
activity in more mundane aspects of human activity -"secular
rituals" that have been documented for decades by anthropolo-
gists and ritualists. 3 More important, such a view ignores a criti-
cal feature of human life at its most basic: ritual is deeply em-
bedded in human ontogeny,4 in our communicative practices,
and in the way that our mind organizes and shapes perceived
reality. The defining and ineliminable traits of humanity include
not only rationality and language, but also the homo ritualis na-
ture of a human being. The ability to create and perform rituals
underlies many of our rational and communicative faculties (in
both practical and evolutionary senses). This ability has impor-
tant implications for our understanding of informal norms, for-
mal law, and our deepest notions of fairness and legitimacy. To
see the world from the perspective of the pervasive cultural
practice of ritual is to see new patterns in the rich tapestry of
human behavior, breaking down the distinctions between our
linguistic, cognitive, emotional, and rational capacities, in a way
that better reflects the way life is lived as an interconnected
whole.
The fundamental insight upon which this article is based is
that there are a number of cultural media through which a social
high degree of trust that the others will follow a cooperative strategy. See id.
3. See generally SECULAR RITUAL (Sally F. Moore & Barbara G. Myerhoff eds.,
1977).
4. Ontogeny is the study of the life cycle of a single organism or individual.
Ritual practices constitute an essential part of childhood development, continuing
into adolescence and early adulthood; in particular, it appears that ritualized prac-
tices may form an indispensable basis for subsequent development of human sym-
bolic and linguistic capacities. See TERENCE W. DEACON, THE SYMBOLIC SPECIES:
THE Co-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND THE BRAIN 401-10 (1997); ERIK H. ERIKSON,
The Eight Ages of Man, in CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247 (35th anniv. ed. 1986);
MICHAEL TOMASELLO, THE CULTURAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN COGNITION 87-89 (1999).
See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, TOYS AND REASONS: STAGES IN THE RITUALIZATION OF
EXPERIENCE 67-115 (1977); Erik H. Erikson, The Development of Ritualization, in THE
RELIGIOUS SITUATION 711 (Donald R. Cutler ed., 1968); Erik H. Erikson, The Ontog-
eny of Ritualization, in PSYCHOANALYSIS: A GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY (Rudolph M.
Loewenstein et al. eds., 1966).
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norm can be instantiated in social life, and that the specific me-
dium adopted has important implications for the normative or-
der. Specifically, a norm that is generated by, or reinforced in
connection with, ritualized practices is likely to be clearer and
more widely understood, more strongly held, and less suscepti-
ble to change than norms instantiated in other ways. Because of
its central role in our communicative and cognitive systems,
ritualized behavior forms a fundamental constitutive element in
the underlying cultural, social, and linguistic background in
which all evolution and transformation of normative orders oc-
curs, including changes implemented by self-interested, rational
actors. As it helps create and maintain informal social norms,
ritual simultaneously provides the most important, and in many
cases the only, vehicle for the creation of our notions of higher
values, unquestionable authority, and ultimately of the sacred,
in both the religious and secular spheres. As a result, the rituali-
zation (or deritualization) of social norms has an inevitable im-
pact on larger issues of morality, legitimacy, and justice, extend-
ing beyond the norms themselves.
The distinctive way that ritualization affects social norms
can be intuitively captured by considering the differences be-
tween norms of safety governing traffic at a stoplight and norms
of solidarity among members of a labor union that are perpetu-
ated at communal dinners and ritualized songfests (singing
"Solidarity Forever"). 5 The sequence for stop and go at the traf-
fic light is arbitrary and purely conventional, based upon gen-
eral convenience and common practice; the meaning of red and
green signals could be reversed without difficulty, provided
enough people agreed to follow the new convention. Addition-
ally, merely conventional norms often have implications only
within their own sphere of activity - in this case traffic safety. In
contrast, we have a deep understanding of the difference be-
tween such conventional norms and ritual labor norms. Ritual
norms stir up powerful emotions and are a strong motivational
force compelling compliance, with a correspondingly strong re-
sistance to alteration. Moreover, ritually instantiated norms of
solidarity ultimately have an impact far beyond the sphere of
employer/employee relations, involving concerns such as the
dignity of labor and the moral obligation of mutual assistance.
5. See WILLIAM G. DOTY, MYTHOGRAPHY: THE STUDY OF MYTHS AND RITUALS
104 (1986) (discussing ritual activity in the context of labor unions).
[Vol. 43392
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These distinguishing features are not merely the result of con-
text, but reflect the impact of the ritual process itself upon hu-
man cognition, emotions, communication, and understanding of
higher values.
A practice-based approach 6 of the type offered here differs
in certain crucial respects from both the cultural and rational ac-
tor theories more commonly employed in the analysis of infor-
mal norms, while incorporating elements of each. 7 Like recent
cultural theory of norms and laws, this perspective views cul-
ture as a set of artifacts or tools with which we actively organize
and act upon our understanding of reality. But unlike many of
these theories, this perspective rejects a strong "interpretivist" or
hermeneutic view that treats culture primarily as a set of codes,
texts, or traditions, and sees the evolution of social norms as the
primary result of interpreting or contesting these traditions.8 In-
6. Although differing from other practice-based theories, this approach shares
a number of their central concerns such as: the importance of emotion and the hu-
man body; the significance of temporality on human action; the critical importance
of repetitive behavior in stabilizing a social order; the way that everyday practice
"instantiates" higher-level normative considerations; the interaction of material
practices with symbolic structures; and the way that cognitive practices are "situ-
ated" in everyday forms of activity. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A
THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977) [hereinafter
BOURDIEU, OUTLINE]; PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice
trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1990) [hereinafter BOURDIEU, LOGIC]; MICHAEL COLE,
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY: A ONCE AND FUTURE DISCIPLINE 124 (1996); EDWIN
HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD (1995); Randall Collins, On the Microfoundations
of Macrosociology, 86 AM. J. SOC. 984 (1981); R. Friedland & R. Alford, Bringing Soci-
ety Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 223-62 (Walter W. Powell & Paul
J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) [hereinafter THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM]; Marshall Sahlins,
Individual Experience and Cultural Order, in THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: THEIR NATURE
AND USES (William Kruskal ed., 1982), reprinted in MARSHALL SAHLINS, CULTURE IN
PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS 277 (2000). For influential practice-based approaches to
formal law (albeit differing significantly from the one presented here), see generally
PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW
IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999). Practice based considerations are also important in
pragmatist legal theorizing, notably Richard Posner's "activity theory" of adjudica-
tion. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 456-57 (1990). The
practices discussed by Posner in this work, however, relate exclusively to activities
within the legal profession, without consideration of the impact of specific cultural
practices within the broader society. See id.
7. See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
8. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 219-25
(2000), for a summary and critique of "interpretivist" theories. Although Amster-
dam and Bruner differentiate their views from interpretivist/constructionist mod-
els, their heavy emphasis on the role played by canonical narratives in legal and
normative considerations appears to constitute yet another form, albeit substan-
tially modified, of interpretivist/hermeneutic discourse. Interpretivist theory is
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stead, this article focuses on the way that a specific social prac-
tice, in this case ritualization, ultimately shapes and constrains
the values, interpretations, and understandings that underlie
every system of social norms. This emphasis on cultural practice
reflects the fact that we simply cannot talk sensibly about inter-
preting cultural artifacts without taking into account the impact
of the specific concrete cognitive and institutional structures
within which the interpretive process takes place. Conceptual
systems survive poorly in the absence of social practices that
sustain them.9
Like current rational actor models, this article's treatment of
ritual and social norms reflects a form of methodological indi-
vidualism. Ritual is an important vehicle through which indi-
viduals actively define themselves as members of a normative
community, communicate amongst themselves normative com-
mitments, internalize prevailing norms, and act to transform
normative systems. A ritual-based perspective is thus to a large
extent compatible with the dominant rational actor paradigm of
informal social norms. It is not, however, reducible to this para-
digm. A ritual perspective highlights one of the most important
ways that individual rationality depends upon, and is shaped
by, a broader sphere of human communicative and social activi-
ties, exploring factors that are generally treated as non-
problematic in game theoretic models.10 This in turn points out
some of the ways that cost-benefit analysis of social norms can
and should take greater explicit account of cultural factors.
Finally, focusing on ritual practices allows us to incorporate
particularly associated with the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz. See, e.g.,
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-30 (1973). See CLAUDIA STRAUSS & NAOMI QUINN,
A COGNITIVE THEORY OF CULTURAL MEANING 14-47 (1997), for a trenchant anthro-
pological critique of this view. See ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 1, at 157-58, 169,
for a critique in the context of informal social norms.
9. See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS & STEVEN NEY, MISSING PERSONS: A CRITIQUE OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 29 (1998).
10. Indeed, too sharp a dichotomy between methodological individualism and
holism appears problematic under careful analysis. For example, as Edwin Hut-
chins has powerfully argued, because virtually everything that we do in the course
of everyday task-performance reflects a division of cognitive labor within society, in
many ways it makes little sense to sharply distinguish individual cognition (includ-
ing "rationality" stricto sensu), from more systemic forms of cognitive processing
(or vice versa); what needs to be explained is the complex interrelationship between
the two. See HUTCHINS, supra note 6, at 185, 239-62; see also JOHN R. SEARLE, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 25-26 (1995); James V. Wertsch, Mediated Action,
in A COMPANION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 518, 525 (William Bechtel et al. eds., 1998).
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recent advances in our understanding of the role of emotion in
human thinking into the study of informal social norms, and the
realization that our capacity for thought is ultimately grounded
in organic brains and physical bodies.11 A combination of emo-
tional and physical factors has been shown to affect a wide range
of human communicative, cognitive, and social activities. Rit-
ual's unique blend of emotion, physical performance, and com-
municative activity not only helps explain why the process of
ritualization has such a profound and distinctive impact on so-
cial norms, but also makes ritual an ideal vehicle through which
to gain a better understanding of how emotion and physicality
operate in our cognitive and social lives.
Part II of this article briefly reviews current cost-benefit and
sociocultural theories concerning the development of informal
norms, and suggests how a ritual perspective can resolve signifi-
cant aporias that currently exist in each type of theory and can
unify these approaches in the context of studying ritualized
norms.1 2 Part III defines the ritual process and highlights the sa-
lient features of ritual practice. It shows the pervasiveness of
both religious and secular rituals in our everyday life.13 Part IV
discusses ritual's "constitutive" role, including the ways that it
influences human communication, cognition, and social interac-
tion so as to provide the framework within which a society cre-
ates, maintains, and changes systems of informal norms.14 Part
V looks at the impact of ritualization on social norms in opera-
tion during the course of everyday life, with particular emphasis
on the role played by human emotion and physicality in pro-
moting a stable and effective system of norms.15 Part VI offers a
ritual perspective on the question of when formal law should
substitute for informal norms (or vice versa).16 It continues with
a discussion of the impact that formal state law can have on civil
society's ability to create and articulate its sense of the sacred
through ritual practice, and briefly highlights two well known
cases. In Employment Division v. Smith and Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, the Supreme Court's failure to fully understand the rit-
11. There has been some discussion of certain aspects of the embodied nature
of human cognition and its impact on formal law, notably by Steven Winter. See,
e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part VI.
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ual implications of the case before them resulted in highly prob-
lematic answers to the question of the scope of the state's au-
thority to regulate the sacred.1 7 A brief conclusion is offered in
Part VII., - I i
II. CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON NORMS
A great deal of progress has been made over the last decade
in our understarding of informal social norms, both on a theo-
retical level and in empirical studies documenting the existence
and efficiency of informal norms in fields as widely varied as
bee-keeping and sumo wrestling. 18 Most of these studies focus
upon the development and maintenance of beneficial normative
structures by self-interested rational actors, and arose in re-
sponse to a growing awareness that most of human activity is
regulated by informal norms rather than by formal law. More-
over, earlier sociologically-oriented studies have conspicuously
failed to develop a coherent explanation for why norms arise in
the first place and how they change. 19 The new studies adopt a
non-cooperative game theoretic approach, generally employing
some form of the Prisoner's Dilemma.20
17. See infra Part VI.
18. See ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 1, 46-103 (norms governing cattle ranch-
ing in Shasta County); see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extrale-
gal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Imma-
nent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (norms governing behavior in
American grain industry) [hereinafter Bernstein, Immanent Norms]; Lan Cao, Looking
at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841 (1999) (role of community
norms in informal, ethnic rotating credit associations); Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fa-
ble of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 11 (1973); J. Mark Ramseyer,
Products Liability Through Private Ordering: Notes on a Japanese Experiment, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1823 (1996) (product liability norms governing Japan's Product Safety
Council); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997) (role of informal norms in development of
Delaware corporation law); Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, The Unenforceability of
Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1997) (norms gov-
erning a firm's internal labor market); Mark West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in
Japan's Secret World of Sumo, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997).
19. While recognition of the importance of norms can be traced back at least to
Weber and Durkheim, the fullest expression of this view of norms is associated
with Talcott Parsons. See, e.g., TALCOTT PARSONS, ON INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL
EVOLUTION 174-77, 188-209 (Leon H. Mayhew ed., 1982). For criticisms of Parson's
views as "oversocialized" and ignoring individual rationality and choice, see
CHONG, RATIONAL LIVES, supra note 1, at 12-44; ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 1, at
149-55; Dennis H. Wrong, The Oversocialized Cohception of Man in Modern Sociology,
26 AM. Soc. REV. 183 (1961).
20. In a classic Prisoner's Dilemma, two players have the option of adopting a
[Vol. 43
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At the heart of new norms literature is a central problem of
social coordination: how, given the presence of utility maximiz-
ing rational actors, can cooperation occur despite incentives for
such individuals to act in their own self-interest? A collective
action problem exists wherever social welfare would be en-
hanced if everyone cooperated to adopt a certain type of behav-
ior, but because the benefits are diffusely spread throughout the
community, and significant costs are incurred by each individ-
ual in adopting the cooperative solution (either directly or in
terms of lost opportunities for individual maximizing activity),
individuals are tempted to defect from the cooperative solution
and seek to maximize their own benefits while "free riding" on
the cooperative activity of others.21 This pessimistic model,
however, seriously underestimates the large amount of coopera-
tion that is empirically observed.22 Norms theorists argue that
cooperation is promoted by the presence of informal social
norms that inhibit the ability of individuals to free ride by rais-
ing the cost of defection from cooperative behavior, thereby
serving social welfare enhancing functions, and that such a utili-
tarian bias for informal social norms has been well documented
by a wide variety of empirical studies.23
mutually cooperative outcome (e.g., to work together) or to defect from cooperation
(e.g., shirking from such labor). The payoff for mutual cooperation for each player
is greater than what otherwise would be gained if both go it alone and do not coop-
erate. What complicates matters, however, is that each player will do even better if
she chooses to defect from cooperation and the other player chooses to cooperate,
with the cooperating player thereby receiving a nugatory "sucker's payoff." It is
assumed that players cannot communicate with one another (other than by deci-
sions made in the course of the game itself), and cannot make binding commitments
between themselves to coordinate strategies. Players in Prisoner's Dilemma and
other cognate games are normally assumed to be fully rational and to have perfect
knowledge of their own and opponents moves, as well as of the payoff structure of
the game. The rules of the game are assumed to be fixed. The equilibrium strategy
for both players in a single play of a classic Prisoner's Dilemma is to defect. See
JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 78-79 (1994).
21. A classic paradigm is the problem of a common pool resource that will be
exhausted by overuse. Individuals have an incentive to maximize their own take
while relying on others to restrain their consumption. If free riding becomes wide-
spread, the cooperative solution breaks down and the potential gains from collec-
tive action are lost. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-
POOL RESOURCES 15-16 (1994).
22. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 945 & n.159 (1996); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements,
Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive
Justice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985). See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
23. See ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 1, at 167-83. According to Ellickson, this
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In the literature, this type of cost-benefit approach takes two
main forms.24 The first focuses on the community's ability to de-
ter noncooperation by imposing costs for norm violation, either
in the form. of guilt or, through the use of informal social sanc-
tions (e.g., negative gossip, public chastisement, ostracism). A
norm exists and is effective whenever there is a widespread and
well-known consensus in favor of the type of behavior that the
norm encourages. The weight of this consensus, combined with
the willingness of norm adherents to sanction defectors, results
in reaching an equilibrium position at a relatively high rate of
compliance.25 In general, a key element to the establishment of
consensus and equilibrium is the fact that the normative stan-
dard has been internalized (through childhood socialization,
education, etc.) by a sufficient number of individuals. If we ac-
cept that individuals value social esteem very highly, competi-
tion to enhance one's social status by complying with widely ac-
knowledged norms, and seeking to avoid the reputational
damage resulting from norm violations, can also facilitate the
formation of a stable system of social norms.26 Internalization
and esteem can often work together in a common structure,
where some norms are widely internalized, while others rely
primarily upon mechanisms of public esteem for their effective-
is particularly the case in "closely knit communities" (i.e., social groups that are
relatively small and characterized by a high degree of interpersonal interaction), in
which welfare enhancing strategies can be more easily identified, appropriate
norms can be more fully developed, and effective informal sanctions can be applied
to norm violators. See id. One advantage of esteem and signaling models is that
they permit analysis of social norms in a wider sphere of activity than such com-
munities (e.g., the widespread norm against theft).
24. In addition to the two models presented here, a third approach grounds the
possibility of cooperation simply in iterated plays of Prisoner's Dilemma, allowing
players to settle into a cooperative equilibrium through strategies like Robert Ax-
elrod's model of "tit-for-tat." See, e.g., id. at 164-66; GARY WILLIAM FLAKE, THE
COMPUTATIONAL BEAUTY OF NATURE: COMPUTER EXPLORATIONS OF FRACTALS,
CHAOS, COMPLEX SYSTEMS, AND ADAPTATION 293-97 (1998). See generally ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). For a sophisticated recent ver-
sion of this thesis, see Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Genera-
tive Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997); see also DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986). Although such theorizing offers, on an
essentially metaphysical level, a plausible explanation of how cooperation might
spontaneously emerge from iterated plays of a noncooperative game, it does not
appear to accurately model how cooperation and social norms work in practice. See
ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 1, at 165-66; POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 1, at
16-18; Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998).
25. See Cooter, Expressive Law, supra note 1, at 587 (norm as "effective consensus
obligation"); Cooter, Normative Failure, supra note 1, at 954-55.
26. See, e.g., McAdams, Origin, supra note 1, at 355-65.
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ness.
27
The second cost-benefit approach focuses on the way that
players in a non-cooperative game situation can achieve coop-
erative results by means of signaling their intentions to others
through symbolic acts. 28 Individuals who wish to cooperate
identify each other by sending symbolic messages that separate
themselves from non-cooperators.29 Signals are selected from
the available stock of symbols in the prevailing culture.30 Be-
cause signaling is generally costly, only cooperators will nor-
mally be expected to incur this cost in order to signify their co-
operative intent. Having thus identified each other, cooperators
will transact with one another to the exclusion of non-
cooperators, and a stable normative order is thereby created
without the need to impose costly sanctions in order to secure
compliance; a social norm thus marks an equilibrium point
where adherence to a certain type of behavior constitutes an ef-
fective symbol that distinguishes cooperators from non-
cooperators. 31 A social norm generally persists until it fails to
perform its signaling function adequately, either because it is so
broad or inexpensive that everyone issues the same signal, or so
narrow or costly that no one signals, at which time it may be re-
placed by a more effective symbol of cooperative intent.32
In both of the foregoing approaches, the evolution of indi-
vidual social norms and of normative orders is often viewed as
resulting from the activity of rationally self-interested "norm en-
trepreneurs." 33 There is a "market" for norms in which self-
conscious, socially aware suppliers of norms see where new or
improved norms would be welfare enhancing and seek to intro-
duce them to the public in return for personal satisfaction, mate-
rial reward, social prestige, or some other factor. Promoters of
efficient norms are rewarded by the population in general
through, among other means, enhanced esteem (under the es-
teem model) or increased cooperation in mutually beneficial
transactions (according to the signaling model).34
27. See id. at 364.
28. See Posner, Symbols, supra note 1, at 768.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 774.
31. See POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 1, at 34.
32. See Posner, Symbols, supra note 1, at 774, 790-91.
33. See, e.g., POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 1, at 29-32; Lessig, supra note 2,
at 985-86; McAdams, Origin, supra note 1, at 371.
34. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolutionary of Social Norms: A Perspective
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While cost-benefit approaches have deepened our under-
standing of informal social norms and have produced some im-
pressive empirical results, some cogent criticisms have been of-
fered against certain aspects of this theory. One criticism is that
they often fail to take into account the impact of a community's
specific history and traditions on social norms.35 By viewing
norms largely as external constraints on individual (non-
cooperative) preferences, current theory cannot adequately ac-
count for the fact that norms almost certainly influence prefer-
ences because they constitute much of the cultural environment
in which our underlying predisposition, tastes, and choices de-
velop as well.36 Moreover, treating norms as solely extrinsic fac-
tors, combined with the common assumption that preferences
are fixed, paints a distorted picture of the process whereby indi-
viduals internalize normative standards, making them appear
more clearly and indelibly etched into the minds of socialized
individuals than is actually the case.37 As a result, current theory
has difficulty taking into account the obvious fact that different
people internalize norms to a greater or lesser extent, and that
different types of norms have greater or lesser internal motiva-
tional force to compel compliance, nor can it fully explain the
fact that the motivational force of norms can change over the
lifetime of an individual. 38
Additional aporias in these current models exist at an even
deeper level than these sociocultural criticisms - at the level of
human communicative and cognitive abilities. Rational actor
theories assume a great deal of shared background knowledge
on the part of individuals in a specific normative community, as
well as stable practices and rules that structure the game itself.39
from the Legal Academy 23-28 (Yale Law Sch., Program for Studies in Law, Econ.,
and Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 230, 1999). Whether or not this process leads
to the creation of optimal norms and optimal supply of beneficial norms, is hotly
contested. See infra notes 373-75 and accompanying text.
35. See Etzioni, supra note 1, at 171-74. This fundamental significance of culture
and concrete social relations underlies much of the current sociological study of
market behavior, which stresses how exchange activity is "embedded" in sociocul-
tural networks. For a review of this literature, see John Lie, Sociology of Markets, 23
ANN. REV. Soc. 341, 349-51 (1997).
36. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actor
Models, 65 CHI-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Etzioni, supra note 1, at 162-63.
37. See CHONG, RATIONAL LIVES, supra note 1, at 220; Etzioni, supra note 1, at
167-69.
38. See infra notes 332-48 and accompanying text.
39. In the language of game theory, "common knowledge." See MORROW, su-
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This background knowledge includes items such as stable, inter-
subjective understandings pertaining to the literal meaning of a
social norm and of the circumstances under which a norm has
been violated, the costs andi benefits for cooperative or non-
cooperative behavior, and the shared meaning of cultural sym-
bols.40 Factors such as these inform the practices, rules, and
payoffs that give internal structure to the games themselves; in
the absence of this relativelyfixed background knowledge, game
theory cannot model behavior. 41 (Even without adopting a
game theoretic perspective, it is intuitively obvious that human
cooperative activity and social norms themselves could probably
not exist without stable systems of mutual understanding. Try
to imagine a functioning system of norms where everyone un-
derstood all of the norms differently.) Game theoretic models
also make relatively strong assumptions concerning human cog-
nitive capacity: even those predicated on bounded, rather than
full rationality, assume that individuals display impressive
powers of unbiased decision-making, recall, and probabilistic
judgment.42
Our ability to achieve widely shared, stable, and mutually
intelligible background understandings depends upon human
linguistic ability (in terms both of formulating our ideas and in
communicating them so that they can be understood by others).
Yet we know that human language (as well as the social mean-
ings and norms constructed from language) is potentially infi-
nitely plastic, and thus subject to ambiguity or indeterminacy.
Similarly, cognition is subject to severe limitations in its ability
to accurately recall and process information. Because these
weaknesses in communication and cognition occur outside of
our awareness, deeply embedded in our implicit patterns of
thinking, speaking, and acting, it is difficult to model them in
terms of formal decision theory.43 For many pragmatic pur-
pra note 20, at 307-08.
40. See CHWE, supra note 2, at 13-16; OSTROM ET AL., supra note 21, at 40; JOHN
R. SEARLE, RATIONALITY IN ACTION 56-58 (2001) (indicating that a largely culturally
constituted "background" is required for conscious rationality).
41. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 21, at 75-97 (for the relation between cultural
factors (e.g., "deontological statements") and the rules and payoffs of games); see
also ROBERT NOzICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 95-99 (1993) (rationality takes
places within culturally determined contextual framework).
42. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 21, at 320-24. See ROBERT C. STALNAKER,
CONTEXT AND CONTENT 271-73 (1999), for a critique of the assumption of "logical
omniscience" in game theoretic models.
43. See, e.g., ROBIN M. HOGARTH, EDUCATING INTUITION 91-99, 186-89, 224-25
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poses, it is sufficient to treat the existence of relatively stable lin-
guistic/ cultural understandings and of adequate cognitive re-
sources as assumptions. In daily life, linguistic meanings and
social understandings do for the most part remain relatively sta-
ble, and our cognitive resources are sufficient to more or less
successfully navigate the social world.
But something important gets left out. The latent problems
of ensuring stable intersubjective communicative activity and
background knowledge, and of overcoming human cognitive
limitations, are successfully resolved by a complex interaction
that necessarily includes, in addition to cognitive, emotional,
and physiological resources, the utilization of cultural practices
and artifacts such as ritual. These faculties work together to al-
low us to function successfully in the world, and exert a recipro-
cal impact upon one another.44 From the point of view of this ar-
ticle, the critical consequence is that the ritualization of social
norms has profound repercussions in terms of our processes of
thought and language, and that these in turn help determina-
tively shape the system of norms itself.
Alongside cost-benefit theories, there have recently been
several attempts to reintegrate cultural considerations into the
study of social norms without returning to the type of determi-
nist assumptions that plagued earlier sociological models. One
such approach has developed out of the new cost-benefit litera-
ture itself.45 Social meaning theories argue that actions, and the
norms that govern those actions, not only have an instrumental
effect, but also express meanings. Preferences for certain types
of norms therefore reflect, at least in part, preferences for the
(2001). See generally Lessig, supra note 2 (for an attempt to do so in the limited con-
text of the role of government in sustaining or altering the social meanings of ac-
tions).
44. For example, the development of writing helped overcome limitations on
individual long-term memory by permitting us to offload a significant amount of
information to material storage media. At the same time, it also fundamentally al-
tered human cognitive processes; cross-cultural studies have shown that members
of literate societies literally think differently in certain important respects from
members of pre-literate societies. See JACK GOODY, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE
WRITTEN AND THE ORAL 164-167, 290-300 (1987); see also MERLIN DONALD, ORIGINS
OF THE MODERN MIND 269-75 (1991) (evolution of human cognition influenced by
presence of "external symbolic meaning representations"); CHWE, supra note 2, at 1-
18, 98-99 (noting the link between ritual and successful communication); COLE, su-
pra note 6, at 116-45 (discussing the role of artifacts in human cognition); Wertsch,
supra note 10, at 518-25 (indicating that cognition is "mediated" through use of arti-
facts).
45. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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meanings with which those norms are associated; a change in
the social meaning of an action will affect one's choice to engage
in the activity itself.46 Social meanings may be contested, but
more frequently they form a kind of, implicit, uncontested
"background" knowledge, and therefore may be very hard to
change.47 Some commentators have suggested that government
take a robust role in using the "expressive function" of law, its
ability to publicize societal approval or disapproval of an activ-
ity, and thereby to change its social meaning, in the case of
norms that are inefficient, discriminatory, distributionally un-
fair, or otherwise seriously infringe on personal autonomy. 48
Social meaning theories thus provide significant cultural in-
put into our understanding of social norms, but because the
scope of their explanatory power is restricted largely to the lim-
ited context of analyzing the ways that governmental agents can
self-consciously reinforce or alter existing social meanings of
norms, they do not address, other than obliquely, the broader is-
sue of cultural development in general. Moreover, because so-
cial meaning theories ultimately fall back on rational actor mod-
46. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 22, at 909, 940-41; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Ex-
pressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2030-31 (1996). A frequently cited
example is smoking, where the social meaning has changed from positive to nega-
tive with the publication of health concerns in the Surgeon General's report and in
widely publicized studies on the effects of second-hand smoke. See Lessig, supra
note 2, at 1025-34; Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661,
667-68. Lessig has outlined a number of methods whereby a norm entrepreneur
can create or alter a given social meaning. See Lessig, supra note 2, at 991-1015
(techniques of "tying," ambiguation, ritual, and inhibition).
47. See, e.g., TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES 176-95 (1995) (examin-
ing "the unthinkable and the unthought"); Lessig, supra note 47, at 683-85 (contrast-
ing "type A" (contestable) and "type B" (implicit) social meanings); Lawrence Les-
sig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional Theory Should
Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1841-42 (1996); Sunstein, supra note 22, at 920, 923. For exam-
ples that the existence of implicit meaning is also of central concern to anthropo-
logical investigations of culture, see MARY DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS: SELECTED
ESSAYS IN ANTHROPOLOGY 3-7 (1999); to philosophical inquiries on language and
consciousness, see JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF MIND 160-71 (1983), and to cognitive studies of law, see WINTER, supra note 11, at
87-92.
48. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 22, at 953-65; see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Le-
gal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986). For a related
view of the role of law in value expression, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1.503
(2000). For a more pessimistic view, however, of the practical effectiveness of this
expressive function, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 213-
15 (1990).
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els to explain cultural change,49 they cannot adequately account
for changes in a cultural network that occur to some extent in-
dependently of individual rational activity. A more ambitious
attempt to examine the general process of cultural development,
and autonomous processes of cultural change, has been under-
taken by new "epidemiological" theories of culture, which have
been recently introduced into legal discourse from the social sci-
ences.50 According to these theories, cultural artifacts can be
49. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 2. Similarly, Dennis Chong grounds his other-
wise culture sensitive account of social norms on models of economic maximiza-
tion. See CHONG, RATIONAL LIVES, supra note 1, at 224-28. Along with Chwe's in-
terpretation of ritual as common knowledge and Eric Posner's signaling theory, in
all four of these theories, the meaning (cultural model) of a specific social practice
and the specific way that such a practice or belief is intersubjectively transmitted is
largely ignored. In providing a syntactic analysis of the issues, these theories pre-
sume preexisting preferences (and their accompanying cultural meanings), which
are then manipulated in a purely formal manner in accordance with the rules of
cost-benefit rationality, without regard to the specific semantic content (meaning) of
these cultural representations. Yet one of the most robust findings of recent cogni-
tive science is that we cannot make such a sharp distinction between form and con-
tent. It is now believed that much of human thought is organized in terms of
widely shared cognitive models rather than as collections of formal rules. See, e.g.,
WINTER, supra note 11, at 186-222; P.N. Johnson-Laird, Formal Rules Versus Mental
Models in Reasoning, in THE NATURE OF COGNITION 587-624 (Robert J. Sternberg ed.,
1999); see also infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. These context dependent
models provide the framework in which more formal types of reasoning occur, and
place constraints upon the types of choices that can be made. See Douglass North,
Institutions and Economics, in A COMPANION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE, supra note 10, at
713-20. Moreover, our choice of which model to choose in a given situation is gen-
erally not the result of formal, rule based decision making, but arises from an un-
conscious process of pattern association, by which we make our selection on the
basis of analogy to similar types of problem solving situations that we have previ-
ously encountered, or because certain models have become entrenched in our
minds due to repeated use. See id.; see also infra note 186 and accompanying text.
Moreover, it appears likely that not only do these models structure and constrain
the decision space of possible choices, but they also govern the way that we use ra-
tionality itself. Rather than possessing a context independent general mental fac-
ulty, our use of probabilistic reasoning and means-ends rationality is dependent on
the specific context of a decision-making situation, as well as on the mental models
that we employ. See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN
THE REAL WORLD 129-65, 209 (2000) (discussing use of mental models in probalistic
reasoning); JEAN LAVE, COGNITION IN PRACTICE: MIND, MATHEMATICS, AND
CULTURE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 156-58, 188-89 (1988) (discussing how the type of ra-
tionality utilized by individuals in problem solving depends upon the specific con-
textual situation in which reasoning occurs).
50. The generic term "epidemiological" is employed to refer to a group of re-
lated theories that have been recently developed in several different disciplines to
model the processes of cultural evolution. The term itself is associated with the
work of Dan Sperber. See DAN SPERBER, EXPLAINING CULTURE: A NATURALISTIC
APPROACH 25-27 (1996). A very similar "cultural models" theory has been recently
advanced by Naomi Quinn and Claudia Strauss, which differs from Sperber's the-
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analytically divided into conceptual units, each of which con-
tains a certain amount of cultural know-how; these units are
stored and processed in the mind in the form of discrete mental
representations, and the collection of these mental representa-
tions, together with the brain's organic substrate, constitutes
each unique individual as a cultural and social actor.5' Much of
our cultural knowledge provides the fundamental tools that we
use to understand and navigate through the world.5 2
Cultural units replicate through processes of intersubjective
transmission.5 3 Unlike other forms of replication, however, the
replication of concepts is inexact. 54 Among other factors, human
creativity, cultural borrowings, and our penchant for reusing a
piece of cultural know-how in a wide variety of different con-
texts and purposes, guarantee that cultural units will proliferate
in a profuse variety of loosely related forms, and to a large ex-
tent, this accounts for the existence of cultural change and de-
velopment.5 5 Moreover, due to the limitations of human cogni-
tive capacity, cultural units must in effect compete with one
another for representation to consciousness, and not all have the
same survival capacities: some are more memorable, or more
useful, or more prominent in the outside environment. In addi-
tion, the existing cultural knowledge in a person's mind can fil-
ter out conflicting new information, creating a cognitive bias
against change.5 6 By a process analogous, but not identical to
ory primarily in the assumptions made about the architecture of human cognition.
See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 8-10. For a slightly different variant of this
approach, based on Richard Dawkins' concept of "memes," see DANIEL C.
DENNETTI, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE
335-69 (1995). It is this theory, with modifications, that has been introduced into
legal discourse by J.M. Balkin. See J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF
IDEOLOGY 42-97 (1998). What unites all of these approaches is their emphasis on the
way that humans form mental representations of specific concepts or other units of
culture, and how the interplay of the specific features of these representations with
human cognitive processes can account for autonomous cultural development.
51. See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 50, at 342-45 (discussing "memes"); SPERBER,
supra note 50, at 77-78 (discussing private "mental representations"); Naomi Quinn,
Research on Shared Task Solutions, in A COGNITIVE THEORY OF CULTURAL MEANING,
supra note 8, at 137, 139-40 ("cultural models").
52. See, e.g., Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn, Introduction to CULTURAL
MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 3-40 (Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn eds.,
1987).
53. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 50, at 54-73.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., DENNETF, supra note 50, at 345-52; SPERBER, supra note 50, at 70,
105-08 (noting that there are different rates of attractiveness in human minds of dif-
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biological natural selection, certain mental representations pre-
dominate and achieve relative stability over time, as commonly
agreed upon cultural constructions. New cultural concepts that
are particularly well adapted for the pre-existing men-
tal/cultural landscape can 57 rapidly spread in a relatively uni-
form manner among members of a population ("cultural conta-
gion"), while less favored aspects of cultural creativity fail to
gain wide acceptance. 58 An important implication of this ap-
proach is that many aspects of culture cannot be understood
functionally, in terms of survival or optimally for human use,
because the selection process is biased toward the propagation
of the cultural concepts themselves, not the actual human beings
who hold them. 59
Epidemiological theory has a number of significant virtues.
Above all, it explains how cultural factors can become widely in-
tersubjectively shared and can also change in a way that is (at
least sometimes) autonomous from human purposive activity.
Further, this theory explains the reasons that deeply entrenched
cultural concepts and social norms can be pathological rather
than beneficial for human activity. Moreover, because these
processes occur in the first instance within the minds of indi-
viduals, we avoid the need to posit the existence of supraindi-
vidual entities (like a collective consciousness), which have
proved problematic in prior theorizing. In addition, these theo-
ries provide a satisfying explanation for the fact that many im-
portant cultural artifacts, like ritual, are used in a number of dif-
ferent contexts and for different purposes, and can have
repercussions in very different spheres of human activity.
At the same time, however, an epidemiological approach, in
its current form, possesses some critical limitations on its useful-
ness for analyzing complex cultural phenomena. In emphasizing
the role played by epidemiological theories in cultural develop-
ment of abstract, autonomous mental representations, these
theories can overly de-emphasize the role played by concrete
factors such as social structure and institutions in cultural
ferent cultural concepts and representations).
57. See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 50, at 345-52. While Sperber rejects a biologi-
cal evolutionary model, his "epidemiological" model is in fact compatible with such
an approach. See id., at 358-59; BALKIN, supra note 50, at 303 n.32.
58. See generally AARON LYNCH, THOUGHT CONTAGION: HOW BELIEF SPREADS
THROUGH SOCIETY (1996) (discussing cultural contagion).
59. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 50, at 71-72.
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transmission and replication.60 Moreover, the causal connection
between mental representation and human actions, which are
ultimately what we want to explain, often remains tenuous. 61
Among other things, we need to know how (and to what extent)
mental representations provide motivational force for action,
how they are projected in our communication with others, and
how the results of our actions, and the specific form in which the
action occurs, reflexively impact upon the mental representa-
tions themselves. In addition, the emphasis these theories place
on the autonomy of cultural units and their processes of selec-
tion and dissemination can obscure the fact that many of our
most deeply entrenched cultural artifacts and practices continue
to exist precisely because they are functionally useful for indi-
vidual purposive activity or for the human species as a whole.
They comprise tools that we often simply cannot stop using,
even if some of their effects are not beneficial or even pathologi-
cal.62 In some cases, the anti-functionalist bias implicit in epi-
demiolocal theory morphs imperceptibly back into a revived in-
terpretivism, with the consequent devaluation of human agency.
All of these concerns ultimately relate to a deeper issue: the
high level of abstraction at which epidemiological models have
been developed. Mental representations are abstract entities,
largely divorced from psychological, social, or physical context,
and the details of the selection process for successful representa-
tions are left vague; the evolution of a cultural unit occurs
through the interplay of a potentially infinite number of survival
factors, many contingent, all unweighted. Thus, while we may
be able with luck to trace the historical evolution of a single cul-
tural concept, it is difficult to use epidemiological theory as it
currently stands to make statements of general applicability, to
generate positive predictions of change, or to detect common
60. See ROBERT AUNGER, THE ELECTRIC MEME: A NEW THEORY OF How WE
THINK 18-19, 21 (2002). As a result, "a number of real weaknesses debilitate the
epidemiological analogy.... " Id. at 18. For examples of the need to more fully
integrate social and institutional factors into our understanding of the spread of cul-
tural concepts, see MARY DOUGLAS, Thought Style Exemplified: The Idea of the Self, in
RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY 211 (1992) (criticizing lack of atten-
tion to social institutions in Dennett's memetic theory of culture); North, supra note
49; see also WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR., A RHETORIC OF BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION 33-40
(1994).
61. See SPERBER, supra note 50, at 61-66; AUNGER, supra note 60, at 19.
62. This notion underlies the influential view that culture provides a type of
"toolkit" for human use. For a review of this literature, see Paul DiMaggio, Culture
and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. Soc. 263, 267-68 (1997).
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patterns in the ways that cultural forces influence the thoughts
and decisions of individuals in a community. Such a high level
of theoretical abstraction is not a flaw per se,63 but it has the un-
fortunate consequence that we cannot ask many of the questions
that are most relevant to the study of informal norms: why are
some norms stable, effective, and widely mutually intelligible,
and others less so; how do norms gain motivational force; what
are the specific processes that govern a change of norms, pro-
moting or inhibiting innovation; and what are the likely reper-
cussions of an alteration of a social norm, or the replacement of
an informal norm with another method of social control (such as
formal law), on other spheres of human activity.
Many of these difficulties can be ameliorated (if not fully re-
solved) by shifting analysis to a less abstract level. By focusing
on the concrete social practices, such as ritual, whereby mental
representations of cultural artifacts such as social norms are pub-
licly instantiated in the social sphere, and thereby intersubjec-
tively communicated, we can take into account the types of insti-
tutional, functional, and causal considerations that otherwise
remain problematic. The ritualization of social norms pro-
foundly affects how norms are mutually understood, transmit-
ted, and changed; the stability, effectiveness, and motivational
force of the norms; and the way that they become incorporated
into our sense of self and our view of the world. At the same
time, because the ritual process operates in a relatively uniform
manner in different contexts and upon different individuals, we
avoid problems of methodological sterility: we can make valid
predictions about the impact of ritualizing social norms on indi-
viduals and their behavior. This allows us in turn to join, in the
context of ritualized norms, a cultural perspective with the more
analytical approach characteristic of cost-benefit theories, and
thereby gain a deeper understanding of the specific ways that
informal social norms operate in our daily life.
III. THE ENDURING IMPORTANCE OF RITUAL
Ritual can be defined as the performance of a more or less in-
variant sequence of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by
63. See DENNETr, supra note 50, at 358-59. In his recent, comprehensive study
of memetic theory, however, Robert Aunger asserts that, precisely because of the
high level of abstracting and lack of attention to the specific ways in which cultural
information is transmitted, "earlier views on memetics have been framed inappro-
priately." See AUNGER, supra note 60, at 59.
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the performer.64 This definition takes a middle ground between
including virtually every type of formal and repetitive social in-
teraction as ritual (thus rendering the concept useless as a tool
for analysis), 65 and a definition so limited that it applies only in
the context of formal religion. In keeping with this definition,
we can identify eight elements that characterize ritualized activ-
ity.
The first is formalism. Ritual invariably involves use of a
structured set of words and bodily gestures. 66 The ritual process
is highly conventionalized, and employs a "restricted code" of
communication characterized by: (1) a limited means of expres-
sion; (2) a correspondingly limited ability to convey information;
and (3) a resulting sharp limitation on the freedom of receivers
of ritual communication to interpret the meaning of this com-
munication in more than one way. 67 As part of its formality, rit-
ual practice is invariant. Ritual activities involve precise repeti-
tions of utterances and gestures; too great a deviation by
participants from the standard form of performance will cause
the performance to lose its ritual character. 68 Closely related to
formality and invariance is rule governance. Rituals are governed
by complex codes of orchestration regulating the sequence and
performance of ritual activities, 69 and possibilities for innovation
are constrained by second-order rules that prescribe the appro-
priate way that a ritual can change or its meaning be altered. 70
64. See ROY A. RAPPAPORT, RITUAL AND RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF HU-
MANITY 24 (1999).
65. Thus, for example, certain types of events, like theater and athletic contests,
are generally excluded from this definition of ritual inasmuch as they do not entail
performance on the part of the audience, who remain passive spectators. See id. at
37-46. For a contrary view emphasizing the ritualized nature of these activities, see
Felicia Hughes-Freeland & Mary M. Crain, Introduction to RECASTING RITUAL:
PERFORMANCE, MEDIA, IDENTITY (Felicia Hughes-Freeland & Mary M. Crain eds.,
1998) [hereinafter RECASTING RITUAL].
66. See CATHERINE BELL, RITUAL: PERSPECTIVES AND DIMENSIONS 139-40 (1997).
67. See MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS 21-28 (1970); see also Maurice Bloch,
Symbols, Song, Dance, and Features of Articulation, 15 ARCHIVES EUROPEENES DE
SOCIOLOGIE 55 (1974) (constrained nature of ritual expression).
68. See BELL, supra note 66, at 150; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 36-37. Ritual
invariance should be distinguished from other social activities of a highly routi-
nized nature, such as the act of a person washing himself or herself, or the mechani-
cal actions of workers on an assembly line. See id. at 150-51.
69. See id. at 153-55.
70. See BELL, supra note 66, at 235; DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND
POWER 12 (1988); Ingjerd Hoem, Clowns, Dignity, and Desire: On the Relationship Be-
tween Performance, Identity, and Reflexivity, in RECASTING RITUAL, supra note 65, at 21-
43.
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Virtually all rituals make use of elaborate symbolism, 71 and
these symbols are themselves frequently elaborated into com-
plex structures of mythic thought.72 In addition, many rituals,
including those without specific religious content, are tied to
ideas of the sacred.73 Notions of sacrality are inextricably linked
to the use of special symbols, sites, and objects for ritual pur-
poses, which further distinguish ritualized from non-ritualized
(everyday) activity. 74 This association with the timeless quality
of the sacred is reflected in another distinctive feature of the rit-
ual process: ritual is routinely thought of as reflecting a long-
standing tradition (even if the ritual is in fact of relatively recent
origin).75
Ritual is realized through physical performance.76 In an ob-
vious sense, there can be no ritual without performance. More
specifically, performance serves the critical function of socially
and cognitively "framing" the ritual process in the minds of par-
ticipants.77 Performance creates the relevant ritual community
(the participants in the ritual), and demarcates those activities
(and associated norms) from more mundane aspects of daily life.
Finally, the most characteristic hallmark of ritual activity is
that a significant portion of the performance involves expression
that is not encoded by the performer.78 Ritual performance can be
roughly divided into two elements: (1) physical participation in
the performance itself, and (2) the ritual "canon," the linguistic
or paralinguistic "text" uttered or otherwise invoked by partici-
pants. In ordinary communicative action, a speaker encodes her
own thoughts and conveys them to the recipient. In contrast,
because of the invariance of the performance, others have nor-
mally encoded the text of the ritual canon, often far in the past.
79
71. See BELL, supra note 66, at 155-59; KERTZER, supra note 70, at 9.
72. See, e.g., DOTY, supra note 5, at 72-106; Terence Turner, Ethno-Ethnohistory:
Myth and History in Native South American Representations of Contact with Western So-
ciety, in RETHINKING HISTORY AND MYTH 235,254-71 (Jonathan D. Hill ed., 1988).
73. See infra notes 262-67, 412-14 and accompanying text.
74. See BELL, supra note 66, at 155-59.
75. See id. at 145-50; Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction to THE INVENTION OF
TRADITION 1-14 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
76. See BELL, supra note 66, at 159-64.
77. See id.
78. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 32-33.
79. For example, in a Catholic mass, neither the words of the liturgy nor the
bodily acts of the celebrant convey any information about an individual's current
state of mind; the textual "meaning" of the canon has been encoded centuries ago.
For this reason, it does not matter who the individual celebrant happens to be, so
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As a result, the verbal canon cannot convey any new ideas re-
flecting the current state of mind of the speaker, who is, after all,
simply reciting someone else's words or repeating stock ges-
tures. The meanings of the canon (and of the social norms asso-
ciated with canonical meanings) remain fixed through succes-
sive performances by participants.
These characteristic features of the ritual process are most
fully exemplified in the various traditional genres of ritual activ-
ity, such as rites of passage, calendrical rites, rites of exchange
and communion, rites of affliction (healing rituals), and ritual-
ized feasting, fasting, and festivals.80 While contemporary soci-
ety is characterized by a relative sparsity of these types of prac-
tices compared to preceding periods or to non-Western
cultures, 81 all of these categories of ritual practice continue to re-
tain their vitality, and such rituals can often have an important
significance in an individual's life: the Jewish bat mitzvah (rite of
passage);82 calendrical holidays both secular (Thanksgiving) and
religious (Easter); the rituals that surround holiday gift-giving;83
and the rites accompanying death. In particular, political ritual
remains extremely widespread. The development of democratic
politics beginning in the eighteenth century has arguably pro-
moted the salience of political rites and symbolism as cultural
phenomena.8 4 In his classic treatment of political ritual, David
long as he is an ordained priest.
80. See BELL, supra note 66, at 93-137 (providing an outline of such genres).
81. See, e.g., id. at 173-209. Various explanations, none fully convincing, have
been put forward to explain this phenomenon, notably the relative secularity of
modern Western society, the rise of widespread literacy, and the process of division
of labor and concomitant social differentiation, which weakens the role played by
ritually organized communal institutions in everyday lives. See, e.g., ROBERT N.
BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL WORLD 16-43
(1970) (secularism); DOUGLAS, supra note 67, at 54-68 (decline in communal author-
ity over individuals); GOODY, supra note 44, at 165-67 (literacy).
82. See RONALD L. GRIMES, DEEPLY INTO THE BONE: RE-INVENTING RITES OF PAS-
SAGE 28 (2000).
83. See BOURDIEU, LOGIC, supra note 6, at 98-111.
84. For example, the fundamental role played by the dynamic increase in po-
litical ritual and symbolism in revolutionary France has been richly documented.
See generally LYNN HUNT, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND CLASS IN THE FRENCH REVO-
LUTION (Victoria E. Bonnell ed., 1984); MONA OZOUF, FESTIVALS AND THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION (Alan Sheridan trans., 1988). For the importance and ubiquitousness
of political ritual in contemporary society (in addition to the sources cited below),
see generally Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967). For
a similar inventory of ritual patterns in American civic life, see JOHN F. WILSON,
PUBLIC RELIGION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 74-88 (1979).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Kertzer 85 not only shows the powerful way in which political
ritual and symbolism construct political realities, but richly
documents a wide variety of rituals embedded in the political
system: inaugurations, 6 political rallies, 87 state funerals, 88 state
visits from foreign dignitaries, 89 the symbolic use of national
flags and coinage, 90 rites of induction for membership in political
movements, 91 town council meetings, 92 congressional hearings, 93
and televised statements by political candidates surrounded by
powerful symbols of legitimacy. 94
Moreover, the overall decline in the amount of traditional
ritual practice has not entailed a genuine diminution in the im-
portance of ritualized activity. Rather, there has been a shift in
ritual style towards different, nontraditional types of practices. 95
Such "ritualized" practices are characterized to a greater or
lesser degree by the same indicia of ritual as the traditional gen-
res, and to a large extent perform the same types of functions as-
sociated with traditional ritual practices. The practices are also
frequently secular in nature.96 Examples of such "ritualized"
85. See KERTZER, supra note 70.
86. See id. at 24, 57-59.
87. See id. at 164-65; DON HANDELMAN, MODELS AND MIRRORS: TOWARDS AN
ANTHROPOLOGY OF PUBLIC EVENTS 41-42 (1990).
88. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 142-44.
89. See id. at 32, 92-95.
90. See id. at 20.
91. See id. at 17.
92. See id. at 49-50, citing Johan Olsen, Local Budgeting: Decision-making or Ritual
Act?, 5 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 85 (1970) (ritualized nature of public town coun-
cil meetings); see also ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN
AN AMERICAN CITY 133 (David Home ed., 1961) (ritualized behavior in American
municipal government).
93. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 91.
94. See id. at 11; see also W. Lance Bennett, The Ritualistic and Pragmatic Bases of
Political Campaign Discourse, 63 Q. J. OF SPEECH 219 (1977). For examples on the
manner in which television can promote widespread performance in ritual acts, see
GRIMES, supra note 82, at 273-80 (televised and cyber funerary rituals); GREGOR
GOETHALS, THE TV RITUAL: WORSHIP AT THE VIDEO ALTAR 36-56 (1981); Daniel
Dayan & Elihu Katz, Electronic Ceremonies: Television Performs a Royal Wedding, in ON
SIGNS 16 (Marshall Blonsky ed., 1985); Felicia Hughes-Freeland, From Temple to Tele-
vision: The Balinese Case, in RECASTING RITUAL, supra note 65, at 44-67.
95. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 66, at 185, 190, 202; DOTY, supra note 5, at 98 (hu-
man society as essentially ritualistic); Peter Burke, The Repudiation of Ritual in Early
Modern Europe, in THE HISTORICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF EARLY MODERN ITALY:
ESSAYS ON PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION 223 (1987) ("[A]ll societies are
equally ritualised; they merely practice different rituals ... ").
96. See Hughes-Freeland & Crain, supra note 65; Sally F. Moore & Barbara G.
Myerhoff, Introduction to SECULAR RITUAL, supra note 3, at 3-24.
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practices have been found in activities as diverse as: participa-
tion in Alcoholics Anonymous; 97 Labor Day cookouts; 98 feminist
rituals;99 ethnic festival activities;100 Earth Day demonstrations; 0'
the modern Olympic Games;102 historical pageants; 03 the experi-
ence of childbirth in modern American hospitals; 104 hazing ritu-
als by fraternities and sports teams, 05 and evidentiary and other
procedures used in Anglo-American courts.106 Ritualized ele-
ments have also been found in business practices and other
forms of organizational behavior, which serve to achieve a uni-
fied culture and sense of trust among members. 107 To be sure,
not all of these activities possess the same degree of affective
force among participants, nor do they have an equal ability to
enact powerful social meanings and instantiate durable social
norms. Yet to some degree or another, all of them possess these
capacities as a natural entailment of the ritual form.
The extent to which pervasive and imperceptible ritualized
behavior exists in our society can better be seen by considering a
few more detailed examples of the way in which ritual impacts
upon complex types of social interaction. Significantly, all con-
cern everyday "secular" rituals, rather than formal religious
rites.
Urban Gang Criminality. The problem of gang-related vio-
97. See BELL, supra note 66, at 202.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 237; Joan Laird, Enactments of Power Through Ritual, in WOMEN AND
POWER: PERSPECTIVES FOR FAMILY THERAPY 123-47 (Thelma Jean Goodrich ed.,
1991).
100. See BELL, supra note 66, at 237. On the importance of ritual in the formation
of ethnic identity, see KERTZER, supra note 70, at 20-21.
101. See BELL, supra note 66, at 202.
102. See Ingrid Rudie, Making Persons in a Global Ritual?, in RECASTING RITUAL,
supra note 65, at 113, 113-34; John MacAloon, Olympic Games and the Theory of Specta-
cle in Modem Society, in RITE, DRAMA, FESTIVAL, SPECTACLE 241 (John MacAloon ed.,
1984).
103. See DAVID GLASSBERG, AMERICAN HISTORICAL PAGEANTRY: THE USES OF
TRADITION IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 9-16 (1990).
104. See Robbie E. Davis-Floyd, Birth as an American Rite of Passage, in
CHILD9IRTH IN AMERICA: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 153 (Karen L. Michael
ed., 1988).
105. See Sebastian Junger, First the Ordeal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000 at A15.
106. See Arthur L. Stinchcomb, On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism, 23 ANN.
REV. SOC. 1, 6-10 (1997). Judicial trials themselves have also been analyzed as ritual
processes. See, e.g., VINCENT CRAPANZANO, SERVING THE WORD: LITERALISM IN
AMERICA FROM THE PULPIT TO THE BENCH 6-7 (2000).
107. See John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 6, at 41.
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lence and the costs imposed upon the community (generally in-
ner-city minority communities), both in terms of victimization of
law-abiding citizens and in the breakdown of social institutions,
is well-known.10 8 Intriguingly, much gang activity appears to be
highly ritualistic, most notably in connection with initiation
rites, but also encompassing distinctive clothing, speech, and ob-
jects.109 It appears that these features help to create a microcos-
mic representation of social reality, and to produce a social
meaning for the norms of violence instantiated in connection
with these rituals. An anti-cosmos is created, predicated upon
meanings and values antithetical to those of the community at
large. Conversely, introducing "counter" rituals has at times
proved quite effective in curbing this kind of socially deviant
behavior.110
Hunting. Probably from the beginning of humanity, hunt-
ing has been a focus of ritual activity, both in terms of adolescent
rites of passage and as a form of cult activity."' In contempo-
rary American society, many of the same features can be ob-
served: a rite of passage remains an important feature of a
young person's first hunting experience with parents or friends;
hunting is a repetitive activity in which neophytes are gradually
initiated into the lore of hunting; and a strongly communal as-
pect is created by participating in the hunt." 2 Hunting sites, fre-
quently visited, can take on a special significance, similar to that
of sacred sites in other forms of ritual behavior. Also, like other
forms of ritual practice, hunting has a timeless quality. It is en-
108. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349 (1997); Dan Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 609, 612-15 (1998); Tracey Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in
Attitudes Towards Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal
Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 137 (1997); Tracey Meares, Social Organization and Drug
Lazo Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998); Tracey Meares & Dan Kahan, The
Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 197.
109. See, e.g., STEVEN L. SACHS, STREET GANG AWARENESS: A RESOURCE GUIDE
FOR PARENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 79-123 (rites of initiation, symbols, clothing, lan-
guage).
110. See BELL, supra note 66, at 151 & n.52.
111. The anthropological literature on this topic is enormous. See, e.g., DOUGLAS,
supra note 47, at 22-28 (hunting as communal ritual among the Lele in West Africa);
VICTOR TURNER, THE FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL 11-12 (1967)
(hunting cult among African Ndembu people).
112. See, e.g., Help for Non-Sporting Spouses, OUTDOOR LIFE, Nov. 1999, at 18 (on
child's first hunting experience and how hunting strengthens family ties); Sibling
Rivalry, N. AM. WHITETAIL, Nov. 1999, at 46 (hunting as ongoing family experience).
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visioned as a family tradition handed down from generation to
generation that evokes archetypal images of our hunter-gatherer
ancestors.1 3 Additionally, hunting has a well known affective
quality that can most clearly be seen in the emphatic reactions
expressed by hunting groups at the threat of gun control laws.
Indeed, the social identity of some communities appears to be
defined, to some extent, by this activity.114 Hunting also pro-
vides a clear example of the way in which beneficial social
norms can be instantiated in connection with ritualized activity.
Because hunting can be quite dangerous, norms of safety are in-
culcated into children from an early age, often in the form of
rigid, easy to remember maxims or other mnemonic devices. 115
Scouting. The Boy Scouts of America offers a rich example
of the way in which formalized ritual functions in the instantia-
tion of social norms deemed beneficial to society.116 Central is
the Scout Oath, which is recited by participants at virtually
every major scouting event. The basic canon of the oath is elabo-
rated in the Scout Law, which prescribes specific norms associ-
ated with the oath (e.g., to be trustworthy, helpful, obedient,
courteous, and thrifty).117 The Boy Scout Handbook further pro-
vides concrete examples of ways to fulfill the norms embodied
in the Scout Oath, and instructs scouts to continually evaluate
the extent to which they adhere to these norms." 8 From per-
sonal experience I can vouch for many other ritualized activities
connected with scouting. Bodily posture may be rigidly pre-
scribed (e.g., standing at attention); the beginning and end of
many events (including waking up and lights out at campouts)
may be ceremonially marked; formal rites of passage mark be-
113. See Camps, Kids, and Safaris, RIFLE HUNTING, Fall 1999, at 52 (interaction of
modem American and traditional African hunters on safari); Sibling Rivalry, supra
note 112 (on family tradition).
114. Note the difficulties that were experienced by the Labour Party in trying to
ban fox hunting in England, owing to opposition from rural communities. See Pro-
posed Ban on Fox Hunting Draws Big Protest in London, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 23, 2002,
at 6A.
115. See, e.g., START 'EM YOUNG: RECRUITMENT OF KIDS TO THE GUN CULTURE,
VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, Nov. 2, 1992 (describing "Eddie the Eagle" safety cam-
paign).
116. See infra notes 422-24 and accompanying text for a discussion from a ritual
perspective of the recent Supreme Court decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
concerning the right of the Scouts to exclude homosexual scoutmasters.
117. See BoY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, THE BOY SCOUT HANDBOOK 45, 108 (11th ed.
1998).
118. See id. See also id. at 7-9 for other examples of ritualized activities, such as
saluting, use of special signs and handshakes, and reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.
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coming a member of the scouts and of achieving higher rank;
and older troops can have a strong sense of tradition and follow
special customs, unique to themselves. The net effect is to estab-
lish a specific group identity, a mini-universe of sequenced
events, postures, and utterances that reinforce the normative
world encapsulated in the Scout Oath canon, and to profoundly
affect individual behavior and values outside the context of
scouting.
Voting. Public choice theory has found it difficult to explain
why people vote, in light of the fact that the probability of any
single vote changing the outcome of an election is outweighed
by the cost of voting itself.'1 9 To overcome this theoretical prob-
lem, recent scholarship has suggested that the decision to vote is
promoted by a social norm.120 While this is certainly true, such a
view misses an essential dimension of the problem. Voting is
not just norm-governed, but is also a ritualized practice. The
voting process substantially meets all of the criteria discussed
above for ritualized behavior. It is repetitive and the formalities
involved in casting a ballot are rigidly stylized and highly rule
governed. Formality, external encoding, and a limited code of
expression are further emphasized by the fact that generally (ex-
cepting the unusual case of a write-in ballot) the voter must
choose among the candidates listed on the ballot, or vote yes/no
on a given issue. Additionally, the voting booth constitutes a
quasi-sacral site, set apart from normal routines of life, where
the voter engages in the performative (ritualistic) act. Moreover,
the act of voting is enmeshed in a host of other political rituals,
ranging from participation in campaign events (either personally
or through television) to the formal ritual of the inauguration of
the winning candidate. Indeed, Kertzer and others have charac-
terized voting as the central performance in an entire complex of
"electoral rituals."121
119. See, e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY 70 (1994). Of course, the 2000 presidential election results have
highlighted the potential impact of a small number of votes on the larger electoral
process.
120. See Richard Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (1996).
121. See, e.g., KERTZER, supra note 70, at 49. The performative and ritualized as-
pects of voting appear even more clearly in the historical record. Prior to the adop-
tion of the secret ballot, voting was an open, public, and communal act. See
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 174-233 (1988) (describing the rituals
surrounding electioneering and voting in eighteenth century Britain and America).
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIVE FUNCTION OF RITUAL
The persistence of myriad ritualized practices in a largely
secular society turns out to be a reflection of the constitutive role
that ritual plays in our speaking, thinking and acting, as well as
in the way that we organize and create our perceptions of real-
ity. This section explores this "constitutive" aspect of ritualiza-
tion and its profound impact on informal social norms.
A. Ritual As Communication
1. Social Norms and Communicative Failure
In most real world situations, communicative activity is a
pervasive feature in the generation and mairitenance of systems
of informal social norms. Both experimental evidence and
fieldwork strongly suggest that even a limited amount of com-
munication between individuals faced with a collective action
problem can significantly enhance the likelihood of a coopera-
tive outcome. 122 But even where explicit communication is rare,
there still must be a widespread, intersubjective consensus con-
cerning shared background assumptions, rules, and meanings.
Because these factors are all conceived of and expressed through
language, the inherent problems of human communication can-
not be ignored. This point has been obscured by the practice of
modeling collective action problems in terms of non-cooperative
game theory that ignores the possibility of communication
among players outside the context of moves in the game itself.123
The innate plasticity of language lends itself to problems of
ambiguity, referential indeterminacy, and lying, and tends to
cause erosion in generally accepted linguistic meanings during
the course of everyday practice. These types of limitations on
human communicative activity can potentially impose devastat-
ing transaction costs on the ability for human interaction to es-
tablish stable normative orders.1 24 If the meaning of fundamen-
122. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 21, at 167-69.
123. See CHwE, supra note 2, at 96-99.
124. In the context of informal social norms, transactions cost analysis has been
traditionally applied to the process by which norms are developed and applied in a
system of social control, both with respect to the costs of regulating behavior
through norms (for example, the cost of informal sanctioning), and especially to
costs that can prevent the generation of beneficial norms in the first place. See
ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 1, at 173-74. The analysis offered here considers ad-
ditional types of costs that have generally been ignored (or valued at zero) in prior
discussions. On the need to enlarge our conception of transactions costs beyond
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tal terms had to be constantly negotiated in the course of our in-
teractions with others, the effort required to search for and de-
velop common understanding would likely overwhelm the sys-
tem and outstrip human cognitive capacity.125 Too great a
degree of malleability or too rapid a rate of change in the mean-
ing of norms would likewise inhibit the formation of a stable
system. Preferences for norms among the population would be
subject to continual shifts, reflecting changes in the social mean-
ing of the activity in question, thereby inhibiting the formation
of a stable equilibrium around a set of norms as well as the es-
tablishment of a coherent set of reputational rewards for norm
adherents and sanctions for norm violators.126 If we imagine the
understanding of the precepts of informal social norms and the
content of social meanings as a statistical average-that enough
of the population understand them in the same way so as to es-
tablish a common understanding of the norm-ordinary usage
and inherent flexibility constantly threaten this critical mass.127
These problems occur both in systems of formal and informal
social control,128 but are arguably more intractable with informal
control systems that lack authoritative interpreters. 29
factors directly related to the bargaining process, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behav-
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1498 (1998).
125. See, e.g., OSTROM ET AL., supra note 21, at 327-28 (on the need for individuals
to find others sharing the same mental heuristic to facilitate cooperative behavior);
see also CHONG, RATIONAL LIVES, supra note 1, at 216.
126. See Richard H. McAdams, Modeling Morality: What Are the Limits of Self-
Directed Preference Change, 78 B.U. L. REV. 947, 951 n.17 (1998).
127. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 126-30; Edmund Leach, The Influence of
Cultural Context on Non-Verbal Communication in Man, in NON-VERBAL
COMMUNICATION 315 (Robert A. Hinde ed., 1972).
128. Carol Rose has noted how formal law tends to fluctuate between clear rules
("crystals") and more formless standards ("mud") and back again. Here, however,
stabilization of clear meanings can be accomplished through the agency of an au-
thoritative interpreter, either by the act of a legislature or by explicit agreement be-
tween two affected parties. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40
STAN L. REV. 577 (1988), reprinted in CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION
199-232 (1994). For a perceptive analysis of judges' attempts to deal with problems
of linguistic ambiguity in formal law, see LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
JUDGES (1993).
129. In the context of informal social directives, Kent Greenawalt has shown
how difficult it is for a basketball player, instructed by her coach "[D]on't shoot; run
out the clock," or for a housekeeper, instructed to "buy soupmeat every Monday
from Store X" to interpret how to carry out these instructions in light of pragmatic
ambiguity, the potentially multiple contexts in which the instructions may have to
be applied in the course of the game or of shopping, and of the potential semantic
ambiguity of key terms (such as "soupmeat"). See generally Kent Greenawalt, From
the Bottom Up, 82 CORNELL. L. REV. 994 (1997). The potential for such ambiguity is
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These types of communicative problems give rise to three
potential types of "cultural" transaction costs that have a par-
ticular importance for informal social norms. The first is the
problem of trust. There must be a minimum threshold level of
trust among members of a society without which successful co-
operative activity simply cannot occur.130 One way that social
trust is achieved results from a human cognitive bias towards
trust and a provisional belief, subject to later disapproval, in the
veracity of information that we receive.1 31 This bias is relatively
weak, however, and individuals can, and do, take into account
the possibility of deceit. A sense of trust is also established by
repeated successful social interactions among individuals, or by
a process of signaling that one! is a trustworthy partner. 132 These
processes too are subject to limitations, however, and where the
level of social trust is sufficiently low, people rarely engage in
the types of social interaction that can give rise to beneficial so-
cial norms.133
Another type of potential cost relates to the question of how
we determine under what circumstances a social norm has been
violated. Unlike the case of idealized game theoretic models, in
real social interactions the line between adhering to and violat-
ing a norm is often unclear. The meaning of the norm may be
fuzzy,134 the relevant social context may be ambiguous, 135 and
we cannot look into another person's mind in order to determine
whether her partial compliance with normative behavior reflects
genuine cooperation, or whether her partial noncompliance re-
even greater in the case of those directives that, like many informal norms, lack ma-
terial referents. Edwin Hutchins provides a detailed ethnographic account of the
problems posed by ambiguity and by other informational constraints on the clear
transmission of instructions even in such a highly structured and rule-governed ac-
tivity as the task-performance of a naval vessel's navigation team. See HUTCHINS,
supra note 6, at 209-17.
130. See generally North, supra note 49; Eve E. Sweetser, The Definition of Lie: An
Examination of Folk Models Underlying a Semantic Prototype, in CULTURAL
MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT, supra note 52.
131. See North, supra note 49; Sweetser, supra note 130.
132. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 21, at 323.
133. See id. at 328; DOUGLAS & NEY, supra note 9, at 168-69.
134. See Posner, Inefficient Norms, supra note 1, at 1699; Gillette, supra note 24, at
825.
135. Note, for example, that the definition of cheating in a social-contract situa-
tion depends upon the perspectives of the parties included, and appears to be
highly content and context dependent. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive




flects a defection.136 Even something as apparently straightfor-
ward as deciding whether or not someone is lying turns out of-
ten to be indeterminate. 37 One way that individuals deal with
this difficulty is by developing social heuristics to make rough
and ready determinations as to when behavior slips across the
border into defection or a lie. 38 Such individual heuristic rules,
however, may not be widely shared, and thus may prove inef-
fective in establishing and stabilizing a widely shared under-
standing of what types of behavior constitute compliance or de-
fection from norms, thereby adding a significant element of
costly uncertainty into the system of social interaction.139
Third, any system of informal social norms that is (or seeks
to be) social welfare enhancing requires that individuals perform
a relatively complicated process of mental accounting, so as to
reduce the complex realities of the world into a relatively simple
set of prices, costs, benefits, and payoffs. The process of organiz-
ing widely disparate phenomena according to a common metric
can be problematic, involving significant information loss and
the question of how to correlate information obtained from in-
commensurably organized systems. This problem is particularly
acute for many norms in which the context of application is far
removed from market or market-like activity and the availability
of formal prices or relatively accessible quasi-prices.140
136. This corresponds to Lessig's argument that deviation from a norm can only
be determined by reference to a commonly understood meaning of the norm. As
discussed below, ritual is an important method through which meanings are "objec-
tified" (in Lessig's terminology) and thereby made more effective. See Lessig, supra
note 47, at 680-81.
137. Research in cognitive linguistics has shown that in many common situa-
tions, people with full knowledge of the relevant factual background (including the
intention of the speaker) still appear unable to decide whether a given statement
should be categorized as a lie. In experiments, subjects were presented with three
proposed conditions for the definition of a lie: (a) the speaker believes that a state-
ment is false; (b) the speaker intends to deceive; and (c) the statement is in fact false.
Where all of the conditions are met, the respondents have no difficulty in identify-
ing the statement as a lie; conversely where none of the conditions are met, they
have no difficulty categorizing the statement as a non-lie. Where only some condi-
tions are met, however, the subjects frequently became confused and unable to
categorize the statement as a lie or as a non-lie. See Linda Coleman & Paul Kay,
Prototype Semantics: The English Word Lie, 57(1) LANGUAGE 26 (1981); Sweetser, supra
note 130, at 43-44.
138. See Sweetser, supra note 130, at 47.
139. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 21, at 327-28 (discussing the importance of
finding partners with shared mental heuristic frameworks).
140. This does not necessarily mean that individuals cannot create a workable
price system in these contexts. Robert Ellickson has suggested that individuals can
[Vol. 43
2003] RITUAL & SOCIAL NORMS JURISPRUDENCE 421
In theory, it is possible that these difficulties could be re-
solved solely by the use of cost-benefit mechanisms like sanc-
tioning, conferral of esteem, and signaling to promote uniform
understandings. Sanctions can prevent individuals from adopt-
ing idiosyncratic meanings of social norms that deviate too far
from common understandings, and conferral of esteem can
promote consensus around a dominant understanding of a new
normative model. Alternatively, as individuals become aware of
a problem of variant meanings, they can signal their individual
understandings of a new meaning to one another, until a new
equilibrium is achieved wherein a sufficient percentage of the
population adopts the new understanding.
There are ample reasons to believe, however, that this can-
not be the whole story. Sanctioning and signaling are costly,
and therefore are only feasible where not too many semantic and
cultural meanings are continually "up for grabs." 41 Variations
in cultural meanings and the understanding of norms may often
occur imperceptibly, on the largely unobservable cogni-
tive/linguistic level, and therefore not be amenable to conscious
sanctioning or conferral of esteem. Such a procedure would also
be very cognitively inefficient. When we consciously adopt a
decision to sanction or signal, we utilize a type of explicit, "de-
develop "rough and ready" valuations through observation of the behavior of oth-
ers. See ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 1, at 172-73. A similar rough valuation sys-
tem is implicit in Bourdieu's symbolic exchange theory. See, e.g., BOURDIEU, LOGIC,
supra note 6, at 112-21. In a series of ethnomethodological studies, Jean Lave has
documented how individuals employ highly efficient heuristics to solve difficult
quantification problems in everyday life. See, e.g., Jean Lave, The Savagery of the
Domestic Mind, in NAKED SCIENCE: ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO BOUNDARIES,
POWER, AND KNOWLEDGE 87-100 (Laura Nader ed., 1996) [hereinafter NAKED
SCIENCE]. Nevertheless, it is by no means clear how accurate and effective these
valuations are; there is substantial evidence that individuals do have significant
trouble pricing many types of nonmarket situations. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note
124, at 1518-19, 1545; Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes
on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1996), reprinted in BEHAV-
IORAL LAW AND ECONOMICs 232, 232-58 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); see also David
Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relationships, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1841, 1858 (1966) (on problems posed by "noneconomic" motivations for
understanding the development and effectiveness of normative systems).
141. Lessig argues, for reasons similar to these, that signaling can never by itself
solve problems of intersubjective interpretations of social meanings (including the
meanings of informal social norms), in opposition to strong theories of signaling
which suggest that the signaling process can overcome these difficulties. Compare
Lessig, supra note 47, at 682-83, and CHWE, supra note 2, at 79-83 (processes of
transmitting symbolically coded information cannot be divorced from considera-
tions of semantic content), with Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meanings, and
Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553 (1998).
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liberative" cognition.142 This deliberative style places strains
upon human information processing and short-term memory re-
sources, and is notoriously inefficient compared with more
"automatic" cognitive processes.1 43 As a result of factors such as
these, the evidence strongly suggests that cost-benefit mecha-
nisms constitute only part of the way that we acquire and retain
cultural concepts like social norms.1 44
These problems of communicative practice are resolved (in
a satisfactory, although not optimal fashion), by a much more
complex interaction that involves basic processes of human cog-
nition and the use of cultural artifacts, along with social prac-
tices like signaling and sanctioning. 45 Cultural practices like
ritual play a central role in this process, providing vital tools to
help resolve difficulties that would be hard, if not impossible, to
deal with in any other way. It is here that the real work of ritual-
ized behavior begins.
2. Problems of Reference: Ambiguity and Lying
Ordinary speech typically uses conventional linguistic
terms to convey a wide variety of information concerning the ac-
tual or possible states of affairs in the world or of the psycho-
logical state of the sender. The flexibility inherent in this type of
communication allows a sender to communicate fine gradations
of meaning corresponding to the infinite variety of distinct states
of affairs that can exist in the actual world.146 This flexibility in-
142. See, e.g., ROY D'ANDRADE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF COGNITIVE AN-
THROPOLOGY 136-49 (1995); Steven A. Sloman, Rational Versus Arational Models of
Thought, in THE NATURE OF COGNITION, supra note 49, at 557.
143. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 142; Sloman, supra note 142.
144. Thus, theories of learning emphasize, in addition to explicit correc-
tion/sanction mechanisms, the ability of learners to obtain information through di-
rect observation, verbal exchanges, and emulation of adult exemplars. See, e.g.,
BAMBI B. SCHIEFFELIN, THE GIVE AND TAKE OF EVERYDAY LIFE: LANGUAGE
SOCIALIZATION OF KALULI CHILDREN 5 (1990); TOMASELLO, supra note 4, at 81-82; R.
MURRAY THOMAS, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT THEORIES 75-84 (1999). Similarly, genera-
tive linguistic theories of the process whereby children achieve linguistic compe-
tence stress, in addition to an innate "language instinct," direct emulation of adult
discourse patterns. See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 286-93 (1994);
see also STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 94 ("Human learning depends on more
than appropriate rewards and punishments.").
145. On the role of cultural factors in communication and group cognition, see,
e.g., D'ANDRADE, supra note 142, at 207-12; HUTCHINS, supra note 6, at 261-62; Andy
Clark, Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition, in A COMPANION TO COGNITIVE
SCIENCE, supra note 10, at 506, 509-10, 515.
146. See RAY JACKENDOFF, FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE: BRAIN, MEANING,
GRAMMAR, EVOLUTION 38-39 (2002); RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 151.
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herent in language is not found in animal communication, and
enables us not only to communicate, but also to engage in most
if not all of what we think of as higher thought, such as planning
or decision-making.147
Such freedom of expression is obtained at a cost, however,
which is implicated in the very flexibility of language itself.
First, there is the problem of ambiguity. Although context in
many cases allows a listener to infer the correct meaning of a
semantically ambiguous expression, this is not always the
case.1 48 Ambiguity can also result from problems of linguistic
framing, where the basic lexical meaning is clear enough, but
where its use in a specific pragmatic context is inappropriate or
confusing.149
Lying is also a problem. Formal semanticists separate de-
clarative sentences into two categories. A sentence is linguisti-
cally true (or false) if its truth (or falsehood) is determined solely
by the semantics of the language, and it is not necessary to verify
any facts about the nonlinguistic world in order to determine its
accuracy (e.g., "If John is a bachelor, then John is unmarried.").150
This is in contrast to a sentence that is empirically true or false
depending upon the state of affairs in the nonlinguistic world.151
All empirically true or false declaratory statements are poten-
tially subject to the problem that the sender is consciously or un-
consciously transmitting a message that, although unambigu-
147. See DEACON, supra note 4, at 79-101; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 4-11;
ANTHONY WILDEN, SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE: ESSAYS IN COMMUNICATION AND
EXCHANGE 166-77 (1972).
148. See, e.g., RAY JACKENDOFF, SEMANTIC STRUCTURES 9 (1990) (noting that inde-
terminacy is "rampant" in lexical concepts); JOHN LYONS, LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS:
AN INTRODUCTION 56-60, 266-68 (1995); PINKER, supra note 144, at 69-70.
149. See, e.g., Charles Fillmore, Frames and the Semantics of Understanding, 6
QUADERNI DI SEMANTICA 222 (1985). Fillmore has also provided a well known ex-
ample of the framing issue: although it is tautologous that a "bachelor" is an "un-
married man," is the Pope really a bachelor? See Charles Fillmore, Towards a De-
scriptive Framework for Special Deixis, in SPEECH, PLACE, AND ACTION: STUDIES OF
DEIXIS AND RELATED TOPICS 31, 34 (R.J. Jarvella & W. Klein eds., 1982), quoted in
GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS 70 (1987).
150. See ADRIAN AKMAJIAN ET AL., LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 230-31 (4th ed. 1995); see also RONNIE CANN,
FORMAL SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 13-23 (1993). This is not the place to enter
the vexed linguistic dispute as to whether or not semantic representations are ulti-
mately grounded in referential truth conditions. In many forms of everyday dis*-
course, truth conditions and logical entailment do play a significant role in commu-
nication. See JACKENDOFF, supra note 146, at 328-29.
151. See AKMAJIAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 230.
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ous, misrepresents a state of affairs or the sender's intention.15 2
The nature of ritual performance as communicative activity
serves significantly to mitigate such difficulties. The enactment
of any rite necessarily entails the simultaneous performance of
two types of performances, the "canonical" and the "self-
referential." 153 As a result of this dual structure, ritual perform-
ance requires the transmission of two separate messages con-
taining distinctly different content and expressing contrasting
relationships between the signifier and the signified. The mean-
ing of any ritual, and in particular the strong sense of obligation
on the part of participants to norms instantiated in connection
with ritual activities, are to a large extent the result of the inter-
action between these two components of the ritual process.
54
This dual communicative process is unique to ritual.
Canonical performance is associated with the expression of
the canon's statements and beliefs. Because the canon is invari-
ant, its reiteration in repeated rituals provides no information
about current states of affairs to the participants; rather, any in-
formation conveyed has an abstract, timeless quality.155 For ex-
ample, periodic recitation of the sh'ma by an Orthodox Jew con-
veys no new information as to the meaning of the words, or the
state of mind of the speaker. This is particularly true inasmuch
as the canon cannot express the performer's own thoughts and
feelings as the cannon has not been encoded by the performer.
The self-referential aspect of the ritual, in contrast, involves the
message conveyed by the performer about her current state of
affairs and state of mind through participation in the ritual proc-
ess itself.15 6 This type of performance is treated as self-referential
because communicating information about the participant's cur-
rent social and mental condition to others inevitably and fun-
damentally also conveys information to herself about her psy-
chic state, social position, and sense of obligation to the social
and linguistic conventions and norms generated in the ritual
process.157 For example, while private rituals, such as a Catholic
saying the rosary or an Orthodox Jew reciting morning prayers,
do not convey information to third-parties, they do reaffirm the
152. See id; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 11-17.
153. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
155. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 52-58.
156. See id. at 54-58.
157. See id. at 51, 54-58.
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participant's state of belief, at that moment, in the dogmas and
norms of Catholicism and Judaism.
The importance of this aspect of self-referentiality can
clearly be seen by analyzing ritual communication from a semi-
otic perspective. Using Peirceian categories, we can say that or-
dinary discourse is primarily conducted with "symbols": ab-
stract signs that designate a signified solely on the basis of
conventional usage.158 In addition, ordinary discourse normally
privileges the underlying meaning of a statement (the signified)
over the words used to express such statements (the signifiers),
which ideally should provide a transparent linguistic medium.
In contrast to ordinary discourse, self-referential ritual commu-
nication commonly utilizes indexical and/or iconic forms.159
An "indexical" sign represents the signified by displaying a
physical relationship between signifier and signified, whereas an
"icon" is a physical object that represents the signified by virtue
of the fact that the icon and the signified possess certain physical
elements in common.160 Take, for example, the fundamental de-
cision to participate in a ritual. The bodily act of participation
constitutes a physical indexical sign of compliance with the con-
cepts and norms associated with the ritual's invariant canon;161 it
indicates membership in the ritual community, rather than
merely symbolizing it. Thus, physical participation in a ritualized
practice conveys to others and to the participant a representation
of an otherwise unknowable internal psychic state.162 At the
same time, the relationship between signified and signifier is re-
versed in ritual communication. The emphasis is placed upon
the form of expression itself. The invariable canon (the ostensi-
ble signified) is already known and can reveal no new meanings
in successive ritual performances. Rather, the information con-
veyed about the current status and mental state of the performer
due to the ritual acts (signifiers) themselves is what makes it sig-
158. For a discussion of Peirceian categories, see 1 JOHN LYONS, SEMANTICS 99-
109 (1977).
159. See BELL, supra note 66, at 129; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 54-67.
160. See HERBERT H. CLARK, USING LANGUAGE 156-59 (1996); 1 LYONS, supra note
158, at 102-07.
161. Bodily actions in particular have a powerful impact on both an individual's
self-identity and also on messages transmitted to others. See, e.g., BOURDIEU, LOGIC,
supra note 6, at 66-79; DOUGLAS, supra note 67, at 69-87; see also infra notes 317-20
and accompanying text.
162. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 54-58.
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significant. 163 Ritual communication thus reduces important
sources of referential indeterminacy and opacity by physically
creating-in the presence of oneself and of the other partici-
pants- a number of key referents. In this way, ritual perform-
ance can also be said to move otherwise empirically true or false
communication toward the state of being linguistically true, by
embedding in the performance itself many of the empirical data
necessary to determine the truth of the statement. This commu-
nicative value of the physical and sensory nature of ritual per-
formance is even more significant if, as cognitive linguists sug-
gest, our most basic grounding of reference for the meaning of
statements by others arises from the kinesthetic awareness of
our own bodies.164
This physical, self-referential ritual communication consti-
tutes ari important part of the larger semantic category of "para-
linguistic" phenomena. Paralinguistic features include various
physical actions, including vocal signals (e.g., tone of voice), ges-
tures, and facial expressions, which play a supporting role in
verbal communication. 165 Paralinguistic signals allow us to
communicate that which we can only express with difficulty (if
at all) by means of words. They also provide a metalanguage
through which we frame the pragmatic effect of our discourse
on our listeners, subtly articulate social relationships, and ex-
press our public attitudes and social personalities. 66 In evolu-
tionary terms, paralinguistic signaling is a very old and wide-
spread phenomenon, employed by many nonverbal animals as
well as by human beings in conjunction with verbal communica-
tion.167 All natural languages contain paralinguistic features,
and arguably all verbal communicative systems must be com-
plemented with paralinguistic practices that can express the oth-
erwise hidden or inexpressible, and can provide metalinguistic
163. See id. at 53.
164. See LAKOFF, supra note 149, at 269-303; GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH 94-117 (1999); Ronald W. Langacker, Conceptualization,
Symbolization, and Grammar, in THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE: COGNITIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE STRUCTURE 1-39 (Michael Tomasello
ed., 1998). For a different perspective that likewise emphasizes the role of (embod-
ied) conceptions of space and time in semantic communication, see JACKENDOFF,
supra note 148, at 16, 25-27.
165. See 1 LYONS, supra note 158, at 61.
166. See id. at 61-66; GREGORY BATESON, STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND 370-72
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1972).
167. See BATESON, supra note 166, at 370-72.
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context for our utterances. 168 In both animals and humans,
probably the most important functions of paralinguistic com-
munication are precisely these interpersonal social aspects:
when a dog playfully pretends to bite his owner, it is paralin-
guistically signaling that it is friendly (and therefore would not
in fact harm the owner); when a speaker addresses a physically
restless or inattentive audience, the paralinguistic expression is
that the audience views the speaker as not worth paying atten-
tion to.169
The interaction of invariant canon with indexical, iconic,
and self-referential performance thus creates a sense of confi-
dence among observers that the ritual participant will adhere to
the content of the ritual canon and its associated norms in the
face of the potential problems of ambiguity and lying. Ritual
communication forces participants to make relatively unambi-
guous statements concerning their current status and mental
state, which makes it much more difficult for an individual per-
former to dissemble her meaning or make it ambiguous.170 In-
dexical/iconic communication and the signifier/ signified inver-
sion provide concrete indicia of the performer's otherwise
unobservable intention to comply with the ritual's content and
with those norms associated with the ritual. Through metalin-
guistic communication, the ritual process also creates a social re-
lationship that ritual anthropologist Roy Rappaport termed
"hypertrust": a participant's heightened sense that others actu-
ally believe what they are saying and will act accordingly.171 For
example, I may promise to be your ally, but it is much more
powerful if I physically dance an "alliance dance" with you. 172
168. See 1 LYONS, supra note 158, at 64-65.
169. See id. at 67; BATESON, supra note 166, at 370-72; WILDEN, supra note 147, at
172-73.
170. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 54-58.
171. See id. at 57-58.
172. See id; PASCAL BOYER, RELIGION EXPLAINED 245 (2001) (ritual participation
signals to others that participant "will cooperate regardless of cost"); DEACON, supra
note 4, at 402-04 (use of ritual to make the concept of "peace" concrete and emo-
tionally motivating). There is also evidence from neuroscience suggesting that rit-
ual behavior creates a deep sense of trust among participants by acting directly on
the neuromodulators in the brain. See WALTER J. FREEMAN, How BRAINS MAKE UP
THEIR MINDS 11 (2000). The self-referential aspect of ritual performance and the
ability to demonstrate to others, in a very powerful manner, our adherence to ritu-
alized beliefs and norms, is similar to the types of activity analyzed by Eric Posner
in his theory of signaling, and my discussion of ritual communication is in a num-
ber of ways compatible with his thesis. See, e.g., POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note
1, at 24 (on "rituals of mutual assurance"); see also supra notes 33-38 and accompany-
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These self-referential and metacommunicative aspects of
ritual communication are especially important in situations
where the signified is of a covert or incorporeal nature, espe-
cially social concepts such as honor, prestige, worthiness, and in-
fluence. Because the referents for these abstract qualities are ei-
ther intangible or - as in the case of social attributes - only come
into existence through ephemeral and highly contextual social
interactions, it is often difficult in ordinary discourse to articu-
late the full meaning of such terms. 173 An individual has pres-
tige when enough people defer to her, and the deference is of
significant quality, but it is difficult to capture this highly nu-
anced reality in a set of formal truth conditions. It is likewise of-
ten difficult to be precise about the degree to which a person en-
joys attributes like honor or prestige. Moreover, because of this
imprecision, we face the problem of the lie and of strategic be-
havior. For instance, every political candidate claims to be "the
people's choice," but is this true or simply a political stratagem
to gain the support that she does not in fact currently have?
174
ing text. There are, however, certain fundamental differences. For example, by
treating symbolic action simply as the passive demonstration of cooperative intent
(low discount rate), Posner's analysis ignores the active role that self-referential rit-
ual signaling plays in affirmatively creating the very framework of obligation and
of the terms of cooperation. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. On the
importance of distinguishing, in the context of social norms, an affirmative obliga-
tion from other types of behavior, see Cooter, Normative Failure, supra note 1, at 954.
There is also a sign of a more fundamental disagreement. In the context of ritual
practice and ritualized norms, I simply cannot accept Posner's view that a social
norm is simply a behavioral regularity resulting from signaling behavior, lacking
independent motivational force. See POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 1, at 28.
The overwhelming evidence from decades'of ethnographic study has documented
the power of ritual practice to transform the obligatory into the affectively desir-
able. See infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text. In addition, viewing social
norms in this manner does not fit well with much of our new understanding of how
physicality and emotion affect human rationality and the motivational sources of
human behavior, including the role played by the ritual process on the workings of
human cognition. See FREEMAN, supra, at 11. See infra notes 317-31 and accompany-
ing text. These same objections also apply to Chwe's publicity theory, which treats
ritual action as fundamentally a way to create common knowledge in order to solve
social coordination problems. See CHWE, supra note 2, at 1-18. From this perspec-
tive, Chwe's argument that "[W]idespread ritual signs of dominance do not by their
omnipresence evoke transcendence but are rather more like saturation advertis-
ing... " appears to be far too rediuctive. CHWE, supra note 2, at 21.
173. See DEACON, supra note 4, at 402-08; JACKENDOFF, supra note 146, at 299.
According to Jackendoff, highly abstract objects can only be understood through
metaphor based on concrete objects. See id. On the role of metaphor in ritual, see
infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
174. Similarly, successful national politicians (above all successful presidential
candidates) routinely claim a "mandate" from the voters, even if (as was the case in
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Note that this class of intangible social abstractions includes
many of the basic building blocks of social categorization and
entitlement that are necessary for a community to create social
norms in the first place. 75
Through self-referential ritual communication, the mean-
ings of such abstractions become accessible by being linked to
tangible significations.176 Whenever a politician is seen in the
presence of adoring crowds during an electoral ritual, the physi-
cal act of the crowd participating in a rally indexically represents
the candidate's popularity, while the very presence of the crowd
itself (presumably as part of a larger group of supporters) con-
veys the same message iconically. It is one thing to say that I am
popular, another to appear in the midst of a throng of support-
ers.' 77 For example, Martin Luther King's march in Washington
was a demonstration in the fundamental sense of the term; the
march not only asserted support for the civil rights movement, it
also displayed (literally "demonstrated") this support. 78 More-
over, in some cases, the ritual act itself actually creates the signi-
fied, and thus itself creates its own truth conditions. 179 If a soci-
ety accords prestige on the basis of competitive public
distributions, then those individuals who display larger ritual
distributions ipso facto have more prestige; higher status is a
necessary entailment of ritualized generosity.'so Similarly, a po-
the 2000 U.S. Presidential election), their electoral support is very soft. See BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 255 (1991).
175. On the way that such abstract "constitutive" rules establish the institutional
reality that undergirds social interaction, see SEARLE, supra note 10, at 43-51. As for
basic entitlements as a viable system of informal norms, see ELLICKSON, ORDER, su-
pra note 1, at 174-77. Ellickson's analysis is limited to property rights (and the sup-
plementary rules that protect these rights), and purely distributive norms such as
charity. But the category of entitlements underlying a social order has been prof-
itably extended to take into account such intangible features as trust, status, and
honor. See, e.g., POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 1, at 56-58 (discussing status);
JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 116-18 (1989) (discussing honor). Bourdieu
has likewise highlighted the importance of abstract "symbolic capital" in his social
exchange theory. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 1-
102 (John B. Thompson ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., 1991).
176. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 141-42; see also DEACON, supra note 4, at
401-10.
177. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 55.
178. On the importance of iconic demonstration in communication, see CLARK,
supra note 145, at 174-76.
179. On truth conditions and entailments, see generally 1 LYONS, supra note 158,
at 163-76.
180. See BELL, supra note 66, at 120; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 77-80. A good
example of how a distributive ritual creates social prestige is the potlach ritual
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litical candidate's prestige and popularity itself are (at least
partly) instantiated by the very presence of the crowd. 181 Ar-
guably, ritualization is the only way that the full import of these
concepts can be represented in the mind.
The repetitive and self-referential nature of the ritual proc-
ess, combined with the fixed nature of the ritual canon, pro-
motes an internalization of these norms and models that is rela-
tively uniform and subject to less interpersonal variation than in
other cases. In this context, the fact that the ritual canon is rig-
idly fixed and not encoded by any individual performer be-
comes particularly significant. Canonical texts and the cultural
models and norms that they embody or reinforce are quintessen-
tially public in nature; by their constant public exposure, they
come to exist outside the realm of privately understood and in-
ternalized cultural models, meanings, and norms. These texts
come "pre-interpreted" from the outside in a public and fixed
manner, sometimes from the distant past, so that their meaning
is highly over-determined, and these stock interpretations ap-
pear to participants as an inevitable part of an objectively ascer-
tainable natural order of things.182 Consequently, these models
and norms come to be understood in roughly the same way by
the entire community of ritual participants, and such partici-
pants are more likely to give esteem to adherents and sanction
violators precisely because they feel that these models and
norms are not the result of individual judgment, but rather re-
flect social or even cosmic truths.
The foregoing does not mean that the ritual process can
completely eliminate the problems of ambiguity and falsehood.
It is possible that a performer may later renege upon the pledge
to fulfill an obligation formally undertaken in the ritual process.
found among native peoples of the Pacific Northwest. See SAHLINS, Cosmologies of
Capitalism, supra note 6, at 448-52. See generally CHIEFLY FEASTS: THE ENDURING
KWAKIUTL POTLATCH (Aldona Jonaitis ed., 1991); IRVING GOLDMAN, THE MOUTH OF
HEAVEN: AN INTRODUCTION TO KWAKIUTL RELIGIOUS THOUGHT (1975). Similarly,
in Melanesia an individual's social status and personal identity are largely cultur-
ally defined by the nexus of (often ritualized) gift-exchange reciprocity relation-
ships. See DOUGLAS & NEY, supra note 9, at 93.
181. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 165.
182. See, e.g., DOTY, supra note 5, at 21. Bakhtin makes a similar point about the
overdetermined "completedness" of language, character, and temporality in the
case of the epic genre (which, of course, is closely associated with both myth and
ritual). See M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 30-34 (Michael Holquist
ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981) (indicating mythic and ritual
language as "single-meaning codes").
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Nevertheless, ritual provides the framework for obligation it-
self.183 Accepting the precepts of a canon and its associated
norms by a ritual performance is a public, social act, to some ex-
tent distinct from the performer's actual mental state. Accep-
tance does not necessarily entail belief. However, the act of
pledging one's self in a ritual is a public commitment to the obli-
gations entailed by the pledge, and a failure to perform the obli-
gations constitutes a violation of this self-commitment. The dis-
tinction is important. A failure to fulfill a ritually pledged
obligation constitutes a violation of the ritually constitutive
normative order, but does not challenge or disrupt this order. 8 4
As a result, a public, ritually enacted pledge provide for a stan-
dard by which the performer herself can evaluate her own be-
havior; moreover it also - as a result of the performer's public
act of acknowledging the normative universe -provides a solid
basis for third-party sanctioning of norm violations, based upon
the performer's own pledge to comply.
3. Problems of Change: The Stabilization of Meaning Against
Conventional Drift
Cultural conventions, including informal norms, always
remain open to the potential erosion of their generally under-
stood meanings, and therefore may be subject to losing their
ability to order human thought and behavior. 85 I term this ero-
183. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 119-24.
184. Indeed, it has plausibly been argued that this sense of obligation, generated
out of the ritual process, constitutes the fundamental grounding of moral systems in
all human cultures (dating from the beginning of the species). See id. at 104-06;
DEACON, supra note 4, at 393-410.
185. See, e.g., RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 17-18. This insight is also central to
epidemiological explanations of cultural development. See supra note 50 and ac-
companying text; see also AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 8, at 231-39 (disintegra-
tion of established meanings is necessary for cultural development). One of the
most striking examples concerning the connection between ritual and stability of
meaning involves not just shifts in meaning within a language, but the loss of lan-
guage itself. Ethnographers have noted that while speakers in Papuan New Guinea
are traditionally bilingual in their own local vernacular and in a pidgin dialect that
forms the regional lingua franca, younger speakers tend to be competent only in the
pidgin. This disappearance of the vernacular is surprising in light of the voiced
concern among elder vernacular speakers about this loss of local language and tra-
dition. One reason for the disappearance of the local vernacular is predictable: the
impact of modernization as a result of increased contact with the outside world.
The second, however, is unexpected and significant. The conversion of villagers by
Roman Catholic missionaries has undermined the traditional ritual structure, which
used the vernacular language. As a result, unconsciously the villagers have subtly
devalued the use of the vernacular in favor of the pidgin (used in Catholic rites),
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sion of meaning "conventional drift."
We have within our minds "cognitive (or cultural) models,"
abstract, schematic structures that provide the conceptual
framework through which we process and interpret outside
events, and organize many domains of experience. 186 These
cognitive schemas form the implicit, taken-for-granted models of
the world that we use to make sense out of a chaotic phenome-
nal reality, provide dynamic structures through which we rea-
son, and incorporate the ideologies and values (such as social
norms) of a culture that render it unique.187 Cognitive models
are generated and maintained in the minds of individuals by a
process of associative learning, characterized by repeated expo-
sure to the same types of stimuli and by pragmatically successful
use of the models in reasoning and problem solving.188 A cul-
tural concept, or a practice, such as following an informal social
norm, takes on an intersubjectively understandable social mean-
ing if its underlying cognitive model is mutually intelligible and
widely shared among community members through exposure to
similar life situations, common practices of socialization and
education, and exposure to well- publicized exemplars.18 9
The potential for conventional drift arises because such cen-
tripetal factors, which promote stable, mutual understandings of
with the result that they no longer invest much effort in ensuring that their children
understood the local language. See DON KULICK, LANGUAGE SHIFT AND CULTURAL
REPRODUCTION 20-21, 72 (1992).
186. See, e.g., KERTZER, supra note 70, at 83; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 93-
96; Holland & Quinn, supra note 52.
187. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 77-78; Holland & Quinn, supra note
52, at 22-27.
188. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 53-56, 125 (discussing the importance
of repeated associations for creating, maintaining, and learning cultural models).
This pattern of associative learning reflects the fact that for many types of reason-
ing, the human mind reflects a type of "connectionist" (or "pattern associator")
structure. See, e.g., id. at 48-84; STEVEN PINKER, WORDS AND RULES: THE
INGREDIENTS OF LANGUAGE 103-119 (1999); see also MICHAEL R.W. DAWSON,
UNDERSTANDING COGNITIVE SCIENCE 36-65 (1998). For an application of connec-
tionist theory in the context of contractual norms and legal doctrines, see Beverly
Horsburgh & Andrew Cappel, Cognition and Common Sense in Contract Law, 16
TOURO L. REV. 1091 (2000). On the importance of problem solving ability, see JOHN
H. HOLLAND ET AL., INDUCTION: PROCESSES OF INFERENCE, LEARNING, AND
DISCOVERY 277-79, 283 (1986) (reviewing experimental data on human use of
"pragmatic reasoning schemas"). Indeed, people will continue to use flawed deci-
sion-making models, even if they are informed of this fact, if these models remain
pragmatically useful in the common events of everyday life. See id.
189. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 122-30. On the processes through
which cultural models like social norms are internalized by individuals, see infra
notes 3334-52 and accompanying text.
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cultural models and allow these models to be used to solve
shared tasks, are offset by corresponding centrifugal tendencies,
which can potentially cause individuals to understand cultural
models in diverse, and even contradictory, manners.190 This po-
tential forms part of the general phenomenon that cultural units
are resistant to exact replication.191 More specifically, it un-
avoidably arises from the way that humans, as language-using
creatures, think and communicate.
In contrast with the instinctual programming of animals,
which greatly limits the conceptualization and response to a
given condition, the plasticity of language permits virtually lim-
itless ways in which situations can be conceptualized and,
within the limits imposed by physical reality, allows infinite po-
tential responses. Language thus makes it possible to conceive
of alternative worlds: to say "Christ is king" is inevitably, by the
nature of grammar itself, to admit the possibility that "Christ is
not king." This possibility, always inherent in language, to
imagine alternative orders greatly increases grounds for disor-
der and misunderstanding. The conception of the possible al-
ways threatens the stability of the actual, and it is only when al-
ternative orders can be imagined that the problem of
disagreement arises.192
Among the centripetal forces promoting shared under-
standings are two that are especially relevant to the process of
ritualization. Recall first that a member of a community ac-
quires her fund of common cultural models through associative
learning; models become internalized, retained, and shared by
individuals in a relatively uniform manner through repeated ex-
posure and reinforcement. The second point relates to the use of
metaphor in natural language. Our discourse is permeated by
metaphorical tropes.193 Sometimes the meanings of metaphors
are open-ended, indeterminate, and subject to creative reinter-
pretation, as in the case of poetic diction. 194 Most metaphors that
190. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 98-101, 109-110, 115-118, 120-22, 131-
34; DiMaggio, supra note 62, at 282 (noting that meanings are rarely fixed).
191. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 23, 33 (criticizing "fax model" of cul-
tural transmission).
192. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 17-22.
193. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980);
James W. Fernandez, Introduction: Confluents of Inquiry, in BEYOND METAPHOR: THE
THEORY OF TROPES IN ANTHROPOLOGY 1-13 (James W. Fernandez ed., 1991); Paul
Friedrich, Polytropy, supra, at 175.
194. Note also the use of the open-ended texture of metaphor in the process of
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we employ in ordinary discourse, however, are conventional,
and encapsulate a fixed meaning of a cultural model. 195 These
metaphors enable us to clarify what we mean to others by pro-
viding a powerful, easy to understand exemplar of the underly-
ing cognitive model that we have in mind, drawing on familiar
images from everyday life or common bodily perceptions. 196
This not only reduces possibilities for misunderstanding or di-
vergent interpretation, but also, because our use of these stock
metaphors is so pervasive, it subliminally reinforces, on a con-
stant basis, such stable interpersonal understandings of common
cultural concepts.197
Ritualization harnesses these features of associative learning
and metaphorical usage that exist on the micro-levels of per-
sonal thought and communicative interaction, and plays them
out on a larger stage. The result is a powerful clarification, stabi-
lization, and reinforcement of commonly shared linguistic and
cultural meanings of ritualized social norms.
The essence of ritual is the repetitive performance of a fixed
and invariant canon, which reflects widespread cultural models
and associated norms. Repetition by participants thus serves to
reinforce these models, even where such reinforcement may not
otherwise be available either in ordinary linguistic usage or in
the form of dominant cultural exemplars. This reinforcement is
particularly important where the scope of shared cultural mod-
els, for example, fundamental conceptions of honesty and fair-
ness, encompasses widely disparate geographical or social
groups, and where significant divergences in the understanding
of cultural symbols and norms are accordingly more likely to oc-
lexical development. When a linguistic community lacks a term for a new object or
event, it generally does not invent a new word, but metaphorically extends an exist-
ing term (e.g., the use of nautical terms for airplanes). See AKMAJIAN ET AL., supra
note 150, at 43-44.
195. See Quinn, supra note 51, at 140-52; see also DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES
INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 245-64 (1984) (discussing "dead metaphors");
Dedre Gentner et al., Metaphor Is Like Analogy, in THE ANALOGICAL MIND:
PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 199, 227-30 (Dedre Gentner et al. eds., 2001)
("conventional" metaphors).
196. For example, in describing marriage, Americans frequently resort to meta-
phors of a well-made product (e.g., "[W]e forged a lifetime proposition"), to em-
phasize a widely shared cultural model of marital lastingness, along with a con-
comitant normative commitment to make the marriage a success. See STRAUSS &
QUINN, supra note 8, at 143.
197. See id. at 104-41; Naomi Quinn, The Cultural Basis of Metaphor, in BEYOND
METAPHOR, supra note 193, at 56, 68, 74, 81 (metaphors iterate, emphasize, and fix in
the mind cultural models).
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cur.198 Thus, a shared ritual process can provide a unifying in-
fluence around a common set of understandings and practices.
The kind of reinforcement that occurs through ritual per-
formance is far more powerful than through other mediums.
Because cultural models are abstract and schematic, they estab-
lish conceptual categories on the basis of a relatively small num-
ber of prominent features. As a result, the human mind need
not take into account an infinite (and overwhelming) variety of
sensory and symbolic stimuli.199 The ritual process interacts
with and complements such schematized conceptual models.
Rituals highlight a limited series of vivid images: the external
images displayed in the ritual process correspond to the salient
features of the relevant cognitive cultural model. Consequently,
ritual performance firmly fixes cultural models in the minds of
the participants in a much more unmediated and less ambigu-
ous manner than ordinary processes of conversation and social
practice, because it can act directly upon the basic cognitive
components of comprehension. 200
Metaphor pervades the ritual process. Ritual symbolism
metonymically represents salient (often intangible) entities and
events: when the President delivers an address, alongside him
appears the flag as symbol of the Nation.201 Ritual also evokes
synecdochic, part-for-whole relationships: the ritual site may be-
come the entire cosmos, which may be timeless, encompassing
all eternity. 202 More fundamentally, the ritual process is itself a
metaphoric event, physically enacting a metonymic relationship be-
tween objects or concepts. 203 Ritual performance can thus function
in the same way as common linguistic metaphors, to clarify and
stabilize the meaning of underlying cognitive/cultural mod-
els.204 In general, ritualized metaphor tells us what we already
198. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 131.
199. See, e.g., D'ANDRADE, supra note 142, at 122-49.
200. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 82-83; see also SCHIEFFELIN, supra note 144, at
5, 113-14 (discussing the role of ritual song and poetry in strengthening previously
socialized feelings of reciprocity).
201. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 90.
202. On this "totalizing" effect of ritual practice, see infra notes 258-70 and ac-
companying text.
203. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 193, at 233-35; James W. Fernandez, The
Mission of Metaphor in Expressive Culture, 15 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 119 (1974).
204. Paul Ricoeur makes a similar point in his discussion of the "bound" charac-
ter of symbolism in ritual/sacred discourse. See Paul Ricoeur, Manifestation and
Proclamation, 11 BLAISDELL INST. J. 13 (1978), reprinted in PAUL RICOEUR, FIGURING
THE SACRED: RELIGION, NARRATIVE, AND IMAGINATION 48, 51-54 (Mark I. Wallace
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know, and tells it clearly and repeatedly.
One way to view ritual, therefore, is to see it at the apex of
an unbroken continuum of cognitive, linguistic, and social
mechanisms for ensuring stable intersubjective understandings.
This continuum begins at the micro-level of individual cogni-
tion,205 and reaches its fullest development in formal public
ceremony. The primary cultural meanings and norms that are
implicitly imparted by caregivers to children in their families of
origin in the early learning process are subliminally stabilized
through our ordinary conversational practices, and thus are rep-
licated in the form of widely shared rites and myths.206
4. Digital Representations of an Analogic World and the Problem
of Incommensurability
The previous discussion focused on ritual solutions to po-
tential weaknesses in our use of language to communicate. Rit-
ual also plays an important role in two more general aspects of
information transmission, both linguistic and non-linguistic.
The first relates to the disparity between the way information is
organized in digital and analogic systems. The second concerns
the problem of transmitting information across incommensura-
bly organized systems.
Many of the phenomena in the outside world are composed
of a seamless reality characterized by minute distinctions and
classifications that imperceptibly merge into one another at the
edges. In information theory, information of this type is termed
"analogic" (or "continuous"), referring to entities and processes
whose values change through continuous imperceptible grada-
tions.207 In contrast, in the "digital" mode of information, the
values of entities and processes do not change through contigu-
ed., David Pellauer trans., 1995).
205. See Collins, supra note 6, at 998-102 (on microsociological "interaction ritual
chains").
206. See, e.g., KERTZER, supra note 70, at 13; EDMUND LEACH, Ritual as an Expres-
sion of Social Status, reprinted in 1 THE ESSENTIAL EDMUND LEACH 153, 153-58
(Stephen Hugh-Jones & James Laidlaw eds., 2000); SCHIEFFELIN, supra note 144, at 5,
113-15; Mary Dillon & Thomas Abercrombie, The Destroying Christ: An Aymara Myth
of Conquest, in RETHINKING HISTORY AND MYTH, supra note 72, at 54; Turner, supra
note 72, at 260-61. For examples of the importance of myths in legal discourse, see
KAHN, supra note 6, at 53, 106-12, 115-16 (1999); ACKERMAN, supra note 174, at 41-43
(prominent role played by the "myth of rediscovery" in contemporary legal dis-
course).
207. See BATESON, supra note 166, at 372-74; WILDEN, supra note 147, at 155-57,
191.
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ous infinitesimal gradations, but in discontinuous leaps.208
Symbols can be either analogic (e.g., cries of pain which vary ac-
cording to intensity) or digital (like mathematical notation)- 209
The virtue of a digital system of information is that it increases
clarity, and permits more complex messages to be transmitted,
but only at the expense of an accurate depiction of phenom-
ena.
210
The analogic/digital disparity is one facet of a broader
problem of transmitting information across otherwise inc-
ommensurable information systems. In cybernetics and systems
theory, information systems are incommensurable where they
are not organized according to a common metric or "language"
through which information is organized, evaluated, and com-
pared.211 For the study of informal social norms, problems of in-
commensurability principally arise in the interaction of three
systems: the human psychophysical system, the physical envi-
ronment, and the social system, all of which organize and proc-
ess information in distinct ways. Each individual's personal sys-
tem is concerned with organic and psychological factors,
208. See BATESON, supra note 166, at 372-74; JOHN R. PIERCE, AN INTRODUCTION
TO INFORMATION THEORY: SYMBOLS, SIGNALS & NOISE 65-67 (2d rev. ed. 1980);
WILDEN, supra note 147, at 155-57, 191. For a cultural perspective on information
theory, and its relevance to myth and ritual, see EDMUND LEACH, Genesis as Myth,
DISCOVERY 1962, reprinted in 2 THE ESSENTIAL EDMUND LEACH, supra note 206, at 29,
29-32; Edmund Leach, Ritualization in Man, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
SOC'Y. OF LONDON, SERIES B 251 (1966), reprinted in 1 id. at 158-64 (role of digitalized
"bits" to convey information over background "noise" in ritual/mythic language)
[hereinafter Leach, Ritualization].
209. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 87. Linguistic communication is generally
digital in nature, while physical types of paralinguistic communication are analogic.
See PAUL WATZLAWICK ET AL., PRAGMATICS OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION 61-62
(1967).
210. See FRED I. DRETSKE, KNOWLEDGE AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION 135-42
(1981); see also PIERCE, supra note 208, at 131-32; WILDEN, supra note 147, at 163, 168;
RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 88.
211. This notion of incommensurability was developed in the context of phi-
losophy of science. See PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD 210-13 (1975);
THOMAS KUHN, THE ROAD SINCE STRUCTURE 33-57 (2000). For a useful introduction
to the literature in this area of, see STEVE FULLER, SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 99-138
(1998). For a discussion of incommensurability from a communication/linguistic
perspective, see LAKOFF, supra note 149, at 322-37. In the legal literature, the in-
commensurability problem has generally been discussed from a perspective some-
what different than the linguistic and systems theoretic approach presented here (in
particular by emphasizing the potential problem of the "incompatibility" of differ-
ent forms of knowledge). See generally INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Symposium, Law and Incoin-
mensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ultimately connected to the growth and health of the organism,
the gratification of its desires, and ultimately, its survival.2 12
These processes may be subconscious and therefore unknown
even to the individual experiencing them, and many are
analogic. 213 Individual thought is characterized by analogic
tropes (e.g., imagery, allusion, analogy, metaphor, and symbol-
ism), at least as much as by exclusively logical, verbal formula-
tions. 214 In contrast, the social system in which an individual
operates refers to external social, economic, demographic and
political events, entities or processes, and concerns the mainte-
nance and transformation of social orders. Thought in this con-
text is characterized by a much greater prominence of conscious,
rational, and verbal processes, largely digital in nature.215 The
environmental system is composed of a series of complex rela-
tionships that exist in the physical world, and is not directly
comparable with either the intrapersonal or social systems, be-
cause it includes the needs and actions of many species other
than human beings. 216
The fact that these systems are incommensurable does not
mean that the information contained in one system is not rele-
vant to the other. Systems are normally considered incommen-
surable when there is no common metric against which informa-
tion in one system can be compared to information in another.217
For example, individual opinions, feelings, and preferences are
obviously relevant to the social order as a whole. Due to the
lack of a common metric, however, it is problematic for relevant
information from one system to be conveyed to another system
in terms that are meaningful to the different type of informa-
tional structure of the recipient system. These difficulties of the
analogic/digital dichotomy and system incommensurability
pose obvious problems for the generation of beneficial social
212. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 97-101.
213. For example, emotions are often regulated by continuous minute secretions
of chemicals throughout the neurological system. See ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE
FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS 67 (1999); WILDEN, supra note 147, at 156.
214. See, e.g., BATESON, supra note 166, at 138-42 (distinguishing "primary" and
"secondary" process thinking); LAKOFF, supra note 149 (discussing metaphor);
PINKER, supra note 188, at 279, 282 (discussing how human language capacity is a
hybrid of rules and analogic structures); Fernandez, in BEYOND METAPHOR, supra
note 193; Friedrich, Polytropy, in BEYOND METAPHOR, supra note 193 (indicating that
human thought is characterized by multiple types of tropes).
215. See BATESON, supra note 166, at 139; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 99.
216. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 98-101.
217. See supra note 211.
[Vol. 43
2003] RITUAL & SOCIAL NORMS JURISPRUDENCE 439
norms (and formal law as well). Norms exist in terms of the so-
cial system, but they cannot properly regulate behavior if they
cannot reflect relevant input from the internal systems of indi-
vidual actors, or if they do not have a predictable impact on in-
dividual behavior. Similarly, norms cannot properly regulate
the impact of human activity on the environment if information
about the environment is not available to us in cognitively and
socially usable form. This poses particularly acute problems for
cost-benefit procedures, which require individuals to perform
mental accounting in which complex analogic information from
a variety of formally incommensurable systems (like the psychic
and environmental) must be translated into a digital system of
discrete quasi-prices governing norm-following behavior. There
is substantial disagreement about the importance of these prob-
lems: at one extreme, it is argued that they preclude application
of straightforward cost-benefit procedures in many spheres of
activity,218 at the other, incommensurability is viewed as a
purely illusory phenomenon.219
Incommensurability is real and ubiquitous, but it does not
completely prevent the passage of information between incom-
patible systems. Incommensurability has traditionally been
treated primarily as a problem of translation; systems are com-
mensurable only if each concept in one system can be directly
translated into corresponding terms of the other system, pre-
serving truth conditions (think of a word-for-word translation of
French into English). 220 However, this is too limited a concep-
tion; relevant information can pass between systems in modes
other than literal translation, and many systems are thus at least
partially commensurable. 221 In communications theory, this
process is termed transduction, whereby information flows from
one system in a form understandable in terms of the other, but
only subject to considerable modification.222 The most important
method for transduction, and the only form used in many types
of systemic interaction, is digitalization.223 Thus, our brains of-
ten interact with our musculoskeletal system by means of digi-
218. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 44-64
(1993).
219. See, e.g., POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 1, at 184-202.
220. See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 195, at 183-98; see also LAKOFF, supra note 149,
at 327.
221. See LAKOFF, supra note 149, at 310-17, 322-24, 327-28, 336.
222. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 101.
223. See WILDEN, supra note 147, at 159, 185.
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talized pulses of electrical or chemical signals.2 24 The fact that
digitalization achieves transduction by increasing clarity of a
transmission at the cost of nuanced accuracy explains, for exam-
ple, why we can communicate facts about our internal state to
others through language, yet we also intuitively recognize that
our individual physical/ psychic system knows experiences,
states, and feelings that cannot be fully expressed through this
digitalized medium.
Ritual is a culturally pervasive and powerful method to
achieve informational digitalization. Because of its self-
referential nature and use of a restricted communicative code,
ritual forces communication towards a digitalized (often binary
"yes/no") mode.225 For example, one participates in a ritual
(thereby assuming all of the obligations that this entails) or one
does not. Ritual canon expresses itself in fixed, stylized units of
meaning, which likewise have a restricted or binary nature char-
acteristic of digitalization.226 Rites of passage provide a clear ex-
ample of the way that ritual practice achieves transduction from
the individual to the interpersonal social system. From the per-
spective of individual childhood development, the passage from
childhood to adulthood is a complicated, analogic process re-
flecting nuanced and graduated changes in physical and psycho-
logical development. A puberty rite, in contrast, occurs at a
fixed age and establishes as a social reality the adulthood of the
participant, regardless of the contextual physical and psycho-
logical factors. In terms of the social system, prior to the rite, the
individual is considered a child, but after the rite, the individual
224. See DAMASIO, supra note 213, at 126, 346 & n.4; WILDEN, supra note 147, at
159.
225. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 89-97. In addition, the clarity of the digi-
talized message instantiated through the ritual process is further enhanced by the
repetitive nature of many ritual performances, which instill redundancy into the
process of ritualized communication. In information theory, redundancy is charac-
terized by extra informational details that are theoretically unnecessary for a trans-
mission to be understood, but that reduce the uncertainty that might otherwise
cause a failure of communication due to background noise or errors in transmis-
sion; in particular, redundancy is a ubiquitous and necessary quality of all linguistic
communication. See PIERCE, supra note 208, at 39, 149-50; PINKER, supra note 144, at
177-78. Successive performances of the same invariant ritual convey no new infor-
mation to participants (and are therefore formally redundant), but rather serve to
drive home the meaning of the ritual, and of the norms associated with it, in an un-
ambiguous manner. See Leach, Ritualization, supra note 208, at 164.
226. See generally EDMUND R. LEACH, CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION: THE
LOGIC BY WHICH SYMBOLS ARE CONNECTED 47-64 (1976); LEACH, Genesis, in 1 THE
ESSENTIAL EDMUND LEACH, supra note 206; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 89-97.
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is considered an adult.227 The binary nature of the rite thus al-
lows analogic information concerning individual maturity, lo-
cated in the individual's private physical and psychological sys-
tem, to be expressed publicly in the incommensurable sphere of
social activity.228 To give another example, electoral rites reduce
the complex views of voters about the issues and the candidates
to a binary either/or decision between rival candidates or posi-
tions, or (in the case of proportional voting systems) greatly re-
duce the number of choices that can be expressed. 229 Similar
transductive properties have been noted in rituals that mediate
the information flow from the environmental system to the so-
cial system, ranging from relatively straightforward seasonal
rites (such as a harvest festival) to very complex ritual systems
that minutely track and express the impact of human agricul-
tural and hunting activities on environmental resources. 230
Ritual also plays another important role in transducing
relevant information across differently organized systems, one
that is not achieved by most other social or cognitive transduc-
tive mechanisms. Ritual serves to justify and reconcile us to the
loss that occurs when information must cross system borders.
Even though such loss is inevitable, in many cases it may appear
to be highly problematic, and lead us to question the validity of
the transductive process itself. For example, as lawyers, we are
acutely aware that in court proceedings, issues such as truth,
guilt, and fault can (at best) be grasped as approximations of a
much messier reality: objective indicia such as intent in a con-
tract dispute can never fully reflect the subjective beliefs and
understandings of the parties; the suffering of crime or tort vic-
tims can never be fully expressed in an interpersonal, social set-
ting; and any determination of culpability is a binary distinction
that probably cannot take into account the more nuanced fea-
tures of legal and moral responsibility. Voting in a political de-
mocracy poses similar problems. Much of what a voter believes
and feels about a candidate or issue inevitably cannot be re-
duced to the type of restrictive (yes/no) choice that collective
decision-making generally requires. We often feel that no elec-
toral option fully reflects how we feel and what we want, and
227. See ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RiTES OF PASSAGE 65-66 (Monika B. Vizedom
& Gabrielle L. Caffee trans., 1960).
228. See PINKER, supra note 188, at 286-87.
229. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 90.
230. See id. at 266-67.
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we are right to feel this way. Due to the limitations of digital-
ized communication, we can no more represent our full subjec-
tive opinion with a ballot than we can ever fully express the full
range of our subjective experience in words. Loss of personal
input is particularly significant under majoritarian decision
rules, where it is virtually certain that someone's belief that she
will be made worse off will ultimately be ignored in the final de-
cision.231
It is no accident that voting is a ritual and that trials are per-
vaded by ritual practices. Ritualization allows us to overlook or
accept the informational defects latent in each system. The self-
referential nature of ritual binds a participant to a normative ac-
ceptance of a process, in this case a legislative or judicial deci-
sion. Additionally, ritual participation can evoke powerful emo-
tional support for such a practice or make a different practice
unimaginable. Finally, because of the tight connection between
ritual and myth, ritualized practices -like those used in voting
and in trials -can become integrated into the structure that our
culture uses to organize its most basic beliefs about how the
world should work. Thus jury trials, although often criticized,
remain popularly viewed as the keystone of American judicial
procedure; the majoritarian "one person, one vote" standard ar-
ticulates an affectively powerful touchstone for American no-
tions of democratic legitimacy.
B. The Cognitive Aspects of Ritual: Attention and Memory
In our discussion of human communication, we noted a
number of ways that ritual affects individual cognitive proc-
esses, such as the way that ritual interacts with schematic mental
models and how it facilitates cognition by digitalizing input that
we receive from the outside world. In this section, we look at
ritual's impact on two additional cognitive properties: attention
and memory. Neither attention nor memory is a uniform phe-
nomenon: we pay more or less attention to a given situation, or
to specific events within a given context; our recall may be less
than fully reliable. Such variability, however, is not completely
random; it is structured in certain predictable ways, and the rit-
ual process exploits these regularities to focus attention on the
norms instantiated in a ritual, and to make them highly memo-
231. On the problematic aspects of majoritarian voting rules, see DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 43-57 (1989).
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rable.
We can only apply a social norm (either to oneself or to the
behavior of others) if we are paying sufficient attention to the
situation, and attention is likewise required to learn new norms.
Yet because we lack sufficient cognitive resources to be equally
aware of everything, some elements are always grounded in the
forefront of our consciousness, while others remain in the im-
plicit background. 232 If we are distracted from paying attention
to relevant information, we can make mistakes of judgment.233
For example, if I am lost in thought and fail to greet an old
friend when I see her, she may justifiably feel aggrieved by my
insensitivity; due to my inattentiveness, I have failed to notice
social cues triggering the application of a relevant norm, thereby
committing a gaffe.
Ritual helps us focus attention on relevant social norms by
virtue of its ability to frame social contexts and of its repetitive
nature. As Erving Goffman long ago observed, much of our
daily social interaction, such as greetings, farewells, etc., takes
the form of "interaction rituals," characterized by repeated use
of a limited set of linguistic and bodily symbolic actions. 234 One
purpose of this ritualistic behavior is to frame the social context,
and thereby focus our attention on the relevant social features of
the situation. 235 The framing of ritual performance as a special
occasion is especially prominent in more formal ritual processes,
and likewise focuses attention on the event and on the norms
that are instantiated as part of the ritual process.
Use of a system of informal social norms also requires that
we adequately recall both the content of the relevant norm itself,
and the social contexts in which the norm is applicable. But our
memory does not function like a computer disc, a storage and
retrieval system that unproblematically preserves information in
fixed form to allow us to recall past events exactly as they hap-
pened. Human memory is organized in a highly plastic phe-
nomenon. Due to the physical architecture of human neural sys-
232. See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 132-33 (1999); Randall
W. Engle & Natalie Oransky, Multi-Store Versus Dynamic Models of Temporary Storage
in Memory, in THE NATURE OF COGNITION, supra note 49, at 515, 531-34.
233. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 267-72 (2d ed. 1994)
(role of "attention bias" in causing incorrect judgments); ALVIN I. GOLDMAN,
EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION 351 (1986); Arthur S. Reber et al., Implicit Versus Ex-
plicit Learning, in THE NATURE OF COGNMON, supra note 49, at 475.
234. See ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL 5-95 (1967).
235. See id. at 113-16; ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 247-86 (1974).
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tems, our memory of a single object, such as a hammer, is not
stored in one place in the brain; rather, various aspects of the
hammer (e.g., touch, feel, function, etc.) are stored in different
locations. 236 In the act of remembering, we literally reconstruct
in our consciousness the image, emotions, and bodily sensations
associated with the recalled event. This reconstruction is never
an exact copy of the previous event.237 When information from
the outside is encoded in memory, there are systematic biases
that make certain aspects more easily accessible to consciousness
than others; when we retrieve items from memory, our current
situation can affect the content of what we reconstructively re-
member.238 Our current circumstances also appear to continu-
ously modify, on an unconscious level, the content of memories
laying dormant in the mind.239 Yet for all of this plasticity, we
do consciously retain sufficient continuity in our recollection of
past events so as to go about our daily activities, retain a unified
sense of self, and identify other individuals and social settings in
terms of a comprehensible narrative of events. As in the case of
communicative activity, this stability is the result of evolution-
ary, physical, and social factors, in which ritual plays a signifi-
cant role.
In ritualizing behavior, we make the ritual canon and the
associated norms more amenable to (relatively) faithful storage
and reconstruction. Part of this amenability is a function of in-
creased awareness; by focusing on the situation, the ritual par-
ticipant is more capable of coding relevant information into
memory.240 In addition, ritualization facilitates ease of encoding
by the fact that it tracks directly onto the schematic structures
through which our thoughts are organized. 241 Moreover, be-
cause our ability to access relevant information at a later time is
significantly increased if the situation in which the information
is presented is especially vivid or emotionally charged, 242 the
framing function of the ritual process, in conjunction with for-
236. See DAMASIO, supra note 213, at 220-22.
237. See id.; HOGARTH, supra note 43, at 92-93.
238. See DAMASIO, supra note 213, at 224-28; ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION:
MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 174-93 (1999).
239. See DAMASIO, supra note 213, at 224-28.
240. On the relationship between attention and memory, see KUNDA, supra note
238, at 163-64.
241. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text for discussion of the rela-
tionship between ritual and mental representations.
242. See KUNDA, supra note 238, at 171-72.
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mality and use of unusual symbols, can make memories associ-
ated with ritual exceptionally vivid and easily retrievable. The
emotionally charged atmosphere of ritual performance, together
with the bodily performances that accompany all ritual prac-
tices, also help ritually instantiated memories to remain less
likely to be unconsciously modified between the time of encod-
ing and the time of recall. 243 Finally, because information is
more likely to be accurately recalled if the stimuli are repeated
with a short time interval between exposures, the periodicity of
many ritual practices strongly facilitates our ability to remember
ritualized norms.244
So far, this discussion has concentrated primarily on norms
that we consciously remember and apply to ourselves or to oth-
ers. Often, however, our social judgments and behavior are
governed by norms and reactions that evade explicit awareness
and deliberative control. Cognitive psychologists term such
processes "implicit" or "automatic" behavior because these
processes are not explicitly available for introspection or delib-
eration.245 Implicit forms of learning and action are necessary
for reasons of cognitive economy; such processes are much more
efficient than explicit deliberative thought.246  Our implicit
judgments and reactions in specific social settings are created as-
sociatively by repeated (often unconscious) exposure to the same
type of social situation, and appear to be embodied in specific
neurological tracks, carved out of the brain's neuronal architec-
ture, that in effect "short-circuit" the processes of conscious
awareness. 247 Automatic behavior is then triggered by situ-
ational cues that reflect a familiar configuration of elements.248
It is readily apparent that a great deal of our learning and
application of informal social norms involve automatic processes
like this. This is most clearly seen in everyday "mindless" social
243. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 92-93 (indicating how emotion
strengthens the neural connections that underlie cultural models). See infra notes
309-35 and accompanying text for information on the relationship between ritual,
emotion, and cognition.
244. On the significance of this "spacing effect," see GOLDMAN, supra note 233, at
221-26.
245. See KUNDA, supra note 238, at 265-309; John F. Kihlstrom, Conscious Versus
Unconscious Cognition, in THE NATURE OF COGNITION, supra note 49, at 173, 173-203;
Reber et al., supra note 233.
246. See KUNDA, supra note 238, at 288-303; Kihlstrom, supra note 245, at 176.
247. See KUNDA, supra note 238, at 303-04.
248. See id. at 307; Kihlstrom, supra note 245, at 192-97.
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etiquette.249 It is also evident in action that is more significant,
such as the norm against theft.250 We usually do not consciously
deliberate whether to take another's belongings whenever we
have an opportunity to do so. Unthinkingly, we just don't do it.
Just as ritual can focus our conscious awareness and memory of
explicit forms of normative behavior, it also reinforces the im-
pact of norms on implicit judgment and behavior, by virtue of
the repetitive nature of each ritual performance, and the con-
stancy of periodic reenactments. Repetition of words and ges-
tures in a ritual performance necessarily involves a correspond-
ing repetition in our minds of the norms associated with the
ritual canon and rules governing our social judgments and be-
havior. It is these repeated associations that help form the cogni-
tive and neural patterns that ground our automatic norm-
governed conduct in much of everyday life.
C. Ritual Constitution of Social Reality
Ritual has a third constitutive role, in addition to facilitating
communication and cognition. The fact that humans must em-
ploy schematic mental structures in order to organize and com-
prehend an otherwise bewilderingly complex reality, together
with the fact that these mental categories are disseminated and
intersubjectively understood in the form of widespread cultural
models, entails that much of our understanding of reality is in
some way socially created. The most obvious forms of social
construction relate to specifically "social" phenomena such as
the presence of status hierarchies in a culture and various types
of social roles. Its more pervasive impact, however, arises from
the way that we construct our implicit, cultural background
knowledge of the way the world works, of time and space, ,and
of our conceptions of the sacred. 251 Without this background
knowledge, all rational social interaction, much less the devel-
opment of normative orders, would be extremely problematic, if
not impossible.252 Ritual has always formed an important vehi-
cle through which we create the background framework of our
249. See KUNDA, supra note 238, at 270-72.
250. Arguably, a great deal of our ability to make complex social judgments re-
flects automatic properties. See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 238, at 307; John A. Bargh,
The Automaticity in Everyday Life, 10 ADVANCES IN SOC. COGNITION 1, 50 (1997),
quoted in Kihlstrom, supra note 245, at 178-79.
251. See, e.g., SEARLE, supra note 232, at 175-96.
252. See id.
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social interactions, and one that has distinctive features and per-
forms unique functions.
1. Performative Language and the Construction of Reality
Ritual communication is characterized by a high density of
performative and commissive statements. 2 3 Speech act theory
defines a performative statement as a statement that does not
convey information about the state of the world, but rather by its
very utterance creates and realizes a state of affairs.254 When the
president-elect takes the inaugural oath, it is the recitation itself
that makes him the President, at the precise moment of the reci-
tation. "Commissive" (or "explicit performative") statements
are promises or pledges through which the speaker binds herself
to a specific course of action.255 In a manner similar to performa-
tives, it is the act of saying the promise that creates the obliga-
tion upon the speaker to perform.256 For example, among the
Maring people of New Guinea, neighbors promise to help one
another against enemies by performing a ritual "alliance
dance." 257 Another example is the pledge of allegiance in Amer-
ica, with its implication that the performer binds herself to act in
a manner consistent with the interests of her country.
At the same time that they create status or obligation, how-
ever, performative and commissive statements expressed in rit-
ual also immediately and imperceptibly merge into the realm of
facticity. Unlike declaratory sentences, performative and corn-
missive statements cannot be disproved; because they create
their own satisfaction conditions, they cannot be false.258 After
an authorized individual dubs someone a knight or inaugurates
someone as President, he is, as a matter of fact, a knight or a
President. Similarly, after a ritually enacted pledge, the per-
former is bound by the obligations undertaken, even if she later
253. See, e.g., STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, CULTURE, THOUGHT, AND SOCIAL
ACTION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 123-66 (1985); Ruth Finnegan, HoV to
Do Things with Words: Performative Utterances Among the Limba of Sierra Leone, 4 MAN
(N.S.) 537 (1969); Benjamin Ray, "Performative Utterances" in African Rituals, in 13
HISTORY OF RELIGIONS 16 (1973).
254. See STEVEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS 226-42 (1983) (discussing the relevant
terminology of Austin and Searle's theories).
255. See id.
256. See JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 60 (1969).
257. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 79-80.
258. See AKMAJIAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 374; LEVINSON, supra note 254, at
243-46.
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reneges upon them.259 Because many of the conceptions and
norms instantiated through the ritual process are unfalsifiable,
they take on the appearance of unchallengeable, immutable
truths.260 Thus, the provisional, contingent, and created nature
of concepts and obligations instantiated in the ritual process be-
come transmuted-in a manner described by anthropologist
David Kertzer as "sleight of ritual"-into the world of facticity
and thereby into a "natural" part of everyday life.261 The pre-
cepts and norms instantiated through the ritual process can thus
form a type of implicit, background knowledge that is difficult
consciously to challenge, because it appears to be integral to and
a fundamental part of the "real" world as it is,262 or to reflect
timeless, unchanging tradition.263 At times, derogation or viola-
tion of norms might thus be literally unthinkable. In many
cases, because the meanings of ritually instantiated norms have
an immutable quality in the minds of most if not all individuals
in the relevant community, they are less likely to be deviated
from, either by idiosyncratic interpretation or by outright rejec-
tion.
Ritualization thus tends to insulate a normative order from
the ordinary give and take of everyday life, by locating it instead
in the realm of implicit, timeless reality. By doing so, ritual
promotes the stability of these orders against too rapid change,
and also against gradual deterioration as more and more people
choose to violate a norm. It also provides one of the important
methods by which informal social norms obtain their specifically
normative character, reflecting not only what we do, but what we
ought to do, because such norms reflect the world as it truly ex-
ists. This stands starkly in contrast to conventions that exist
solely on the basis of the fact that a high percentage of the popu-
lation adheres to them.264 Such conventions can be violated or
individually reinterpreted without the community believing that
they are violating the natural order of things.265 Insulation of so-
259. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 166; SEARLE, supra note 232, at 62.
260. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 164-68.
261. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 48-50.
262. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 66, at 167 (noting that people are largely unaware
of how they construct social practices through ritual); KERTZER, supra note 70, at
101; TAMBIAH, supra note 253, at 123-66; Bloch, supra note 67.
263. See BELL, supra note 66, at 145-50.
264. See Leach, supra note 127, at 320 (noting such "statistical" norms and con-
ventions).
265. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 126-30.
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cial norms from the vagaries of everyday practice is further en-
hanced by the self-referential nature of ritual performance.
Through the periodic self-referential display of adherence to
ritually instantiated norms, an individual binds herself to pub-
licly understood normative definitions and standards, and is
thereby inhibited from reinterpreting these standards or from
arguing that the norms do not apply to her. Norms can be vio-
lated, but generally the normative structure remains intact. 266
2. Totalization, Communitas, and the Creation of the Sacred
Everyday life confronts the individual with discrete and di-
vided units of reality. Time is at a minimum divided into past,
present, and future, and generally is more formally subdivided
according to the logic of the calendar and the clock. In addition
to such mechanical formulations, we also conceptualize time in
socially relevant units such as an individual's change from
childhood to adult status, or time as reckoned from some cultur-
ally significant event (e.g., the birth of Christ or the foundation
of a constitutional republic). The fact that we use different con-
ceptions of time in different situations is a constant feature of so-
cial life in general and law in particular.267 Space is likewise
subdivided into units: the planet and the cosmos, different na-
tion-states, the distinction between locality and larger cultural or
political units. All of these divisions reflect social and cultural,
as well as geographical considerations.
Because the ritual process frames ritual performance as a
unique and exceptional experience, 268 it helps demarcate rele-
vant units of social time. Micro "interaction rituals" delineate
the temporal scope of everyday social interactions; on a larger
scale, a rite of passage marks the transition to adulthood. Ritu-
als also can demarcate significant spacial divisions, most notably
between ordinary space and ritualized "sacred" space, either re-
ligious or secular (for example the White House). Paradoxically,
however, the ritual process not only can create distinctions in
time and space, but also can conflate and thus obliterate these
266. See id. at 205.
267. See BOURDIEU, LOGIC, supra note 6, at 80-84 (noting on the social nature of
time in everyday practice); KAHN, supra note 6, at 40-60 (commenting on the social
and cultural components of time and space in the context of the legal system).
268. For examples on the function of framing in the ritual process, see BATESON,
supra note 166, at 182; MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER 64 (1966); GOFFMAN,
supra note 233, at 58.
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distinctions altogether, and create a framework within which a
condensed symbolic microcosmic portrayal of the world can be
produced.269 The result is that ritual tends to "totalize" lived ex-
perience; that is, to collapse in the minds of participants divi-
sions of time, space, and social structure into a unified cosmo-
logical structure that is experienced by each participant as a
totality.270
One way that the ritual process accomplishes such totaliza-
tion reflects the metonymic nature of ritual performance and
symbolism, which permits the currently enacted ritual drama to
be metaphorically extended to encompass our understanding of
the world as a whole.271 Additionally, formal ritual unifies in a
single moment the three basic rhythms of human temporality.
Ritual gestures, chants, and breathing reflect the physiological
rhythms of organic beings. At the other extreme, the invariant
ritual canon, which may be centuries old, corresponds to soci-
ety's historical memory, and this sense of timelessness is accen-
tuated by the periodic repetition of this canon in recurrent ritual
performances. These two rhythms fuse with the third, the nor-
mal time of ordinary social interaction, to form a special, unitary
ritual time, which constitutes a unique "time out of time." 272
Such a union of temporalities also occurs in less formal ritual-
ized practices by infusing current reality with a sense of timeless
tradition. Traditionalism is a fundamental characteristic of all
ritual and ritualized practices.273 For example, a Thanksgiving
dinner conflates present time with that of an idealized colonial
past; hunting evokes timeless traditions that create a linkage be-
tween contemporary hunters and their remote human ancestors.
Additionally, ritual and ritualized activities are frequently
performed at special sites. The conjunction of special sites with
the eternal, "time out of time" temporality of ritual performance
has the effect of breaking down geographical as well as temporal
269. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 66, at 160; HANDELMAN, supra note 87, at 81.
270. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 208-26; RICHARD P. WERBNER, RITUAL
PASSAGE, SACRED JOURNEY: THE PROCESS AND ORGANIZATION OF RELIGIOUS
MOVEMENTS 13 (1989); Sherry Ortner, On Key Symbols, 75 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
1338, 1344 (1973).
271. See supra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
272. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 222-25; see alsoMIRCEA ELIADE, COSMOS
AND HISTORY: THE MYTH OF THE ETERNAL RETURN 35-36 (Willard R. Trask trans.,
1959).
273. See BELL, supra note 66, at 168;. see also Barbara Myerhoff, A Death in Due
Time: Construction of Self and Culture in Ritual Drama, in RITE, DRAMA, FESTIVAL,
SPECTACLE 149, 159 (John J. MacAloon ed., 1984).
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divisions. This breakdown may occur because the ritual site be-
comes a microcosm of an eternal, cosmic process (as particularly
in the case of religious ritual).274 On the other hand, the simulta-
neous performance of ritual or ritualized activities in many
places can likewise have the effect of dissolving geographical
separation. For example, voting takes place in a number of loca-
tions on Election Day, but is perceived as the single action of a
unitary entity (the sovereign People), in a way that transcends
the physical separation of the actual electorate.
This totalizing aspect of ritual has important implications
for ritualized social norms. One implication relates to the way
that ritual breaks down spacial differences. It is well established
that transactions costs are likely very high where bargaining to
establish beneficial social norms entails the agreement of a rela-
tively large number of parties separated by wide geographic dis-
tances, for example the costs of locating all of the necessary par-
ties, or bringing them together in one forum.275 Furthermore, as
Robert Ellickson has noted, prospects for cooperative behavior
appear to be significantly enhanced in the setting of closely-knit
communities. 276 Yet many of the most important informal social
norms, for example the generalized norm against theft, are in-
ternalized and transmitted across widely dispersed communities
of strangers. Ritualization constitutes a very significant way for
informal social norms, which typically lack the institutionalized
territoriality of formal laws, to overcome problems of geo-
graphic dispersion. Due to the invariance of the ritual process, a
ritual can generally be performed in the same way any number
of times in any number of locations. As a result, multiple rites
performed among a dispersed population create localized fora
for participation that act to build consensus on the local level for
a normative order that is unitary and uniform.277 The most ob-
vious examples of this process are of course the ethical precepts
of the great world religions, whose rites can promote uniform
belief structures among believers scattered widely around the
globe.
274. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 66, at 157-59; ELIADE, supra note 272, at 35;
RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 209-10.
275. See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the
Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 97 (1984).
276. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
277. See, DOTY, supra note 5, at 104; see also CHWE, supra note 2, at 61-66 (explain-
ing how ritual helps build common knowledge among members of otherwise
weakly organized social networks).
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Ritual shares similar properties with social hierarchies and
structures, and with time and space. On the one hand, many as-
pects of social class distinction, like honor or prestige, can be
partly or wholly created through ritual. In addition, it is well
documented that ritual processes can be manipulated by aristoc-
racies, clergies, or single party state apparatuses in order to
maintain the dominant position of their members. At the same
time, however, ritualized activities tend to "totalize" society by
dissolving perceptions of social distinction. Victor Turner has
described how many ritual practices commonly emphasize what
he terms "communitas": feelings of social cohesiveness, shared
human interests, and concerns, coupled with a sense of equality
of all human beings. 278 These feelings stand in stark contrast to
the actual division of society into hierarchical (and frequently
unequal) classes and other socio-political divisions. During the
ritual period, this feeling of communitas can break down ordi-
nary distinctions between groups and classes, while at the same
time functioning to stabilize these hierarchies during non-ritual
periods. 279 The communal feelings of solidarity generated by the
ritual reduce the potential for disorder directed against the hier-
archical system itself. 280 The generation of communitas can
clearly be seen in certain rites of passage and rites of inversion
(such as Carnival) where the advantaged are temporarily de-
prived of their privileged status and can be insulted by the
greater mass of ordinary people or forced to act as their ser-
vants.28' It can also be discerned in more familiar contexts, such
as political rites where a candidate shakes hands with voters
(thus breaking physical barriers and emphasizing that the can-
didate too is a "common man" rather than a member of the
elite), or in political speechmaking addressed to a unitary sover-
eign people ("my fellow Americans") undistinguished by race,
sex, or class. 282
By emphasizing such transcendent notions of eternity, infin-
ity, community, and sacrality, ritual can generate powerful feel-
ings of trust, and especially of belief in and commitment to the
278. See VICTOR W. TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND ANTI-
STRUCTURE 94-130 (1969).
279. See id. at 125-30, 176-78.
280. See id. at 125-30.
281. See BELL, supra note 66, at 126-28; NATALIE ZEMON DAVIS, The Reasons of
Misrule, in SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 97-123 (1975);
KERTZER, supra note 70, at 55.
282. See, e.g., KERTZER, supra note 70, at 49, 55-56.
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norms and precepts contained within the ritual process. "Ritual
transforms the obligatory into the desirable." 2 3 Indeed, this po-
tential ability to generate tremendous affective force has been ex-
tensively documented by many observers of the ritual process.
284
The way in which ritual simplifies a complex, divided real-
ity into an integral whole thus plays an important role in allow-
ing society to create binding, socially acknowledged, and emo-
tionally motivating obligations amidst a welter of conflicting
individual opinions and beliefs. But the impact of ritual's total-
izing effect, and its ability to create a microcosmic world of im-
mutable time, limitless space, and homogenous community, ex-
tends even further: ritual is the primary vehicle through which
all humans create the sacred.285 Through ritual participation we
confront the infinite and the eternal; out of this encounter with
the ineffable we ground our conception of the ultimate postu-
lates, unquestionable and inaccessible to reason alone, upon
which we anchor our ultimate understanding of reality and give
meaning to our lives. 286 The connection amongst ritual, the sa-
cred, and the basic postulates of our existence is clear enough in
the religious context: participation in holy rites creates the aura
of the sacred that valorizes belief in a religious creed and leads
the believer to organize relations with other people and the cos-
mos in accordance with divine precepts.
But the sacred is not solely a religious phenomenon, and
transcendent, unquestionable postulates exist in the secular
world as well. 287 Commonly known in American law as "We the
People," in American democracy, the ultimate authority upon
which the entire legal edifice is postulated falls upon the "Peo-
283. TURNER, supra note 111, at 30.
284. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE
258-60 (Joseph Ward Swain trans., rev. ed., 1954); KERTZER, supra note 70, at 11, 101;
RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 258-59; TURNER, supra note 111, at 29-30.
285. There is a vast literature describing this phenomenon. See, e.g., BELL, supra
note 66, at 155-59; DURKHEIM, supra note 284, at 455-61; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64,
at 276-312; RICOEUR, supra note 204, at 40-51.
286. See BELL, supra note 66, at 75 (ritual performance "[v]alidates cultural values
that cannot be proven real and correct in any other way"); RAPPAPORT, supra note
64, at 277-81; DAN SPERBER, RETHINKING SYMBOLISM 95-99 (Alice L. Morton trans.,
1975) (noting that sacred symbolism expresses logically unverifiable ultimate
truths); Ricoeur, supra note 204, at 49.
287. See, e.g., KERTZER, supra note 70, at 37-38 (sacralization of power in political
rites); Moore & Myerhoff, supra note 96, at 20-21; Barbara G. Myerhoff, We Don't
Wrap Herring in a Printed Page: Fusion, Fictions, and Continuity in Secular Ritual, in
SECULAR RITUAL, supra note 3, at 200-02.
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ple," indeed, even authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have
recourse to formal recognition of popular sovereignty as the pu-
tative source of their legitimacy. Yet this sacred notion of a
"sovereign people" is an abstract, transcendental, unitary entity,
distinguishable in important ways from the mere aggregation of
individuals who compose the body politic. 288 "We the People" is
an elaborate symbol through which we conceptualize an abstract
sovereignty that cannot be directly encountered in everyday life
and therefore is not capable of being comprehended other than
in symbolic form. 289 This symbolism is constructed through a
host of political rituals, of which the most important is ritualized
voting.290 For this reason, those political scientists who have
studied the restoration of democratic government after previous
autocratic regimes have discovered that the most important fac-
tor in the legitimization and consolidation of nascent democratic
regimes is the prompt implementation of electoral politicking.291
It seems obvious that informal social norms (and formal law
for that matter) will become more stable and hence more un-
questionable the closer that they can be associated through ritu-
alization with such an aura of sacredness, of a transcendent le-
gitimacy coming from outside human society itself.
3. Solidarity Without Consensus
The symbolism inherent in ritual communication has addi-
tional properties that also provide the constitutive framework
for a stable normative order, while at the same time facilitating
the ability of a community to make beneficial changes in social
norms when it so desires. It does so because of ritual's ability to
achieve "solidarity without consensus." 292 This article thus far
has emphasized the ways in which ritualization can stabilize
and facilitate widespread transmission of norms and their ac-
288. See MORGAN, supra note 121, at 55-77, 263-287.
289. See KAHN, supra note 6, at 77-78; KERTZER, supra note 70, at 6-7; Michael
Walzer, On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought, 82 POL. SCI. Q. 191 (1967). Rit-
ual also allows us to comprehend abstract social constructions like political sover-
eignty. See DEACON, supra note 4, at 403; TURNER, supra note 111, at 49-50 (ritualiza-
tion makes the invisible visible); supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
290. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 90.
291. See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
AND CONSOLIDATION 438 (1996).
292. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 67. A similar concept in the legal literature is
Cass Sunstein's notion of incompletely theorized agreements. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-61 (1996).
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companying social meanings. Ritual symbolism, according to its
very nature, however, can also promote social solidarity in sup-
port of systems of social norms in the absence of a broad consen-
sus of individuals concerning the precise meaning of a norm or
on all of the fundamental values underlying a normative system.
Ethnographic studies have identified two universal types of
dominant, or "key" symbols employed by cultures: elaborating
symbols, which allow us to form categories by demarcating
relevant distinctions between entities in the physical and social
worlds, and summarizing symbols that combine diverse elements
of reality into an undifferentiated whole. 293 In ritual contexts,
the more important types of symbolism involve summarizing
symbols, 294 which have two distinct properties that differentiate
them from other types of symbolic signaling. The first involves
condensation, where ritual symbols bring together a wide variety
of thoughts and actions in a single formation that synthesizes
these disparate meanings into a single foCUS. 2 95 The second dis-
tinguishing feature, related to the first, is that ritual symbols are
multivocalic (or polysemic).296 Even though, as a result of con-
densation, a number of social meanings are synthesized into a
single symbol, they retain a portion of their original autonomous
nature. Ritual symbolism can be analogized to musical chords,
in which each note retains its identity while at the same time
contributes to a larger synthetic whole. 297 Because a given sym-
bol retains all of its constituent significata, the same symbol may
be interpreted in different, and potentially contradictory ways.298
For example, blood can simultaneously symbolize feminine re-
productive qualities (by analogy to menstruation) and masculine
power (by analogy to hunting).299 Likewise, the national flag
293. See Ortner, supra note 270, at 1338-40. In contrast to this dichotomy, Pos-
ner's signaling theory appears to treat all symbols as potentially elaborating; on this
view, Ortner's "summarizing" symbols are simply signals that fail to achieve an
effective Bayesian separating equilibrium. See POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 1,
at 18-27. But Ortner's point is that some symbols must elicit from a wide group
within a community this type of messy, largely uninformative and unanimous as-
sent, precisely in order to form the cultuial framework within which the process of
distinction and elaboration can occur. See also RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 254-56.
294. See Ortner, supra note 270, at 1340.
295. See TURNER, supra note 111, at 28-30.
296. See id.
297. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 255-56; BOURDIEU, LOGIC, supra note 6, at
88.
298. See, e.g., KERTZER, supra note 70, at 69.
299. See TURNER, supra note 111, at 41-42.
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and the concept of a national homeland can evoke incompatible
conceptions of the nation as a homogeneous, organic entity and
as a heterogeneous collection of social groups joined together by
adherence to a common abstract conception of human rights and
dignity. 00 For this reason, ritual symbolism is always poten-
tially ambiguous; the symbol has no precise meaning under-
stood by everyone in the same way in every context.301
This does not mean, however, that in specific contexts sym-
bols do not have a single widely intersubjectively understood
and accepted primary meaning. Each ritual process tends to
create -in the specific context of the precepts and norms associ-
ated with that ritual - a hierarchy of meanings among the di-
verse significations that are combined in a single symbol. In this
way, the process privileges a predominant meaning that has
general acceptance or appeals to a commonality of interests.302
The nonprivileged meanings still exist, although pushed into the
background. Characteristically, therefore, ritual symbolism en-
genders a joining together of opposites.3 3 Solidarity is achieved
in connection with the widely accepted, dominant, general
meaning of a symbol and the norms associated with it, while
disparate secondary meanings can also be held concerning less
fundamental matters. Above all, support can be widespread
concerning the obligatory aspect of a social norm, that it is some-
thing one ought to do, without similar consensus about the rea-
son why we ought to do it, or the social values underlying the
norm, both of which can be variously interpreted by different
ritual participants without destabilizing the normative system.
Ritual thus promotes adherence to norms even in the absence of
commonly shared values.30 4
300. See, e.g., JEAN-DENIS BREDIN, THE AFFAIR: THE CASE OF ALFRED DREYFUS
275-98 (Jeffrey Mehlman trans., 1986) (noting the clash of differing conceptions of
the nation in France during the Dreyfus affair). See also KERTZER, supra note 70, at
69.
301. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 11; SPERBER, supra note 286, at 51-84.
302. See TURNER, supra note 111, at 52 (discussing "paramount meanings").
303. See BOURDIEU, OUTLINE, supra note 6, at 132-39; KERTZER, supra note 70, at
69-70.
304. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 67-75; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 102-03; see
also Lessig, supra note 2, at 1010 (discussing the role of "ambiguation" in the crea-
tion of social meanings); Steven Lukes, Political Ritual and Political Integration, 9
SOCIOLOGY 289 (1975) (discussing ambiguity in political ritual symbols). A similar
distinction underlies recent discussion of the difference between shared, "public"
meanings of actions and their private interpretations. See, e.g., SPERBER, supra note
50, at 61-63; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 48, at 1524.
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In the case of social norms, the capacity of ritual symbolism
to promote solidarity without consensus works in tandem with
the widespread social phenomenon: there is a difference be-
tween "social consensus," a general agreement about the appro-
priateness of certain actions under certain circumstances, and
"cultural consensus," agreement among people about the spe-
cific social meaning of such an action.305 Thus, people can agree
on a course of action even where they disagree about its ultimate
meaning and underlying rationale and values. To return to the
example of the flag: while individuals may disagree about the
precise meaning of the "nation," or on the positive values that
are embodied in the nation-state, they may nevertheless agree on
the obligation of citizens to defend the country against foreign
invasion, albeit for different reasons. As our discussion of self-
referentiality has noted, obligation arises out of participation in
the ritual practice itself (such as pledging allegiance to the flag),
regardless of the exact nature of the beliefs underlying this par-
ticipation. The social consensus instantiated in ritualized norms
relates to actions, and the appropriateness of actions, and not to
individual beliefs. Self-referential acceptance of ritualized can-
ons and norms publicly obligates the participant to the entire
package of group norms instantiated by the ritual process, even
if she disagrees with some of these norms, interprets them dif-
ferently from the majority of group members, or even intends to
violate them.30 6 Ritual thus provides for a commonality of ac-
tion, and for a common standard for judging the acceptability of
individual acts, without the need for continual resort to a welter
of shifting or conflicting individual beliefs and opinions about
the precise meaning or propriety of these norms.
The ability of ritualized practices to create consensus with-
out unanimity is extremely important and explains certain as-
pects of normative behavior that are problematic both for cost-
benefit and sociological interpretations of norms. From the cost-
benefit side, it remains difficult to explain exactly how rational
individuals are able to overcome the transactions costs associ-
ated with bargaining to establish a new social norm or change an
old one, even where the initial collective action problem is
solved through the agency of a norm entrepreneur or by the
305. See James W. Fernandez, Symbolic Consensus in a Fang Reformative Cult, 67
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 902 (1965).
306. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 68; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 122-23;
Ortner, supra note 270, at 1340.
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state (using the expressive function of law). This is particularly
true where the norm applies beyond the sphere of small and
relatively homogenous closely-knit communities to a larger
realm encompassing a large, geographically dispersed, and so-
cially and culturally heterogeneous population. Ritualizing
norms provides a way for these costs to be significantly de-
creased. Ritual can elicit widespread consensus on certain key
issues while allowing for individual disagreement concerning
secondary matters, rationales, and values. Consequently, the
number of items that must be agreed upon in order to establish
or change a normative order is greatly reduced, thus improving
chances that a large group can come to an agreement. At the
same time, due to the self-referential nature of the ritual process,
a ritual participant binds herself through ritual performance to
an entire package of concepts and norms, even ones to which
she would not have agreed had these concepts and norms been
separately negotiated. The end result of this process is thus that
minimal grounds of agreement yield maximal support for a
normative order.
From the sociological perspective, theories have tradition-
ally assumed that in order for a system of social norms to be ef-
fective in regulating behavior, there must be a widespread inter-
nalized consensus supporting the entire normative structure.30 7
Such an assumption, however, appears to pose a major obstacle
to explaining how social norms can and do change. In the case
of ritualized norms, however, this problem disappears when we
note that such norms partake of the typical ritual feature of soli-
darity without consensus: social solidarity to obey norms may
be widespread and effective, while the underlying secondary
meanings, rationales, and values may be widely diverse. There-
fore, although ritual tends to make social norms highly durable,
the potential always exists for questions, contention, and ulti-
mately change.30 8
V. RITUALIZED NORMS IN ACTION: EMOTION, TEMPORALITY,
AND INTERNALIZATION
Until now, we have been looking at how ritual provides the
307. See, e.g., Etzioni, supra note 1, at 158, 167-70.
308. See, e.g., Holm, supra note 70, at 25-38 (discussing the ritual contestation of
traditional norms of selfhood and morality in Micronesia). Note also in this regard
the analogous role played by symbolism in Anthony Giddens' theory of structura-
tion. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY 107-08 (1979).
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linguistic, cognitive, and social framework within which norma-
tive orders occur. Many of these constitutive aspects of rituali-
zation also have an important impact on the way that social
norms are understood and applied in the give and take of eve-
ryday life; for example, ritualization makes certain norms more
durable and powerful by making them the unquestioned "way
of the world," or even sacred. This is a fundamental point. Be-
cause ritual, like all artifacts, has multiple uses and impacts,
where a culture employs ritualization in a constitutive sense as a
means of overcoming limitations in human communication and
cognition, it inevitably creates side effects that profoundly affect
how ritualized norms operate "in action." In this section, our fo-
cus shifts entirely to such practical considerations. Primarily we
look at the way in which the emotion and sense of eternal time
generated by ritual performance makes ritualized norms more
likely to be adhered to by members of the community and how
ritual promotes the internalization of norms by individuals. The
section concludes with a modern example that ties together the
ways in which the constitutive and practical effects of ritualiza-
tion affect the ability of social norms to solve a collective action
problem in the real world, in this case the problem of overhunt-
ing faced by Native Americans in Canada.
A. Ritual, Emotion, and Motivation
The previous discussion has skirted around the implications
of a key attribute of the ritual process: its propensity to elicit
strong emotional responses in the minds of participants. It is
now time to take this critical factor into account. By looking
more closely at the nature of human emotion, and at the ties be-
tween emotion, reason, and ritual, we can see more clearly how
ritual creates such strong emotional responses, how cultural
practices like ritual influence individual preferences for informal
social norms, and how emotional factors, augmented by the rit-
ual process, undergird the very rational capacities that individu-
als in a society use to create and understand such norms.
Until fairly recently, human cognition was viewed primarily
as a computational, information-driven process lacking signifi-
cant motivational and affect-laden factors. Of late, however, so-
cial psychologists have compiled an impressive array of empiri-
cal data showing that emotional factors profoundly
interpenetrate both cognition and our ability to make judg-
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ments.309 These factors color how we think, plan, and make
judgments in these situations, such as the way that we search
memory for relevant data, the amount of effort we are willing to
expend in making an accurate judgment, the inferential rules
that we apply in making such judgments, and the larger struc-
ture of our beliefs that we bring to the encounter. 310
In addition, we all have emotionally-driven motivations,
deeply tied to our sense of self, to maintain and enhance our
own self-regard, and an equally emotionally motivated under-
standing of our relationship with other people and with events
in the outside world.311 Individuals appear to orient their un-
derstanding of social situations by emotionally coding the status,
role, and expected behavior of participants. These codings are
reflected in stable, long term emotional dispositions towards ac-
tors and events ("affect"). Much of our sense of ourselves and of
self-worth, particularly in social settings, is determined by the
aggregate of these emotional dispositions. 312 As a result, indi-
viduals generally seek to enter into and conduct social interac-
tions with others in such a manner as to confirm identity rein-
forcing affective dispositions. When this is not possible, the
result is an unpleasant, transient emotional state reflecting the
disturbance caused by the failure of the situation to fulfill nor-
mative affective expectations, together with a cognitive sense of
disorientation resulting from the fact that our affect-laden expec-
tations about how the world works appear to be disconfirmed.313
Confronted with such a situation, an individual normally will
cognitively recharacterize the situation so as to realign cognitive
understandings into congruence with the long-term affective
expectations. 314 There does not appear, therefore, to be any clear
309. For a summary of this literature, see KUNDA, supra note 238, at 211-63.
310. See KUNDA, supra note 238, at 211-63.
311. See id. at 220-23.
312. See, e.g., NEIL J. MACKINNON, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AS AFFECT
CONTROL 83-121 (1994).
313. See id. at 127-29. It is this emphasis on "hot," affective factors that distin-
guishes the recent work in social cognition from older theories, such as Festinger's
theory of cognitive dissonance, that focused exclusively on cognitive concerns.
314. See id. at 22-24. Thus, for example, where a friend of mine treats me rudely
or otherwise betrays my friendship, I might initially respond to the situation by
cognitively reinterpreting the event in terms of a temporary alteration in the way
that I normally expect my friend to behave (e.g., "she's having a bad day"). Where
the mistreatment is more serious or prolonged, however, I am forced to alter my
cognitive categorization of the other person in order to maintain my emotionally
based sense of self: she is not really my friend.
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distinction between affect and reason; both interact together to
produce the judgments and behavior that we employ in every-
day life.
Recent developments in neuroscience have both confirmed
and extended our knowledge of the intimate ties between emo-
tion and rationality. An emotion, understood physiologically can
be characterized by a complex set of simultaneous alterations in
body state in response to a stimulus, including changes in the
state of: (i) the central nervous system; (ii) the body's muscu-
loskeletal responses; (iii) electrical skin conductivity, and, (iv)
the chemical state of the brain.315 That portion of the brain's pre-
frontal cortex, which is responsible for continuously monitoring
and regulating conditions within the body, processes these
changes in bodily state by coding the stimulus event in terms of
its characteristic emotional response. It also provides a (cogni-
tive) evaluation of the emotion as positive (pleasurable) or nega-
tive (unpleasant).316 The result is to create an emotion-based
"dispositional response" built into and relying upon on the same
neural substrate as the cognitive processing of information.317
When a stimulus is repeated, either through an encounter with
the outside world or in the form of a mental thought or image,
the accompanying emotional coding is recreated, either physi-
cally in the body itself (think about how your stomach may turn
at a frightening or disgusting thought), or by an "as if" process
that produces a virtual replica of these physical responses in the
brain itself.318
An emotion becomes a feeling when it is processed in a sec-
ond-level set of neural connections that self-reflexively links the
physical state corresponding to an emotion with the mental im-
age that causes the emotional response. 319 It is in this manner
that we can become consciously aware of our emotional re-
sponses to the world, and talk intelligently about "feeling an
emotion" in response to a given situation. Moreover, the same
reflexive monitoring of bodily states, in relation to mental or en-
315. See DAMASIO, supra note 213, at 50-81. For a comprehensive review of hu-
man and animal research, see D. Michael Bitz & Jean Seipp Bitz, Incompetence in the
Brain Injured Individual, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 205 (1999).
316. See ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN 134-36, 173-75 (1994) (discussing the "somatic marker" hypothesis);
Bitz & Bitz, supra note 316, at 244-45.
317. See DAMASIO, supra note 316, at 136-38.
318. See id. at 184.
319. See id. at 279-95.
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vironmental inputs, appears to underlie consciousness itself,
both the core consciousness of ourselves as entities in the world,
distinct from our environment, and also to the more extended
type of consciousness through which we understand ourselves
as unique individuals with our own autobiography, beliefs, and
dispositions.320 Consequently, given the ubiquity of emotional
coding in cognition and in the production of consciousness, all
of our activities, including rationality itself, are permeated with
affective factors.
This emotional coding process appears to be indispensable
for full human reasoning. For example, in many practical rea-
soning situations, we are generally confronted with a far wider
variety of possible choices than we can feasibly cognitively proc-
ess according to the decision theory calculus of formal rational-
ity.321 Absent any way to limit the number of possibilities under
consideration, making a decision could entail an almost literally
endless comparison of alternatives. In normal humans, the fact
that these various options have all been positively or negatively
emotionally coded in the brain permits us to drastically reduce
the number of possible alternatives by almost instantaneously
rejecting those options that would lead to an emotionally nega-
tive or less preferred outcome. In contrast, patients with dam-
age to that part of the prefrontal cortex governing emotional
coding simply cannot reason with full rationality, and in some
cases cannot reach even the simplest decisions, becoming lost in
the realm of unlimited possibility.322
The ultimate grounding of both emotion and feeling in bod-
ily states provides an important key for understanding how rit-
ual can have such a profound emotional impact on participants.
Recall that perhaps the most salient distinguishing feature of rit-
ual is that it invariably involves physical performance. It is this
feature, for example, that separates ritual participation from re-
lated activities like being a spectator at an athletic event or a
play, which by virtue of its passive nature does not have the
same emotionally transformative properties as ritual.323 The
precise, formalized movements inherent in ritual participation,
320. See DAMAS|O, supra note 213, at 169-70 (discussing core consciousness), 197-
98 (discussing extended consciousness); DAMASIO, supra note 316, at 239-44 (dis-
cussing the autobiographical self).
321. See DAMASIO, supra note 316, at 170-73; DENNETr, supra note 50, at 501-10.
322. See DAMASIO, supra note 316, at 170-77, 192-95.
323. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 37-46.
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such as singing, breathing, reciting, standing, and gesturing, all
operate directly upon the body to create positive emotional
states in connection with the ritual process.324 This ability to di-
rectly influence the bodily substrate of our emotional lives, and
to generate correspondingly powerful affective force, is unique
to ritual among social practices, and probably is a principal rea-
son that ritual activity remains so potent and widespread in
modern life.
The bodily based, affective power of the ritual process plays
an important role in ritual's ability to establish an effective and
stable system of informal social norms. Emotional coding en-
hances attention and thus recall of ritually instantiated norms.325
Because emotion and cognition are functionally and neurologi-
cally interrelated, the emotionally charged nature of the ritual
experience also influences the way that ritually instantiated
norms are cognitively processed. 326 For example, ritualized
norms are likely to be accepted by participants more uncritically,
and the underlying justification for such norms is made more
persuasive, than would otherwise be the case with other social
practices. 327 Moreover, once ritualized norms become power-
324. See id. at 226-30 (describing neurological effects of ritual performance);
TURNER, supra note 111, at 28-29, 54-55 (describing the physical/emotional "sensory
pole" of ritual performance); James W. Fernandez, Persuasion and Performances: On
the Beast in Every Body... And the Metaphors of Everyman, 101 DAEDALUS 39, 54-56
(1972); Charles D. Laughlin & Jason Throop, Emotion: A View From Biogenetic Struc-
turalism, in BIOCULTURAL APPROACHES TO THE EMOTIONS 329, 346 (Alexander Laban
Hinton ed., 1999); Margot L. Lyon, Emotion and Embodiment: The Respiratory Media-
tion of Somatic and Social Processes, in BIOCULTURAL APPROACHES TO THE EMOTIONS,
supra, at 182, 196-200.
325. See DAMASIO, supra note 213, at 196-98.
326. For examples on the interrelationship between emotion and cognitive proc-
esses, see BOYER, supra note 172, at 230-40; DAMASIO, supra note 213, at 4041, 41 n.4,
80-81; HOGARTH, supra note 43, at 57-67; KUNDA, supra note 238, at 232-33 (concern-
ing the specific nexus among emotion, cognition, and ritual); Bitz & Bitz, supra note
315, at 257-60.
327. See lain D. Edgewater, Music Hath Charms...: Fragments Toward Construc-
tionist Biocultural Theory, with Attention to the Relationship of "Music" and "Emotion,"
in BIOCULTURAL APPROACHES TO THE EMOTIONS, supra note 324, at 153, 168-69 (de-
scribing how ritual music induces a general emotional response making participant
susceptible to concepts associated with the ritual); see also KUNDA, supra note 238, at
256-57; Fernandez, supra note 324. In addition, neurological evidence reveals that
during the ritual process, the nondominant (usually right) cerebral hemisphere
forms the center of neural activity, inducing a style of thinking marked by holism,
high levels of emotion, and by non-linear (associationist) thought, while causing
characteristic responses in the somatic system; the ritual state may subsequently
engage both hemispheres simultaneously so as to create a fusion, apparently
unique to the ritual process, between these types of thought processes and more
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fully coded into long-term affective dispositions, individual be-
havior will strongly resist, to the point of cognitively recharac-
terizing observed reality, events that threaten the stability of the
normative-affective structure.
Moreover, the affective aspect of ritual interacts with ritual's
more cognitive, constitutive functions to further strengthen an
associated system of social norms. Because emotional coding
creates a short list of alternatives for conscious deliberation, our
thought processes are biased towards positively charged emo-
tional outcomes, such as acting in conformity with ritualized
norms, to the exclusion of other alternatives. At the same time,
ritualization tends to limit our ability to conceptualize noncoop-
erative alternatives, by virtue of its ability to make such norms
appear to be an unchallengeable part of our implicit knowledge
about the natural order of affairs in the world. At the extreme,
this combination of emotion and cognition can strengthen nor-
mative orders even further by transforming norms into part of
an affectively desirable, sacred truth.
One critical consequence of this interplay between ritual's
cognitive and affective aspects is that the ritual process can cre-
ate, deepen, or even alter individual preferences for a given norm or a
system of norms.328 Much of human motivation for action, and
linear, analytic rationality. The result of these somatic and neurological changes is
to create in the participant a sense of harmony, and of oneness with the world and
with members of the community. See ANDREW NEWBURG ET AL., WHY GOD WON'T
Go AWAY 77-90 (2001); Barbara Lex, The Neurobiology of Ritual Trance, in THE
SPECTRUM OF RITUAL 122-37 (Eugene D'Aquili et al. eds., 1979). This appears to
form the neural substrate for ritual's ability to create, inter alia, the affective sense of
communitas among participants that frequently accompanies ritual performance.
See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, 226-30.
328. This, of course, contradicts the common economic assumption of stable in-
dividual preferences over outcomes. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, De
Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977), reprinted in GARY S.
BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 24-49 (1996). More recently, however, Becker has
modified his position, and has developed a theory positing that while individuals
have stable metapreferences, their preferences over everyday outcomes can vary in
light of changing levels of "personal" and "social" capital. See GARY S. BECKER,
Preferences and Values, in ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 3-23. For a similar analysis in the
context of social norms, see CHONG, RATIONAL LIVES, supra note 1, at 98-103. Possi-
bly the impact of ritual activity on individual preferences and choices can be ac-
commodated by theories like this as a form of personal, cultural, or social capital;
more likely, however, especially in light of ritual's ability to act directly on the neu-
rological and physiological bases of preference and choice, we probably must ac-
cept the fact that in the case of ritual, individual preferences for outcomes can and
do change and do so in predictable ways. In general, cognitive psychologists have
not accepted the normative assumptions of economics and decision theory, and in-
stead treat utilities and values as learned behavior, changing over time. See
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therefore motivation of preferences over outcomes, cannot be
understood solely in terms of biological drives or cognitive
computations, but instead is governed by affective considera-
tions.329 On a neurological level, every event is emotionally
coded as a set of unique physical responses with positive or
negative value; these evaluations appear to form the fundamen-
tal basis of our preference structure, and also bias our thinking
towards achieving these goals.330 Because ritual acts directly
upon the physiological bases of human emotional response so as
to achieve great affective power, it can operate in a manner that
powerfully reinforces and deepens the desirability (positive
emotional coding) of norms associated with the ritual process.
Ritual makes adherence to specific social norms highly desirable,
and enhances the willingness of individuals to sanction viola-
tors, even in cases where, on the basis of self-interested rational-
ity alone, adherence would make little sense. For example, the
positive feelings of communitas among diverse social groups
that are engendered as part of the ritual process permit stable
normative systems to exist even where adherence to these norms
results in inequalities of goods or opportunities.331
We noted at the beginning of this article that one of the tra-
ditional weaknesses of cost-benefit theories of social norms lies
in their inability to explain how cultural factors such as social
norms not only constrain individual preferences, but also influ-
ence the nature of these preferences themselves. We can now
see how this process occurs, at least in part, in the context of one
distinctive cultural practice: ritualization. Where a system of in-
formal social norms is instantiated through ritual, a feedback ef-
fect is created that recursively strengthens emotion-based pref-
erences for the norms. At the same time, due to the subtle
HOGARTH, supra note 43, at 186-87.
329. See KUNDA, supra note 238, at 232-33; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 101-
110.
330. On the neurological codings of pleasure and pain as the source of human
preferences, see DAMASIO, supra note 316, at 198-200, 262-64. Moreover, the various
levels of positive or negative emotional coding allow us to rank choices among al-
ternatives. See id. at 199. It is currently not clear how Damasio's findings, which
suggest that conscious human choices are ultimately grounded in (although not
necessarily directly reducible to) a basic hedonic physiological substrate, relate to
the economic theory of preferences, for example whether (or to what extent) these
neurosomatic "preferences" meet the traditional economic assumptions of com-
pleteness, reflexivity, and transitivity.
331. See TURNER, supra note 111, at 176-78. For similar observations in the con-
text of inequalities of political power, see KERTZER, supra note 70, at 49.
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interplay between emotion and cognition, ritualization limits the
conceptual field within which individuals can rationally assess
whether or not to comply with the norms, and to conceive of
possible alternatives. Individual cost-benefit analysis can and
does still occur, but its scope is shaped and constrained by social
practice on models.
This phenomenon has three significant implications for our
understanding of informal social norms. First, we must incorpo-
rate into the models that we use to analyze norm-driven behav-
ior the fact that widespread social preferences for ritualized
norms are likely to be much stronger (and the payoffs for coop-
eration and penalties for defection correspondingly greater) than
for norms instantiated in other ways.332 Second, we cannot as-
sume in the case of ritual that individual preferences for norms
remain fixed, because ritualization can act directly upon the
brain's emotional/neural substrates so as to alter both our pref-
erences and our observed behavior. Thus, it has long been rec-
ognized that participation in rituals can cause profound changes
not only in an individual's behavior, but in her self-evaluation of
her behavior, so as to "reshape" the entire person.333 Conse-
quently, preferences for a system of norms will likely not remain
the same where the norms become ritualized, or, conversely, be-
332. From a game theoretic perspective, one result is that ritualization may actu-
ally alter the payoff structure far enough in favor of cooperation so as to transform
the game from a Prisoner's Dilemma into a game whose structure is more condu-
cive to cooperation. Suppose, for example, that each player's anticipated payoff
from successful cooperation in complying with ritualized social norms, after taking
into account the emotional benefit derived from knowing that one is acting accord-
ing to ritual prescriptions, exceeds the payoff for unilateral defection. The game
may now take the form of an Assurance Game, where each player's best strategy
depends upon whether or not the other player can be expected to cooperate. See
Michael W. Macy, Beyond Rationality in Models of Choice, 21 ANN. REV. Soc. 73, 78
(1995) (discussing the structure of Assurance Game); OSTROM ET AL., supra note 21,
at 293-95 (contrasting Prisoner's Dilemma and Assurance Game models in the con-
text of common pool resource allocation). Given this structure, and in light of rit-
ual's demonstrated ability to create hypertrust among community members, we
should anticipate a high degree of adherence to norms. To the extent that ritualiza-
tion may make defection virtually unimaginable, the model could even shift to-
wards a cooperative structure, characterized by binding agreements among players
to cooperate. See MORROW, supra note 20, at 75-76 (discussing cooperative games).
On the ways that ritual can solve coordination problems within game theoretic
models, see CHWE, supra note 2, at 97-98.
333. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 66, at 151. Note in particular the extensive use of
ritual in certain types of family therapy (in particular "Milan Group" methods), to
act directly upon and reorganize family psychological and interpersonal dynamics.
See GRIMES, supra note 82, at 337-40; Laird, supra note 99, at 144-45. See generally
RITUALS IN FAMILIES AND FAMILY THERAPY (Evan Imber-Black et al. eds., 1988).
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come de-ritualized; additionally, we should anticipate a rapid
shift in support when one set of ritualized norms replaces an-
other.334 Finally, ritualization provides a powerful way out of
collective action problems that are otherwise inherent in efforts
to change an existing set of dominant social norms. Because rit-
ual can generate tremendous affective support for associated
norms, members of the ritual community, even when a small
minority, may still be willing to endure the costs of social ostra-
cism while agitating for desired social change, particularly if
their ritual activity clothes these norms with the aura of the sa-
cred. It is no accident that the initial impetus for both the ante-
bellum abolition movement and the modern civil rights move-
ment occurred largely in religiously oriented contexts.335
B. Action and Time
Several hypotheses have been advanced suggesting that
emotion plays an important role in the way that individuals dis-
count future events, specifically by ensuring that people do not
value present outcomes too highly against future conse-
quences.336 Current cost-benefit theories of norms agree that an
affective normative order cannot exist where most individuals
calculate whether currently to cooperate or defect using a very
high discount rate.337 If someone does not value much what will
happen in the future, the prospect of receiving informal sanc-
tions, disesteem, or ostracism will not influence the decision to
violate a social norm for the sake of short-term benefits.
Recent neurological findings confirm that emotional coding
of events is indeed a necessary condition that enables us to take
334. Such rapid shifts in support for a norm or a system of social norms, result-
ing in "norm cascades," have been extensively analyzed. See, e.g., Timur Kuran &
Cass R. Sunstein, Controlling Availability Cascades, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 140, at 374, 374-97; Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their
Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1998). A similar
notion is captured in epidemiological models by the notion of "cultural contagion."
See supra notes 48-59. Given the powerful potential effect of ritual practice on pref-
erences for, and adherence to social norms, ritualization (or deritualization) must be
added to the factors that have previously been found to create and sustain such cas-
cades, such as availability of information and concern for reputation.
335. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CWIL WAR 109-10 (1970).
336. See RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 220-33 (1987);
ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS 71-95 (1988).
337. See, e.g., POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 1, at 160.
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proper account of the future.338 When the brain suffers severe
trauma to the ventromedial lobes that contain that part of the
prefrontal cortex where the emotional encoding of information
principally occurs, this results in an inability to experience the
emotional responses that normally accompany the reasoning
process, and a corresponding inability to take into account the
future positive or negative outcomes of current choices.339
Trauma victims remain consciously able to understand the con-
cept that a certain course of action will lead to an unpleasant re-
sult in the future. The problem is that because the prospect of
future consequences lack emotional coding, they lack motiva-
tional force. Consequently, in experimental settings, patients
consistently make incorrect choices that reflect current condi-
tions without reference to future negative consequences. 340 In
social situations, this inability to take into account negative fu-
ture public opinion concerning one's actions, or the possibility of
future sanctions or reprisals, can render the behavior of trauma
victims uncontrollably sociopathic.341
The powerful ability of ritual to positively encode emo-
tional, informal social norms, and to negatively encode norm
338. See DAMASIO, supra note 316, at 217-22; Bitz & Bitz, supra note 315, at 254-57.
339. See supra note 338.
340. In one well known experiment, normal subjects and persons with injury to
the brain's ventromedial frontal lobes engage in a "gambling game" involving four
separate decks of cards from which the player can draw in any order. The players
seek to maximize their total return from betting on the game. The rewards from
drawing certain cards from the first two decks are high, but so is the risk of loss,
and normative probability theory postulates that the optimal strategy is to draw
from the other two decks, which have lower rewards but significantly lower risks.
At the outset of the game, players are unaware of either the payoffs or probabilities
connected with drawing cards from each deck. Within a few plays, normal players
are able to develop a heuristic strategy of maximizing success by playing only from
the second pair of decks. They do so, without any formal probability analysis, be-
cause large initial losses from playing from the first two decks cause these decks to
be coded with the emotion of "danger" and thereafter avoided. In contrast, the
brain damaged patients continue to play (and lose) from the first two decks, and
continue to do so even after the payoffs, probabilities, and optimizing strategy have been ex-
plained to them. They rationally understand these issues, and are not insensitive to
losing, but lacking a functioning emotional coding system, they are not motivated
to guard against future negative outcomes and therefore continue to pursue a high-
risk strategy for current gain, oblivious of the future consequences. See DAMASIO,
supra note 316, at 212-17. Inability to generate emotional response due to prefrontal
cortex trauma has a similar effect in the case of the neurological disorder pain
asymbolia, in which otherwise cognitively and neurologically normal patients are
indifferent to the prospect of incurring serious bodily injury. See TODD E. FEINBERG,
ALTERED EGOS: HOW THE BRAIN CREATES THE SELF 2-4 (2001).
341. See DAMASIO, supra note 316, at 3-33, 178.
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violations, thus likely plays an important role in influencing the
discount rate of rational actors in favor of conformity to norms.
Note particularly ritual's ability to create strong affective feel-
ings of communitas, of the desirability of membership in the
community. 342 Such feelings may provide a powerful motiva-
tional bias towards avoiding future social disesteem or ostra-
cism, even at the expense of sacrificing present gains that might
accrue from violating a norm.
A second way that ritual can influence the way we value the
future i cognitive rather than affective, and operates by expand-
ing the temporal framework in which we understand the conse-
quences of our current actions. Recall that the act of ritual per-
formance frequently leads to the breaking down of temporal
distinctions in the mind of the participant. The present is thus
seen from a new perspective, that of eternity, and this perspec-
tive, although only transitorily experienced during the ritual
process, can color our subsequent calculation of the conse-
quences of our actions, making us more aware of their impact
upon the future. Conceivably this occurs whenever someone
experiences a profound religious experience, and finds her un-
derstanding of her relationships with others transformed by
knowledge of "the big picture," or where an environmental rit-
ual focuses the minds of participants on the consequences of
their current behavior on the lives of their grandchildren. It is
certainly a phenomenon well known to medieval economic his-
torians who find in the wills of merchants large bequests to reli-
gious houses to say prayers for the decedent's soul: rational
maximizing is different when the relevant temporal unit ends
not with death but with Judgment Day.343 To the extent that rit-
ual succeeds in generating in our minds such a long-term per-
spective, the more likely we are to adhere to social norms that
provide long run benefit to ourselves and others.
3. Internalization of Norms
Most current theories of informal social norms, both cost-
benefit and more sociological models, predicate the effectiveness
of informal social norms to some degree upon the extent to
which such norms, or values and meanings associated with
342. See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
343. I owe this insight to a great teacher of medieval economic history, the late
Harry Miskimin. See also BECKER, supra note 328, at 11.
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these norms, have been internalized by a significant proportion
of the relevant community. Widespread internalization is often
necessary in order to ensure that most individuals follow the
norm.344 Moreover, widespread internalization of norms and as-
sociated values makes individuals more confident to sanction
norm violators, 345 provides the basis on which the community
confers social esteem and reputational benefit, 346 and promotes
the common understandings of the meanings of the symbols
which are relied upon by individuals to signal their cooperative
intent.347 In many of these theories, internalization is assumed to
occur as a result of childhood socialization and remains largely
unchanged in adulthood. Additionally, the process of internali-
zation is often viewed in abstract, almost binary terms: either a
norm is internalized or it is not, with little allowance made for
the fact that the content of the norm may be ambiguous in the
mind of the individual, much less that the individual may have
internalized multiple, potentially contradictory norms all of
which are potentially applicable to the same type of behavior.348
The problem is that the actual process of internalization is
not so simple and abstract. Internalization does not work like fax
reproduction, providing an exact and indelible copy.349 Like all
linguistically structured processes, 350 the internalization of
norms is subject to problems of ambiguity concerning the pre-
cise meaning of the norms that are being inculcated, and it is
therefore quite possible that children may internalize somewhat
different understandings of the same norm.351 Moreover, the
meaning of even clearly internalized normative standards can
dissipate over time through the process of conventional drift.
This article has already noted the ways that ritual can help over-
come problems raised by the potential ambiguity of norms and
stabilize norms against the potential erosion of their meanings.
344. See, e.g., CHONG, RATIONAL LIVES, supra note 1, at 25-26.
345. See Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 1, at 1668.
346. See McAdams, Origin, supra note 1, at 358-61 (arguing that for esteem to be
able to create effective norms, there must be a consensus on the esteem-worthiness
of a given type of behavior).
347. See, e.g., Posner, Symbols, supra note 1, at 774.
348. See, e.g., KERTZER, supra note 70, at 81 (noting that indeterminacy is caused
by more than one available cultural model or mental schema).
349. See Claudia Strauss, Models and Motives, in HUMAN MOTIVES AND CULTURAL
MODELS 8-9 (Roy G. D'Andrade & Claudia Strauss eds., 1992).
350. On the primary role of language in childhood socialization, see SCHIEFFE-
LIN, supra note 144, at 1-20.
351. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 77-78.
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There are two additional ways, however, in which ritualization
further promotes powerful internalization of a stable normative
order.
The first relates to the motivational force of informal norms.
Recall that social norms, like the rest of our knowledge of the so-
cial world, are instantiated in the mind as cognitive/ cultural
models. In order to influence behavior, however, these models
must not only organize our perceptions of the world in compu-
tational terms, but must also induce individuals to want to sup-
port the norms encapsulated in these models. Effective inter-
nalization of social norms thus requires that the associated
cultural models be inculcated with sufficient motivational
force.352 In addition, although childhood internalization of cul-
tural models and norms is very powerful, its effects are not in-
delible, and the motivational force of internalized norms can
fade over time in the course of everyday practice or as individu-
als are introduced to new experiences. As a result, the socializa-
tion/internalization process must continue throughout adult-
hood, through the continual reinforcement of previously
internalized models, norms, and values.353
There are a number of factors that influence the motiva-
tional force of cultural models in the internalization process.
Three are of particular importance. The first is the frequent
repetition of the cognitive model, so as to entrench the model's
schematic structure firmly in the mind.354 The second is incul-
cating strong positive emotional associations with the model, so
as to make acting in conformance with the model affectively
powerful.355 Neurological research suggests that this is accom-
plished, at least in part, by the (physical) coding of thoughts and
images in the brain. Finally, powerful motivation arises where
the internalization process institutes a connection between a cul-
tural model (social norm) and an individual's self-identity.356
352. See Roy G. D'Andrade, Afterword to HUMAN MOTIVES AND CULTURAL
MODELS, supra note 349, at 225, 225-32; Strauss, supra note 349.
353. See SCHIEFFELIN, supra note 144, at 19; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at
151. Reinforcement is sometimes based upon explicit rewards and sanctions, but
much more commonly occurs implicitly, through ordinary patterns of conversation.
See SCHIEFFELIN, supra note 144, at 17-21; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 176-77;
see also the discussion and sources cited supra notes 40-42, 143.
354. See, e.g., STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 90.
355. See id. at 132-33; Strauss, supra note 349, at 14-15; D'Andrade, supra note 352,
at 227.
356. See, e.g., STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 104-08; D'Andrade, supra note
352, at 227; Dorothy C. Holland, How Cultural Systems Become Desire: A Case Study of
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Absent these factors, individuals may enact lip-service confor-
mance to a normative value (without acting on it), or act accord-
ing to conventional routine.357 They likely will not, however,
develop the type of substantial, internalized commitment that a
system of norms requires to be effective, particularly where the
norms require that an individual act contrary to short-term in-
terest.
Ritual is a repetitive act that, through the nature of its sym-
bolism, directly reinforces the schemata underlying the cultural
models (including norms) that are instantiated through the ritual
process. Through its ability to act directly on the bodies of par-
ticipants, ritualization powerfully encodes positive emotional
responses for associated social norms. Recall, in addition, that
when these ritually encoded emotions become accessible to con-
sciousness as feelings, they play a constitutive role in our ex-
tended consciousness as part of our autobiographical selves, that
is, of our understanding of ourselves as actors, distinct from our
environment, with a history and set of beliefs and desires that
are qualitatively our own. This core autobiographical self is ex-
tremely stable, and we will cognitively recharacterize our under-
standing of the world in the face of information that threatens,
on an affective level, this sense of identity. 35 8 At the same time,
ritual also acts on a cognitive level to make the norms instanti-
ated through the ritual process a part of the taken-for-granted
"world as it is" in which we function. The result is that ritual-
ized norms can become deeply implicated in our very sense of
self and self-esteem, and thereby become, in the profoundest
sense, "internalized."
The second way that ritual facilitates the internalization of
norms relates to the way that we prioritize the various social
norms to which we are introduced in the process of social learn-
ing. In this regard, the metaphor of internalization as fax repli-
cation is particularly misleading, in so far as it implies that cog-
nitive models such as social norms constitute unique originals to
American Romance, in HUMAN MOTIVES AND CULTURAL MODELS, supra note 349, at
61-89. For a discussion of this same phenomenon from the perspectives of rational
action and traditional sociological reference group theory, see CHONG, RATIONAL
LIVES, supra note 1, at 47-51.
357. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 8, at 133-34; Roy G. D'Andrade, Schemas
and Motivation, in HUMAN MOTIVES AND CULTURAL MODELS, supra note 349, at 23,
36-37.
358. See DAMASIO, supra note 213, at 224-26; see also supra notes 312-14 and ac-
companying text.
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be subsequently reproduced. In reality, in the process of inter-
nalization, a child (or an adult, for that matter) may be intro-
duced to more than one cultural model or norm that can apply
to a given situation, and these models or norms may differ
greatly or even be contradictory. 359 At times these models or
norms are organized vertically in the individual's mind, so that a
single model or norm is applied to all analogous situations. 360
But this is by no means always the case. Conflicting models and.
norms can also be organized horizontally, i.e., different models
or norms are applied in roughly analogous situations based
upon small variations in context. 361 Alternatively, an individual
may synthesize multiple cognitive models or norms into a per-
sonal, idiosyncratic hybrid.362 In cases where many individuals
have internalized multiple versions of a cultural model or norm
in a horizontal organization or in an idiosyncratic synthesis, the
resulting indeterminate and shifting understanding and applica-
tion of the normative standard could be expected to inhibit the
formation of a stable equilibrium around a widely accepted
dominant meaning.
In order to see how ritualization helps overcome the prob-
lem of internalization of multiple potentially applicable models
and/or norms, recall the property of condensation inherent in
many of the symbols that are employed in ritual practices. Con-
densation allows multiple meanings to attach to the same sym-
bol, while permitting a dominant meaning to arise. Ritual thus
promotes in the minds of participants a kind of vertical organi-
zation of related meanings and norms, which can take into ac-
count the reality that we generally internalize more than one
relevant cultural model/norm, while at the same time inhibiting
the potential of such multiple internalizations to prevent a
community from developing a stable normative order.
4. Example: The Cree of James Bay
This section concludes with an example of how ritualiza-
tion, in both its constitutive and practical aspects, affects the way
that informal social norms operate in everyday life. The story
begins, as these stories generally do, with a collective action
359. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 81; Claudia Strauss, Research on Cultural Dis-
continuities, in A COGNITIVE THEORY OF CULTURAL MEANING, supra note 8, at 210.
360. See Strauss, supra note 359, at 214, 230.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 230 ("[W]e are only as consistent as we need to be .....
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problem, in this case involving the hunting of wild geese by the
modern Cree Indians of James Bay, Canada. Because geese fly-
ing over the Cree territory are a common pool resource, it would
be expected that absent an effective system of social control, in-
dividual hunters would not limit their kills, and that the result-
ing overhunting would incur a net social loss. This collective ac-
tion problem is further complicated by problems of transmitting
information between distinct systems, in this case between the
social and ecological systems. Geese are intelligent enough to be
sensitive to intensive hunting activity, and will cease flying over
Cree territory if they become aware that they are being
hunted.363 Environmental conditions such as this constitute a
particularly complicated analogic system of data that is inc-
ommensurable with systems of rules that organize human be-
havior.364 In particular, it is difficult for a society to develop a
system of rules governing human behavior that can accurately
track small, nuanced gradations in the local environment (e.g.,
the incremental effect of human activity on the geese's aware-
ness that they are being hunted), which may nevertheless have a
significant impact upon the ecological system as a whole (the
overall supply of geese).
The Cree Indians resolve these problems by utilizing a
complex series of rituals, such as communal feasting, all of
which emphasize a notion of mutual reciprocity between men
and animals. If humans respect the geese by not killing too
many, the geese will in turn reward them with good hunting.
365
Closely associated with these rituals are a series of bright-line
norms that specify the conditions under which hunting should
or should not take place in a given area (thus providing a simpli-
fied digital method for dealing with environmental changes),
along with a set of norms that confer social status upon careful
hunters and social ignominy upon careless ones.
366
These ritual processes can create strong emotional re-
sponses, and participants sometimes report experiencing a
"body-spirit" reciprocity whereby the identity of the hunter
merges with that of the animal. This provides strong affective
force for the norms of reciprocity that proscribe excessive hunt-
363. See Colin Scott, Science for the West, Myth for the Rest?: The Case of James Bay
Cree Knowledge Construction, in NAKED SCIENCE, supra note 140, at 69, 76-80.
364. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 98.
365. See Scott, supra note 363, at 81-84.
366. See id.
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ing of geese.367 It also enables relevant environmental informa-
tion to be transmitted in a form that is easily comprehensible to
human social actors. By anthropomorphizing the animals, hu-
man hunters can gauge the impact of their hunting activities by
asking "what would the goose think."368 Finally, the strength of
these rituals and norms is increased by the incorporation of the
concept of human/animal reciprocity into Cree myths, which
transform the norms into parts of a timeless, sacred, cosmic pat-
tern.369
The result is that the Cree adopt a careful rotation of hunt-
ing areas under the leadership of experienced hunting leaders,
and thereby avoid problems of overhunting. In stark contrast,
nearby areas whose inhabitants do not possess a similar rit-
ual/mythic structure, and where the number of killings is only
regulated by game laws, frequently experience significant over-
hunting problems.370
VI. RITUAL AND THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF LAW FOR NORMS
One of the great merits of the new norms literature is that it
has focused attention on the ways in which formal law and in-
formal norms act as alternative, and potentially interchangeable,
methods of social control. This has resulted in a reexamination
of the circumstances under which formal legal regulation can
and should be substituted for informal social norms, or, con-
versely, that informal norms should be taken into account by
legislators and judges. The problem of substitutability is at pre-
sent poorly understood, and poses one of the most vexing yet
most important issues confronting future norms scholarship. 371
In this section, the discussion shifts from a primarily descriptive
account of ritualized activity to the more explicitly normative
considerations that govern the decision of whether to replace
367. See id. at 75, 84.
368. See id. at 79-80.
369. See id. at 74.
370. See id. at 79. The type of mythic-ritualistic process involving hunting that is
described here is not limited to the Cree, but constitutes an important element in
the cultures of indigenous peoples throughout northern Canada. See SAHLINS, su-
pra note 6, at 449-50, 544. See ROY A. RAPPAPORT, ECOLOGY, MEANING, AND
RELIGION (1979), for another example of the role of ritual in establishing environ-
mental norms. See DOTY, supra note 5, at 76-102; Dillon & Abercrombie, supra note
206, at 54; Leach, Ritualization in Man, supra note 208, at 158, for information on rit-
ual as the "symbolic intercom" between facts in the world and mythic structures.
371. See Lessig, supra note 47, at 686-87.
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ritualized norms with formal law.
Substitutability in this case involves not only the interaction
between formal law and individual rationality, but also their in-
terplay with a third, cultural factor, ritual, which acts as a tool
mediating between the individual and the community without
being fully controlled by, or assimilated into either. To further
complicate matters, the fact that we instantiate some norms
through ritual has social and cultural ramifications extending
well beyond the types of considerations normally encountered
in the case of non-ritualized norms. On the constitutive level,
ritualization impacts upon the cultural, social, and linguistic
framework within which norms are created, maintained, and
changed. On the practical level, it has a profound influence on
the interaction of reason and emotion to strengthen individual
commitment to normative orders. On an ideological level, ritual
creates communal solidarity and, more importantly invokes our
sense of sacred authority and legitimacy. The substitution of a
law for a ritualized norm (or vice versa) is likely to have an ef-
fect on some, if not all, of these considerations, and one that may
be very hard to foresee in the context of ex ante policymaking.
Indeed, because of the ways that ritual acts upon deep structures
of social communication and the individual's comprehension of
shared social meanings, the participants themselves may be un-
aware of their impact.372
Accordingly, it is critical that we learn to ask the right ques-
tions. This section will highlight a number of issues that are
unique to ritual (or are particularly salient in the ritual context),
and to suggest how these considerations should be taken into
account when making any decision concerning a potential sub-
stitution.
A. Efficiency
A great deal of research recently shown that informal social
norms are efficient (or at least welfare enhancing), particularly
with respect to norms existing outside the commercial sphere,373
372. Recall the imperceptible but precipitous collapse of bilingualism in New
Guinea as a result of alterations in ritual practices. See supra note 185.
373. For examples of a relatively optimistic assessments of the efficiency of
many social norms, see ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 1, at 167-83; Cooter, Decen-
tralized Law, supra note 1. For examples of views that many norms are likely to be
inefficient (and that even efficient norms are unlikely to arise in optimal quantity)
due to problems of collective action, strategic behavior, and information asymme-
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and on the related question, the extent to which the evolutionary
process of norm generation ultimately tends to produce increas-
ingly welfare enhancing norms in optimal levels without the
need for formal intervention.374 In this interpretation, formal
law should normally replace informal norms in cases of manifest
inefficiency stemming from factors such as collective action
problems, externalities, or significant information asymmetries.
Conversely, it is suggested that law incorporate norms where
these norms have obvious efficiency advantages, in particular
because the social actors who actually create the normative
structure may enjoy informational advantages specific to the
practices in question over legislative and judicial lawmakers.3 75
Because ritualization is primarily a procedural practice for
instantiating and maintaining beliefs, values, and norms in the
social sphere, a focus on ritual cannot provide definitive answers
as to the substantive efficiency either of a given norm or of the
development of the normative system as a whole. The impor-
tance of a ritual perspective lies rather in its ability help us judge
the likely effectiveness and efficiency of these norms in the job of
regulating behavior. Ritualized norms have distinctive quali-
ties-different both from other types of informal norms and
from formal law -that can hinder or enhance the efficient opera-
tion of a normative system, and a careful consideration of these
features therefore goes to the heart of decisionmaking concern-
ing whether to employ law or norms to regulate behavior in spe-
cific contexts.
So far, this article has shown how ritualization provides
powerful support for the creation and maintenance of an effec-
tive system of social norms. Ritualization enhances the effec-
tiveness of an associated normative system by providing the
framework in which an individual unambiguously commits her-
self, and others, to adhering to social norms. It enhances the
clarity of norms against potential erosion of meaning, and fo-
cuses memory and awareness on relevant norms in situations
where they are potentially applicable. Ritualized norms can be-
tries, see, POSNER, INEFFICIENT NORMS, supra note 1; Gillette, supra note 24; Jody S.
Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377
(1997).
374. See Krauss, supra note 373.
375. See, e.g., Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 1. But see, e.g., Bernstein, Im-
manent Norms, supra note 18, at 1766-69 (opposing incorporation of business norms
into formal law due to detrimental impact on business relationships).
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come largely unquestionable, part of our implicit way of describ-
ing to ourselves how the world works, and in some cases part of
an unchallengeable, sacred cosmos. Ritualization promotes pro-
found internalization of norms, making them part of the partici-
pant's fundamental sense of self, and provides powerful affec-
tive motivation for complying with norms.
These features may also, to some extent, characterize norms
instantiated through non-ritualized procedures like formal law,
but often only to a lesser degree. Moreover, in the case of some
of the most powerful characteristics of ritualization, the ana-
logues in formal law are weak or non-existent. Legal institutions
generally provide little scope, other than indirectly through vot-
ing and other political rituals, for individuals to express the
powerful kind of self-referential, physical/emotional sense of
commitment to legal norms that they commonly do for ritual-
ized informal norms. Additionally, the powerful, positive emo-
tional force towards compliance with ritualized norms may be
absent in the case of formal law, with its emphasis on state-
administered sanctions for noncompliance, and often cannot be
duplicated by a relatively weak and diffuse sense of community
approval or disapproval that may be communicated by law's
expressive function. Individuals frequently do not internalize,
or "act in the shadow" of much of formal law, in contrast to the
way that ritual can turn norms into an integral part of an indi-
vidual's sense of self.376
Ritualization also significantly affects the transactions costs
associated with operating a system of informal norms, acting so
as to make the system more stable and more effective than might
otherwise be the case.377 Profound internalization of social
376. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 1, at 141-47; Andrew J. Cappel, A
Walk Along Willow: Patterns of Land Use Coordination in Pre-Zoning New Haven (1870-
1926), 101 YALE L.J. 617 (1991) (indicating that social norms rather than formal law
govern many aspects of urban development).
377. This analysis ignores the costs of the rituals themselves, including costs to
performers for participation (e.g., lost time), which can themselves be significant.
In the case of existing rituals and rituals that develop more or less spontaneously
(or through the agency of professional "ritual entrepreneurs"), I assume that the
costs of participation are at least offset by the benefits enjoyed by participants from
their participation; this in turn allows me to focus on the positive and negative net-
work externalities of ritualization (e.g., communication, trust) as they affect infor-
mal social norms, on possibilities for strategic behavior within the ritual commu-
nity, and on the potential impact of legal regulation of the ritual process. For a
similar analytical framework in the context of explicitly religious practices, see Pos-
ner, Religious Groups, supra note 1, at 40. For a discussion of the recent prolifera-
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norms, and the powerful positive affective force associated with
compliance makes individuals more willing to sanction norm
violators. At the same time, the emotional impact of ritual prac-
tice on individual discount rates, makes norm violators more
sensitive to the prospect of future and renders informal sanc-
tions and social ostracism more costly to recipients. The result
of ritualization is to decrease the costs of enforcing compliance,
while increasing the costs of noncooperation.
Ritualization also decreases other transactions costs. "Cog-
nitive" costs arise due to limitations on human cognition and
memory, which have the potential to inhibit rational behavior.
Ritual focuses awareness and enhances the recovery of relevant
norms from long-term memory; it preserves norms in memory
in a relatively immutable manner; it makes norms more cogni-
tively efficient by moving them from the realm of explicit rea-
soning to that of implicit response. Ritual also reduces more
traditional types of transactions costs. Widespread ritualization
of norms within a community can overcome problems posed by
geographic dispersion, while ritual's ability to achieve solidarity
without consensus helps limit the issues that must be negotiated
in establishing, maintaining, or changing social norms to a man-
ageable number. Finally, ritual can be very effective in resolving
problems associated with passing information between dissimi-
lar systems, thereby decreasing the costs both of gathering the
information that may be relevant to making norms welfare-
tion of for-profit ritual entrepreneurs, who provide innovative ritual services to cus-
tomers, see GRIMES, supra note 82, at 308. At the same time, the cost of a ritual sys-
tem may sometimes be a significant factor in whether or not a society will support a
given system of rites, as in the case of a centralized organization that sponsors ritu-
als that no longer are effective in inculcating their message (as arguably was the
case towards the end of the Soviet Union), or in a centralized decision to install new
rites or significantly modify older ones. Note, for example, the current discussion
concerning the amount of money the states are willing to spend on improving and
making more publicly acceptable the electoral rituals whose legitimacy has suffered
in the wake of the 2000 election debacle. Historians similarly have suggested that
one of the many causes of the Protestant Reformation was a reaction against the loss
of productive time that resulted from the lush profusion of rituals and holy days
that characterized late medieval Catholicism. On the other hand, a certain amount
of ritual activity is probably immune from this type of cost-benefit calculus, being
required for humans to be able to communicate important concepts that cannot be
understood and transmitted in any other manner. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at
139-41. This would be all the more true if, as has been argued, ritual constitutes an
indispensable preliminary step in human capacity for symbolic manipulation that
underlies basic language competence. See DEACON, supra note 4, at 400-10. Such a
view would appear to be confirmed by cross-cultural evidence that ritualization
forms an essential part of human ontogeny. See sources cited supra note 4.
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enhancing, and of making this information accessible to human
actors in a way that can provide meaningful guidance.
Formal law can capture some, but not all of these qualities,
and not always as successfully. It is well known, for example,
that enforcement costs associated with formal law tend to be
significantly higher than for informal norms.378 More interesting
are the problems connected with information flows. Recall how
elegantly the ritualized maxim of reciprocity "think like a goose"
can immediately transform sensitive environmental data into
meaningful guidelines for action. To accomplish similar results
in formal law would normally require a complex and costly
process of ex ante scientific information gathering, the format-
ting of this data in a manner usable by policymakers, and the
casting of policy decisions into verbal regulations that can be
disseminated among the effected population. Even where all of
these steps are undertaken, the result may not be effective.
There is empirical evidence suggesting that in at least certain
situations, the scientific methods employed in policymaking
simply cannot take all of the relevant environmental and social
information into account, thus vitiating attempts at successful
formal regulation.379 All of these considerations suggest that, at
least in some cases, replacing suboptimal ritualized norms with
superficially more efficient formal laws may not have the de-
sired effect, as any putative efficiency gain that might be derived
from the new laws could be more than offset by higher costs or
diminished effectiveness in regulating behavior.
In other situations, however, efficiency considerations
might justify more aggressive intervention by formal law. This
is particularly true with respect to society's ability to change ex-
isting norms and make beneficial improvements. Informal
norms are commonly viewed as being in general more condu-
cive than formal lawmaking to producing efficient welfare en-
hancing results by virtue of their greater flexibility and sensitiv-
ity to subtle changes in local conditions. 38 0  In the case of
ritualized norms, however, there is reason to be skeptical of such
claims. Because of the repetitive nature and affective force of
ritual practices, ritually instantiated norms are likely to enjoy
378. See, e.g., Cooter, Normative Failure, supra note 1, at 947.
379. See, e.g., M. Estellie Smith, Public Policy, Sciencing, and Managing the Future,
in NAKED SCIENCE, supra note 140, at 201, 212-13.
380. See, e.g., Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 1, at 1646; Cooter, Normative
Failure, supra note 1, at 948.
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very strong support even where they may have outlived their
usefulness or been shown to have inefficient impacts. As a re-
sult, the introduction of new normative proposals, whether due
to efforts of self-conscious norm entrepreneurs or as the result of
a more diffuse and anonymous process of cultural "contagion"
of new ideas, is likely to encounter more resistance than would
otherwise be the case, particularly where existing norms are
viewed as part of the natural order of the world or of a sacred
cosmic structure. Consequently, the ritualization of a set of
norms may well exhibit a significant lock-in effect that inhibits
future innovation.381 Moreover, the way in which ritual serves
to transform the contingent into the factive -obscuring social
construction by making it appear to be part of an immutable
natural order-can inhibit the ability of even acute potential
norm entrepreneurs to see opportunities for beneficial innova-
tion. Because they are thus prone to problems of cultural inertia,
ritualized norms might in many cases be highly inflexible and
difficult to make more efficient, possibly more so than in the
case of formal law.
In addition, even where the need for innovation becomes
apparent, the ritual process tends to restrict the types of innova-
tion that are available. Concepts and norms associated with the
ritual process are exemplified through stylized ritual actions and
utterances, generally embodied in a complex symbolic structure,
and frequently articulated in mythic discourse. New rituals are
devised out of portions of existing rites, 382 and the meaning of
pre-existing symbols and myths is contested and ultimately,
subtly reinterpreted. 383 The combined weight of this structure
ensures that, in general, changes do not occur wholesale, replac-
ing the old structure with new norms, rituals, symbols, and
myths, but rather take place incrementally. The fact that change
generally is channeled into adaptations of previous meanings
and practices limits the free scope for change and innovation.
Thus a new norm may well be adopted because it fits in most
easily with pre-existing ritual and symbolic structures, rather
381. On lock-in effects in the context of informal social norms, see Gillette, supra
note 24. Sociologists have noted a similar "cultural inertia" inhibiting social inno-
vation. See Chong, Values, supra note 1, at 2101-02. Arguably, ritual forms a par-
ticularly formidable source of cultural inertia.
382. See BELL, supra note 66, at 235; KERTZER, supra note 70, at 12; Hobsbawm,
supra note 75.
383. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 12.
SANTA CLARA LAWREVIEW
than because it provides the optimal solution to a perceived
problem.
Ritualization can also promote inefficient results by virtue
of the fact that ritual processes (and accompanying social norms)
are subject to manipulation by groups seeking to impose costs
upon outsiders.3 4 Inasmuch as ritualized activities tend to
sharply separate the world into participants and non-
participants, and to invest participants with an affective sense of
communitas combined with claims to special status, ritual com-
munities are potentially likely sources of discriminatory norms.
Likewise, within a group, ritual can become the source of ineffi-
cient strategic behavior where the ritual process is controlled by
a small group (e.g., the dominant party in a totalitarian state)
that can manipulate popular participation in rituals for its own
benefit.385 In such cases, robust legal intervention may well be
justified.
Although significant, these inhibitory effects should not be
overestimated. Because of the capacity for innovation within the
framework of a ritual structure, ritual and its symbolic and
mythical concomitants (including social norms) do not act as
purely conservative forces upholding the status quo, but are also
capable of significant dynamic change.386 This article has noted
how religious ritual helped solidify the early abolitionist move-
ment in the antebellum period; at the same time, the conversion
of slaves to Christianity provided them with the opportunity to
create norms of solidarity and freedom. Contemporary society
also offers a number of examples of spontaneous ritual innova-
tion designed to change or modify norms of behavior, although
some may not operate within the context of formal religious
practices. Significantly, a number of these practices address is-
sues that pose notoriously intractable problems for formal law.
For example, rites have been invented to help heal and offer
public support to victims of domestic violence, and to focus
community attention and censure upon its perpetrators. 387 Non-
384. For examples of the problems associated with using social norms to exter-
nalize costs onto outsiders, see ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 1, at 249-50;
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1004-08; Posner, Inefficient
Norms, supra note 1, at 1722-23.
385. See generally CHRISTEL LANE, THE RITES OF RULERS: RITUAL IN INDUSTRIAL
SOcIETY-THE SOVIET CASE (1981) (discussing manipulation of Soviet ritual for
benefit of Communist Party).
386. See KERTZER supra note 70, at 11-12.
387. See Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish Women's Use of Ritual As a Means of Em-
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sectarian divorce rituals have proliferated, in which the divorced
couple signify the end of the marriage in a formal and public
way. These rites not only help heal the psychological wounds of
a divorce, but also help re-establish trust and a cooperative
framework for future interaction (such as raising children).388 In
Japan, popular abortion rites help mediate and diffuse the ten-
sion between the reality of abortion and moral or religious dis-
approval of the practice in a way that is not possible in the non-
ritualized context of American society. 389 Feminists have turned
to ritual in order to publicize women's lack of recognition in
public institutions, and to provide a means for women to experi-
ence self-affirmation. 390 Recall as well that the ritualization of
norms can in some cases -like abolitionism in the antebellum
United States-can actually help overcome the types of collec-
tive action problems that typically accompany efforts to intro-
duce new norms, where the proponents of the new norms are
highly motivated to agitating for change despite strong social
disapproval.
There may be similar reasons for not simply displacing ritu-
alized norms with formal law in cases where the ritual process
instantiates discriminatory norms. At times, it may be possible
to remedy these problems without losing the advantages that
ritualized norms possess in terms of effectiveness and cost, by
instead using law to open up the ritual community to outsiders,
to increase the ability of ordinary people to participate in the
control of ritual activities, or to foster growth within civil society
to create a multiplicity of ritual communities, so that it is more
difficult for one to dominate the others. 391
B. Destruction of Social Capital
Another important criterion to take into account is the po-
tential impact of a substitution of law for norms on the stock of
"social capital," 392 features of social organization such as trust,
powerment (Paper Presentation: 2000 Law & Society Association Conference, Mi-
ami) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
388. See GRIMES, supra note 82, at 320-23.
389. See id. at 310-15.
390. See, e.g., Laird, supra note 99.
391. Note, for example, the Australian Civil Marriage Celebrant Program, which
has opened up the ability to perform legal marriages to thousands of informal ritual
entrepreneurs. See GRIMES, supra note 82, at 308.
392. See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055 (1996).
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norms, or networks, which facilitate cooperation and a society's
ability to overcome collective action problems.393 Social capital
is generated by communal activities that require repeated com-
munication and coordinated activity among members, giving
rise to norms of reciprocity that influence behavior so that an in-
dividual's cooperative efforts will be reciprocated, rather than
exploited, by others.394 The importance of social capital has been
documented in studies relating to, inter alia, local politics, 395 use
of common pool resources, 396 and urban planning.397 In contrast,
cultures that possess low levels of social capital and social trust
tend to be characterized by weak institutions (including weak
regulatory norms), low levels of social development, and limited
ability to effect cooperative solutions.398
The concern is that the substitution of formal law for infor-
mal norms can potentially alter the meaning of social relations
and thereby destroy valuable social capital associated with these
norms. This can occur directly, as when laws conflict with base-
line social norms of reciprocity or fairness, or indirectly, where
formal law alters the underlying social conditions that engender
social trust and the production and maintenance of useful
norms.399 Arguably, the very replacement of a normative struc-
ture with formal law, even if both have roughly identical sub-
stantive content, can diminish social capital as norms of recip-
rocity based upon trust among individuals and sanctions based
upon moral and reputational concerns are replaced by an extra-
communal third-party system of compliance and enforcement.400
Such concerns become particularly acute in deciding
whether to replace ritualized norms with formal law, because
393. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 167-71 (1993); see also JAMES S. COLEMAN,
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300-21 (1990).
394. See PUTNAM ET AL., supra note 393, at 171-76.
395. See id.
396. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 21, at 319-29.
397. See Pildes, supra note 392, at 2067-69.
398. See DOUGLAS & NEY, supra note 9, at 166-69; OSTROM ET AL., supra note 21,
at 327-29.
399. See Pildes, supra note 392, at 2069-70.
400. For example, it is possible that replacing informal norms that govern busi-
ness relationships can have the unintended effect of lessening the sense of trust
among businessmen by placing them in a more legal, and therefore adversarial,
type of relationship, and of replacing an expansive notion of reciprocity with nar-
row regard for strict legality, thereby encouraging, rather than discouraging, ex-
ploitative behavior. See Bernstein, Immanent Norms, supra note 18, at 1766-69.
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the ritual process can significantly augment a society's stock of
social trust and social capital in ways that extend beyond ordi-
nary types of social interactions.
The self-referential nature of the ritual process goes beyond
the ability of ordinary social interaction to create trust among
individuals, creating "hypertrust" among members of the ritual
community. Recall in particular how ritual utilizes paralinguis-
tic features to express social relations that cannot be adequately
communicated in words. While paralinguistic features are an
aspect of all face-to-face communication, the physicality and
iconicity of ritual performance serves to cement among partici-
pants feelings of commonality, reciprocity, and trustworthiness
more powerfully and convincingly than otherwise.
Ritual can be distinguished from other forms of participa-
tory activity that create social capital by virtue of its transforma-
tive effects upon the participant. 4 1 The physical, affective prop-
erties of the ritual process promote a high degree of
internalization that, together with the factive nature of the ritual
process, makes adherence to norms of reciprocity among mem-
bers of the community appear particularly inevitable and desir-
able. This is further enhanced by ritual's potential ability to
temporarily dissolve social distinctions, evoke a strong sense of
community, and allow participants to view their conduct to-
wards others from a timeless perspective, set apart from consid-
erations of short-term gain. At the same time, because ritualiza-
tion can influence individual preference in favor of norms of
reciprocity, it can also help create the very types of concrete,
successful, cooperative activities that support social trust.
To the extent that the substitution of formal law for a ritu-
ally predicated normative structure impairs the continuance of
robust ritual activity, we should expect that potentially valuable
social capital may be destroyed, and that compliance with law-
based cooperative norms therefore may be less vigorous than in
the case of their ritualized counterparts. Indeed, the removal of
the affective support of ritual for a set of normative practices can
potentially lead to a cascade effect away from widespread inter-
nalization of such norms that may only be partly offset by com-
pliance with the new, law-based normative structure. 40 2
401. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 39-40.
402. For information on cascade effects, see supra note 334.
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C. Degradation of the Ritual Process
While considerations of efficiency and destruction of social
capital are important, there is a larger issue at stake that arises
not only in the case of the substitution of formal law for ritual-
ized norms, but also in the larger context of the relationship be-
tween law and ritual in general. In addition to its impact upon
ritualized social norms, formal state law may have an impact,
directly or indirectly, on the ritual process itself, and can pro-
scribe or impair a community's very ability to engage in ritual
practice. The problems raised whenever law impinges upon so-
cial practices of ritualization are particularly complex and trou-
blesome in light of ritual's constitutive function-not only its
ability to facilitate communication and generate meaning and
obligation -but especially its connection with the implicit, back-
ground knowledge that we share about the world, and above all,
ritual's central role in forming and instantiating human concep-
tions of the sacred.
Formal law can have a negative impact on ritual in several
ways. Most obviously, it may outlaw ritual practices entirely.403
More subtle but no less important, effects can result where for-
mal law replaces norms that, although not included in the ritual
process itself, are closely associated with it. Where the law con-
flicts with the ritual/mythic structure, and the law is widely ob-
served by the community, the likely result is the devaluation of
the ritual process.404 Alternatively, a community may adjust its
ritual/mythic structure in conformity with the new legal or-
der,405 but if these changes are too abrupt and obviously driven
by expediency, this could itself cause widespread cynicism and a
decline in ritual practice. Appreciable damage to ritual proc-
esses may also occur, at least in some cases, even where formal
law merely restates and incorporates the content of ritually in-
stantiated norms. Rituals may now be perceived as redundant
and fall into disuse. Even if this is not the case, substitution can
still have a profound (possibly deleterious) impact on ritual. In-
403. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); Employment Div. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (attempts by state
and local governments to proscribe ritual practices).
404. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 67, at 37-53.
405. A good example is the change in doctrine of the Mormon church concern-
ing polygamy prior to Utah's admission as a state. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and
Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2422-24 (1997) (providing an
overview of the struggle over polygamy).
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formal social norms are largely a manifestation of oral culture,
whereas formal law (at least in the modern state) quintessen-
tially involves written statutes and opinions. It is well estab-
lished that as literate culture progressively pervades a previ-
ously orally based sector of society, it causes fundamental
transformations in ritual practices. 406 Such transformations can
potentially impair the role played by ritual in facilitating the
generation and maintenance of norms, in the articulation of fun-
damental social meanings, and in the creation of the legitimate
and the sacred.
Because the impact of ritualization is so subtle and multi-
farious, damage to ritual processes can have significant unin-
tended consequences on social practices (including informal
norms), which may not even be perceptible at the time. In New
Guinea, the replacement of traditional rites with Christianity has
played an unexpected and almost unnoticed role in the disap-
pearance of indigenous languages.407 In contemporary Western
society, many observers have noted a connection between the
current relative sparsity of socially accepted ritual practices and
widespread dissatisfaction concerning the fundamental meaning
of one's life and relationship to others, and with the difficulties
that many individuals encounter in coping with important eco-
nomic, social, or biological transitions.408 A well-intentioned ef-
fort in parts of West Africa during the past few decades to stamp
out rituals relating to accusations of sorcery resulted in unin-
tended, and particularly tragic, consequences. It turned out that
proscribing these rituals, instead of eliminating witchcraft accu-
sations, removed the social constraints that had previously
served to limit the scope and impact of accusations of witch-
craft.409 As a result, existing social tensions imploded into an in-
tensified series of sorcery allegations, accompanied by pro-
longed and bloody witchhunts.410 The moral of these stories: the
disruption or displacement of ritual practice by central author-
ity, notably state law, can undermine the social and communica-
tive framework necessary for the existence of effective social
norms, and can do so in a highly unpredictable manner.
406. See GOODY, supra note 44, at 170-71.
407. See discussion supra note 185.
408. For a trenchant analysis in the context of the way that we deal with death in
contemporary American society, see GRIMES, supra note 82, at 281-82.
409. See DOUGLAS, supra note 47, at 77-94.
410. See id.
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But the problem posed by potential disruption, displace-
ment, or devaluation of ritual practice by law extends even
deeper, to the very bases of human conceptions of the sacred, of
authority, and of legitimacy. A common misconception is to
equate the sacred with a body of beliefs (or texts) handed down
through tradition, and to view practices as more or less simply
the acting out of these beliefs. Such a view, however, by focus-
ing only on the content of sacred beliefs and texts, is radically in-
complete.411 Belief and practice exist in a reciprocal relationship,
and no system of beliefs can long retain its sacred character in
the absence of periodic rites, the physical, emotional practices
that put the participant in direct connection with the sacred, and
thereby instantiate a belief system as a sacred object.412 More-
over, the content of a set of sacred beliefs within a community is
always subtly changing, even in the case of well established re-
ligions. Over time, these beliefs may have changed so much as
to be virtually unrecognizable from the standpoint of earlier be-
lief structures within the same tradition. Yet we view all of these
beliefs as part of the same sacred tradition, and the main reason
that we do is that they have been instantiated as sacred by a
common set of ongoing ritual practices. Arguably, considera-
tions like this demonstrate how ritual occurs logically before be-
liefs, just as we know that, from historical and evolutionary per-
spectives, ritualization predated and formed the indispensable
basis for substantive systems of sacred belief.413 Ritual not only
expresses our notions of the sacred, it creates them; the legiti-
411. Failure to clearly grasp this point not only bedevils courts, see infra note 395
and accompanying text, but afflicts commentators as well. See, e.g., Steven L.
Carter, Religious Resistance to the Kantian Sovereign, in 37 NOMOS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 288 (Ian Shapiro & Judith Wagner DeCew eds., 1995). Frank Ravitch has
argued that the privileging of religious belief may reflect a subtle canonical under-
standing of Protestantism, with its relatively anti-ritualistic theology, as the best ex-
emplar of religious activity, at the expense of the more practice-oriented religious
sensibilities of Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam. See Frank S. Ravitch, Judicial In-
terpretation and the Free Exercise Clause, (2000) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author). This may well be true, but it is important not to draw too hard a dis-
tinction; no religion is fully orthodoxic or orthopraxic, each combines elements of
belief and ritual practice, albeit in varying degrees. See BELL, supra note 66, at 191-
97.
412. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 395-96 (discussing the reciprocal nature of
belief and practice, and on the need for ritual to periodically recreate the sacred); see
also ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, RELIGION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL VIEW 102, 104, 107,
243-44 (1966) (noting that ritual has instrumental priority over religious belief).
413. See DEACON, supra note 4, at 322-24; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 371-73,
for information on the historical and evolutionary primacy of ritual.
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macy of the authority of a religious leader or political official ex-
ists largely to the extent that this legitimacy is continuously re-
enacted in a series of religious or secular rites.414
This centrality of ritual in the creation of the sacred raises
fundamental problems when law encroaches upon ritual prac-
tice. We already encounter serious dilemmas when law curtails
actions that are mandated by a set of sacred beliefs, but which
are not direct constituents of the ritual process itself, such as the
ability of an Orthodox Jew in the American armed forces to wear
a yarmulke in his everyday duties.415 From a non-state centered,
cultural/ritual perspective, cases like this demonstrates a clash
between two equal sacred authorities, both instantiated by the
same group through two different sets of ritual practices: par-
ticipation in the ceremonies of Orthodox Judaism; and participa-
tion in the various political rites that create the sacred basis of a
democratic society. In such cases, the identification of an au-
thoritative rule of recognition may be impossible, and the impo-
sition of state law becomes a mere exercise in coercion, or as
Robert Cover memorably phrased it, "jurispathy." 416
Problems of legitimate authority become much more acute
when law curtails fundamental ritual practices themselves. In
this case, law arrogates to itself all of the sacred/symbolic au-
thority, precluding a group from the very creation of its own sa-
cred reality. Yet from a cultural perspective, there is no basis for
privileging one ritually created sacred authority to the exclusion
of others; all of them are normal ways that a society goes about
its business of making sense of the world and relationships be-
tween human beings. There is a serious practical danger as well.
Given the primary role of the sacred in human conceptions of
authority and legitimacy, and the fundamental role of ritual in
the creation of the sacred, the banning of ritual practices can
leave the state with a monopoly of sources of authority at the
expense of civil society; it is no accident that totalitarian regimes
abuse the ritual process by trying to capture all of the ritual
practices, and by outlawing, burdening, or replacing non-state
rituals that create rival sources of legitimacy.41 7 State law inter-
414. See KERTZER, supra note 70, at 24-25, 37-42; RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at
429-30.
415. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
416. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983).
417. See, e.g., KERTZER, supra note 70, at 45-46, 115 (discussing Soviet attempts to
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ference with central ritual activities thus differs from conflicts
between law and nonritual practices and beliefs, and is a far
more serious matter.
This is because excessively burdening or proscribing core
ritual practices does not merely limit an individual's ability to
publicly express or follow the tenets of her sacred beliefs, it de-
stroys the entire system of sacrality, preventing individuals or
groups from the very creation of the sacred, and delegitimizing
the entire belief system instantiated as sacred through the ritual
process. 418 Furthermore, whenever state law conflicts with spe-
cific beliefs or nonritual practices, there at least remains the pos-
sibility for members of a ritual community to accommodate the
demands of larger society without losing their identity, by
means of creative reinterpretation of the meaning of certain be-
liefs, changes in the text of the ritual canon,419 or ritual innova-
tion that can integrate new norms into the sacred structure. In-
deed, this process of adapting to a changing outside world is a
normal part of the growth and creativity of sacred systems, both
inside and outside the context of formal religion. The imposition
of state law to the exclusion of fundamental ritual practices re-
moves this possibility, leaving the effected group few choices.
In our constitutional structure, many of these potential con-
flicts are avoided by the First Amendment protection of religion,
along with longstanding statutory exemptions of religious or-
ganizations from certain types of regulation. But gaps remain,
resulting in an extensive (and frequently incoherent) body of
United States Supreme Court case law relating to government
regulation of the sacred. A ritual perspective, incorporating the
insight that ritual largely creates the sacred, allows us to see
these cases in a new light.
An extended study of this problem is beyond the scope of
this article, but I offer two examples to show what a ritual based
analysis would look like. Each focuses upon one particular
problematic aspect of the current jurisprudence. The first, aris-
ing in the context of formal religious practice, is the confusion
that can result from failure to distinguish between the capacity
appropriate Christian rites and to devalue existing religious rituals). See generally
LANE, supra note 385.
418. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 283-87 (indicating the locus of the sacred in
ritual practice).
419. Note, for example, the frequent introduction of nonsexist language into es-
tablished religious liturgies by liberal sects.
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of ritual to create the sacred, and the specific beliefs that are
made sacred in this way. The second :relates to the problems
that arise in the case of secular rituals. From a cultural perspec-
tive, these rituals are often largely identical to formal religious
practices in their ability to instantiate the sacred and may even
be viewed by participants as quasi-religious, but they do not fit
within the narrow legal rubric of "religion."
The first problem is exemplified in Employment Division of
Oregon v. Smith,420 where an anti-drug norm codified as law con-
flicted with the ingestion of peyote as a sacrament in the rituals
of the Native American Church. From a ritual perspective, the
fundamental error made by the Court in upholding the Oregon
statute was its explicit rejection of any attempt to determine
what should have been the decisive issue: the centrality of the
use of peyote in the Native American religion. 421 It is precisely
at this point that the erroneous conflation of a religion's ritual
practices with its structure of beliefs (and with the non-ritual
acts that arise from these beliefs) becomes pernicious. Certainly,
we may well hesitate at the prospect of a secular court trying to
decide which of a religion's beliefs are more central than others,
a subject about which even theologians may disagree, and which
in any event is inherently subjective in the minds of individual
members of a religious group. The same is true for nonritual
practices (such as wearing a yarmulke in daily life) that allow an
individual to express these beliefs. But ultimately the core of the
sacred does not reside in such beliefs and practices, but in the rit-
ual processes by which they are instantiated. These, in contrast, are
public and objective, and the specific elements which comprise a
given religion's ritual process (along with their relative impor-
tance within the ritual structure) can be determined. In Smith, it
was the central sacrament of the Native American ritual system
that was being attacked by the state law. Thus, by ignoring the
420. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
421. According to the majority, such an inquiry would constitute an impermissi-
ble attempt by the Court to determine the relative importance of religious beliefs
and practices. From this starting point, the Court further reasoned that because we
cannot weigh the relative importance attached to different religious beliefs and
practices, the religious pluralism of the American people would ensure that virtu-
ally any law could be subject to claims that it violated someone's sacred values and
belief, thus potentially undermining the state's ability to regulate behavior at all.
Faced with this unpalatable alternative, the majority established a bright-line rule
that no First Amendment violation occur where the effect of a neutral and generally
applicable state law incidentally burdens religious beliefs and practices. See id. at
880.
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ritual/non-ritual distinction, and by privileging belief and ex-
pression over ritual practice, the Court's majority allowed the
state to undermine the very process whereby religious beliefs
and practices acquire and retain their sacred character.
The failure of law to recognize the capacity of secular rituals
to instantiate the sacred lies at the heart of the Supreme Court's
decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,422 where the Court held
that the Boy Scouts could legitimately refuse to allow gay men to
act as scout leaders. Scouting seemingly does not fall into the
traditional category of religion, and so the Court decided the
case on the basis of the Boy Scout's right of expressive associa-
tion.423 Yet such an analysis clearly misses, from a social and
cultural perspective, much of what is really going on. Recall that
scouting is permeated by rituals designed to inculcate values
into its members in precisely the way that we have previously
defined the sacred: implicit, unquestionable, and ultimately un-
provable postulates upon which we build our understanding of
how the world works and how we are to act in it. Just as in
Smith, Dale concerned a potential clash between a legally codi-
fied social norm (an antidiscrimination law aimed against intol-
erance) and a group's ability to create and articulate its own
conception of the sacred. A cultural/ritual perspective thus
frames the issue on the same factual question that the Court
avoided in Smith: to what extent does formal law impede the rit-
ual processes through which the sense of the sacred and its asso-
ciated beliefs are created? Arguably, in contrast with Smith, sex-
ual orientation does not appear to pose an impediment to the
practice of the fundamental scouting rituals.424 What is impor-
tant, however, is that a critical cultural issue cannot even be ad-
dressed in the language of current jurisprudence or legal com-
mentary because of the way that we ignore the power of secular
ritual and cabin off all discussion of the sacred within the con-
text of formal religious traditions. A ritual perspective in these
situations is critical. Aside from allowing us to identify the
problems, it offers the possibility to adjudicate such claims in a
principled manner.
422. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
423. See id. at 644.
424. For a discussion of scouting as a ritualized activity, see supra notes 116-17
and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Ritual forms an integral part of human life, and ritualization
has a profound impact not only on social norms themselves, but
also on larger issues of morality, legitimacy, and fairness. The
full implications of human ritual practice on these issues fall
outside the scope of this article, and must await further investi-
gation. This article, however, attempts to sketch out the con-
tours of what such a study would look like, and the problems
that it would address. In addition, this discussion underscores a
fundamental point: studies of both formal law and informal
norms need to take into account the multifarious ways that
multi-use, co-evolved artifacts and social practices, such as rit-
ual, cut across the analytical boundaries that we customarily
erect in the study of law, cognition, society, and culture. More-
over, a careful study of these practices can reveal unexpected
patterns of regularity. This ultimately leads towards develop-
ment of a full taxonomy of the most important forms of cultural
practices (and their practical implications), that can clearly expli-
cate the concrete bases, or microfoundations, upon which much
of the social and legal orders rest.
The description of the function and importance of ritual that
is presented here, in particular with respect to ritual's role in the
creation of the sacred, is not intended as an unqualified en-
dorsement of ritual behavior. Like any other cultural tool, ritual
can be employed for evil, as well as beneficial purposes; the
same human impulse that gave rise to Mozart's Requiem also
underlies the Nuremburg rallies and the destruction of the
World Trade Center. Nor should my discussion leave the im-
pression that ritual is an undifferentiated phenomenon, or a uni-
tary vehicle for social cohesion. In my analysis, I have treated
ritual to some extent in the form of a Weberian ideal type, in or-
der to make more explicit the essential features of ritual practice
and ritual's continuing vitality in contemporary life. Real life, of
course, is more complicated. Not all rituals share identical fea-
tures; not all are equally effective or emotionally satisfying; not
all equally partake of ritual's unique ability to sacralize. Some
have become "mere" rituals, impotent vestiges of our culture's
prior history. Moreover, while some rituals powerfully create
social trust and solidarity, others are sites of conflict and contes-
tation.
Yet for all that, we live in a web of ritual behavior, whose
cumulative effect appears to be very much of the type that I have
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described. Ultimately, the reason for ritual's longevity and
ubiquity lies in the fact that it enables us to think, feel, and
communicate important things that cannot be done in any other
way. On a deeper level, all human beings must construct mean-
ings "in a world devoid of intrinsic meaning but subject to
causal laws, not all of which are known."425 Ritualization re-
mains perhaps the most basic and powerful way that we possess
in order to mediate between our symbolically constructed mean-
ings and the brute facts of life, constituting and framing our ra-
tional and emotional faculties. As such, ritual behavior ' will
probably continue in some form or other as long as our species
exists, and its significance, having been made explicit, must be
subject to serious discussion in the law.
425. RAPPAPORT, supra note 64, at 21.
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